


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
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
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DAILY BRIEF

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Cuba: The Castro regime appears to be speeding up the organization of its political machine, which is to be known as the United Party of the Socialist Revolution.

Several hundred local party cells have been formed throughout the country. These are now being organized into district committees. The formal completion of the organizing process, promised this year, is to occur at a still unscheduled First National Congress.

President Dorticos delivered a speech on 21 March to party adherents in the province of Camaguey-- the fourth such address by a leading regime official since 22 February, when Fidel Castro spoke before what he described as the first mass meeting of party members. Dorticos implied that the Cubans would not wholly follow the Soviet or Chinese models in organizing the party.

The party is evidently now being organized in a manner designed to prevent it from being influenced by any pre-existing political organization such as the veteran Cuban Communists' pre-Castro party. Castro's earlier effort to develop the party simply by merging the veteran Communists' party with two other "revolutionary" groups aborted a year ago after a group of veteran Communists led by Anibal Escalante had attempted to establish their domination of the party. Castro successfully resisted and Escalante was purged and exiled. Since then the remaining veteran Communist leaders appear to have accommodated themselves to Castro's leadership.

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DAILY BRIEF

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Iraq-Syria-UAR: (Differences between Nasir and Baath party leaders in the Iraqi and Syrian regimes appear unlikely to be resolved when the tripartite unity talks resume in Cairo this week.)

(Nasir realizes the Baath party is his rival and that it will not agree to his "dictated terms" for union, [redacted])

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What

Nasir wants, [redacted] boils down to Syria. The UAR President allegedly has taken the Baath-dominated coup in Syria as a personal defeat and considers a Syrian-Egyptian reunion as the essential first step toward greater Arab unity.)

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(The Iraqi and Syrian Baathists, on the other hand, are pressing for a confederation of the three states. Each state would retain its independent form of government, economy, laws and army. The centralized administration of the confederation would coordinate military operations and foreign affairs. The Baathists consider that the second step toward a broader Arab union would be the inclusion of Algeria and Yemen.)

(At the meetings earlier this month in Cairo, the Baath leaders refused to consider the return of Syria to the UAR. The Baathist negotiators also reportedly rejected Nasir's alternative suggestion of a union between Iraq and Syria because they regarded it as a maneuver designed to make the Baath appear as opposing the over-all Arab unity movement.)

[redacted]

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UK - UN - Southern Rhodesia: (Britain's refusal to intervene in Southern Rhodesia to achieve greater African participation in the government will draw increased attacks by the Afro-Asian and Communist blocs in the UN.)

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(The British have reiterated their inflexibility on this issue in the 24-member UN Decolonization Committee, claiming that London does not have legal authority to require constitutional revisions guaranteeing the rights of the African majority in Southern Rhodesia.)

(Britain's allies are concerned that this negative position may result in the whole question being transferred to a more important forum in the UN. The Tunisian delegate on the committee believes that the Security Council should consider the question as a "potential threat to the peace." The USSR has already urged that the matter be brought before the General Assembly during its special session in May.)

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NOTES

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South Korea: (The regime has announced that it will convene a conference of key government, civilian and military leaders beginning on 26 or 27 March to seek a solution to the current political crisis resulting from junta leader Pak Chong-hui's 16 March decision to extend military rule. Conditions for the conference are vague, however, and the invitation list is padded with numerous representatives of government-controlled public organizations. The top politicians who are demanding an early return to civilian government are likely to suspect a trap, and may hesitate to attend in the absence of a fuller explanation of the regime's intentions.)

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Chad: Tensions in Chad have been aggravated by President Tombalbaye's arrest on 22 March of the president of the National Assembly, a cabinet minister, and four other important northern Moslem leaders of his one-party regime. The arrests were triggered by recent efforts of the northern Moslem leaders to check the increasing predominance of pagan and Christian southern tribal elements. While Tombalbaye's actions will be widely resented by northerners, effective retaliation would be difficult as they are disorganized and southerners control the country's security forces. [REDACTED]

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DAILY BRIEF

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The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Counsel to the President

The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Under Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant Secretary of Defense

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

Commander in Chief, Atlantic

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director, The Joint Staff

The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Department of Justice

The Attorney General

The Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

The Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

The National Security Agency

The Director

The United States Information Agency

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