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2 April 1963




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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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
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Argentina: [There is growing doubt that the 23 June elections will be held on schedule.]

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[Redacted] if the parties do not reach a suitable election formula within the next several weeks, a military take-over might result.]

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[Redacted] [Meanwhile, civilian sentiment in favor of postponement of the elections is also reported to be growing. If President Guido feels that he is unable to resist these pressures, he might resign, as he has threatened in the past.]

[Peronist leader Matera's visit to Brazil on 30 March, reportedly to discuss the Argentine political situation with President Goulart, is likely to provoke increased resentment against the Peronists.]

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DAILY BRIEF

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South Korea: [Prospects for an early resolution of the political crisis are not good]

[Talks between junta leader Pak Chong-hui and two leading civilian politicians-- Yun Po-sun and Ho Chong--have reached an impasse. A complete breakdown was averted only by the establishment of a working-level group of representatives of the two sides to study Pak's proposals for an interim government.]

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[Ambassador Berger feels that events may be headed toward an "explosion," which would probably cause the regime to take repressive measures and probably, in view of the US stand against the military government, to instigate anti-American demonstrations.]

[Despite a recently staged show of military support for Pak, there is dissension within the armed forces.]

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NOTES

\*Syria: The unstable Syrian Government has been forced to resort to severe measures to suppress three days of pro-Nasir rioting. Pro-Nasir demonstrators, egged on by Cairo, took over Baathist demonstrations planned by the regime and were dispersed by troops and police with fire hoses, clubs, and gunfire. The appointment of the interior minister as deputy military governor in charge of all internal security and imposition of strict curfew indicates the government's determination to force a showdown with the Nasirites.

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[Redacted]

Yemen-Aden-UK: The chances of new clashes along the Yemeni - Aden Federation border appear to be growing. The Yemeni Government alleges that the British are arming royalist tribal elements recently driven out of Yemen. It has asked the US to deliver a note to the British demanding that they expel members of the deposed Yemeni royal family and their followers from Federation territory. The British, while not directly supporting royalist elements, have not prevented such Aden Federation leaders as the Sharif of Bayhan from clandestinely supplying them with small arms and ammunition.

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Yugoslavia - East Germany: Yugoslavia has rejected a formal request by East Germany that diplomatic representations be raised to the embassy level, according to a Yugoslav Foreign Ministry official. The Yugoslavs told the East Germans that the present state of relations did not justify higher diplomatic representation. Belgrade probably does not want to jeopardize the recent improvement in its relations with West Germany.

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[Redacted]

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DAILY BRIEF

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THE PRESIDENT

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Counsel to the President

The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Under Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant Secretary of Defense

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U. S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

Commander in Chief, Atlantic

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director, The Joint Staff

The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Department of Justice

The Attorney General

The Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

The Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

The National Security Agency

The Director

The United States Information Agency

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