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27 April 1963



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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27 April 1963


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***Cuba:** The Cuban Ministry of Armed Forces has been reorganized on a pattern closer to the Soviet system. Five vice-ministerial posts have been created, at least three of which are filled by men close to Fidel Castro and only one by an old-line Communist.

Juan Almeida Bosque, a close friend of Fidel Castro and former chief of staff of the Central Army, has been named first deputy minister of the Armed Forces Ministry. Almeida has never been regarded as being particularly effective, and his appointment was apparently made as a reward for his loyalty to Fidel.

Four other deputy ministers were also named. Sergio del Valle, chief of the Armed Forces General Staff, has been named deputy minister, chief of the General Staff. Del Valle is a "new" Communist who joined Fidel Castro's forces about two years before Castro's victory in 1959.

Jaoquin Ordoqui, an old-time Communist leader who was chief of supply on the Army General Staff, has been named deputy minister of the services department of the ministry. Ordoqui is also a member of the National Directorate of the Integrated Revolutionary Organizations. It appears that in the cases of Del Valle and Ordoqui their duties have not been changed but their posts have been integrated into the Ministry of the Armed Forces.

Efigenio Almejeiras, former chief of the National Police and a member of the Armed Forces

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General Staff, has been named deputy minister for "special affairs." Almejeiras, like Almeida, was one of the 12 who survived Fidel Castro's landing in Cuba in 1956. Belamino Castillo, a former staff member of the Eastern Army, was also appointed a deputy minister for "special affairs." The future duties of Almejeiras and Castillo are not known.

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*Cuba-USSR: (Fidel Castro is to be Moscow's honored guest for May Day. His arrival in the USSR early on 27 April by direct flight from Havana was preceded by more than a week of intensive Moscow propaganda efforts designed to assure him a massive welcome.)

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted] it was Castro's intention to make clear to Khrushchev that, while Cuba needs continued Soviet assistance, Soviet leaders must understand that Cuba will be no "docile satellite.")

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USSR: Khrushchev's remarks in his 24 April speech that he is 69 and cannot "forever" occupy his present posts have the effect of feeding recent rumors that he is planning to relinquish one of his leading positions. These remarks therefore will probably increase the prevailing sense of uneasiness within the party.

The principal economic theme of the speech was the need for greater industrial efficiency. Khrushchev ridiculed the Western press for stressing Soviet economic problems, but admitted that construction was going poorly again this year and called for a further tightening up of controls over investment.

While he gave no clear line on the trend in defense expenditures, he implied that rising costs of military hardware are a significant problem and exhorted the bureaucracy to be more concerned with reducing such costs. He strongly affirmed that the party intends to maintain its control over the military-industrial complex.

Khrushchev suggested that the regime may be preparing an even greater crack-down on economic crime and showed continuing concern over the problem of nonconformist intellectuals. He admitted that "some of our people" question the role of authority in society, demand greater individual freedom, and envy the "free society" of the West.

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Sino-Soviet Relations: (In connection with its efforts to develop pro-Chinese factions in foreign Communist parties, Peiping has begun a new program to promote contacts with anti-Soviet elements in the Western parties.)

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[redacted] the Paris office of the Chinese Communist news agency was given instructions on 10 April about this program, and was asked--among other things--to recruit translators for immediate work in Peiping. The Paris office plans to link its subversive effort in the French party with Chinese activities that have already been initiated in the Italian party.)

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(The receipt of these instructions after the 30 March Soviet letter proposing bilateral talks reinforces other indications that the Chinese Communists have no intention of slowing their campaign against Moscow.)

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East Germany: The East German population, already resentful of heavier work pressures to make up plan lags, will be further irritated by the regime's admission that it has food supply difficulties.

Party leader Ulbricht warned in an open letter on 20 April that present agricultural production is not sufficient to assure steady and better food supplies. Heavy food imports have been planned for this year, but Ulbricht warned that his regime cannot continually import meat and other foods in excess of plans.

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(Despite these difficulties, the Council of Ministers is reported to have passed a secret decree reducing economic plans for domestic production of consumer goods, including food, in order to concentrate more heavily on industrial development.)

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West Germany: (The Bonn cabinet on 24 April approved West German participation in the proposed NATO multilateral nuclear force (MLF).)


(According to a Foreign Ministry official, the cabinet agreed to accept for the present a force employing surface vessels, and the rule of unanimity in the control of the force. The cabinet's decision, however, was made on the understanding that the possibility will remain open for evolution of the MLF along lines favored by West Germany. Bonn favors shifting to submarines at a later date, and to majority rule.)

(The official said Bonn expects to pay at least 30 percent of the costs of the force, but believes that for political reasons the US share should be larger than that paid by the Germans.)


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Malaysia: (A formula for easing tensions among Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines over the proposed Malaysia federation is being quietly advanced by U Thant's Chef de Cabinet Narasimhan.)

(The plan allows formation of Malaysia on schedule by 31 August. The new federation would have administrative control of the Borneo territories, but the question of sovereignty over them would be held in abeyance pending a plebiscite to be held within two years under UN auspices. Narasimhan hopes the formula can be introduced at the tripartite ministerial talks scheduled for mid-May.)

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(Narasimhan apparently has gained the support of Philippine President Macapagal, and is to seek Sukarno's backing when he visits Djakarta on 28-30 April. Sukarno may well accept the formula in the belief that Indonesia could use the interval before the plebiscite to bring about a result in favor of independence.)

(The main difficulty is likely to come from Malaya. Narasimhan claims that he can persuade Prime Minister Rahman of the plan's merits, but both Malayan and British authorities have previously expressed apprehension over granting a plebiscite in the Borneo territories. They fear that a basic desire for independence, further stimulated by Indonesia, might result in rejection of Malaysia and upset the delicate racial balance underlying the present plans.)

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
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NOTES

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*Cyprus: A new constitutional court ruling on the politically explosive municipal administration issue raises the possibility of renewed violence between Greek and Turkish communities. The ruling voided recent actions of both communities in setting up rival administrations and leaves the five major towns on the island without any legally established local government organs. Faced with this impasse, both factions will probably seek a compromise solution before the situation further deteriorates.

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Brazil: Gradual Communist-inspired efforts at communizing the state of Pernambuco and its institutions show an increasing tempo, according to the American consul general in Recife. Pro-Communist Governor Miguel Arraes recently stated,

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"We can socialize Brazil and then detach it from the West without the Americans becoming hysterical, without their waking up to the fact, and without their intervening militarily, if we do it slowly, gradually, and quietly."

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
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