

TOP SECRET

25X1



29 April 1963

25X1




Copy No. *E 1-4*

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



25X1



State Dept. review completed

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

TOP SECRET

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/08/05 : CIA-RDP79T00975A007000040001-9

Approved For Release 2003/08/05 : CIA-RDP79T00975A007000040001-9

29 April 1963

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CONTENTS

25X1



- 3. South Vietnam: Viet Cong step up military activity. (Page 4)

25X1




- 5. Cuba-USSR: Moscow's welcome to Castro is part of all-out effort to dispel any lingering resentment over missile crisis. (Page 6)

- 6. Sweden: New foreign minister's statement fails to show anticipated shift toward West. (Page 7)

25X1

- 7. Notes:  Turkey-Greece-Cyprus; UK-USSR;  (Page 8)

25X1




25X1


Approved For Release 2003/08/05 : CIA-RDP79T00975A007000040001-9

Next 4 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2003/08/05 : CIA-RDP79T00975A007000040001-9



25X1



25X1

South Vietnam: The Viet Cong have stepped up the tempo and scale of their attacks in the past two weeks.

The number of Communist attacks in the week ending 22 April, reported at 128, was the highest weekly total since last June. Included were major offensives in the northern coastal province of Quang Ngai as well as two company-size actions east of Saigon. Communist pressure has since been maintained throughout the country with larger strikes, including at least one and probably two battalion-size attacks on government posts, in the southern-most province.


In the largest single attack in several months a Communist force, estimated at two battalions, on 27 April inflicted heavy casualties on a large government unit in the central province of Kontum.

The Viet Cong offensives suggest a continued ability to mount effective, coordinated actions throughout the country. The campaign may be an effort to undercut the psychological effect of Diem's amnesty program, recently launched on the first anniversary of South Vietnam's strategic hamlet program.

While government troops reported highly successful counteraction in Quang Ngai, claiming to have inflicted nearly 400 casualties, they failed to engage the large Viet Cong concentrations in the south which apparently dispersed rapidly after attacking. (Map)

25X1

25X1



29 Apr 63

DAILY BRIEF

4

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/08/05 : CIA-RDP79T00975A007000040001-9

Approved For Release 2003/08/05 : CIA-RDP79T00975A007000040001-9

Cuba-USSR: The massive Red Square welcome given Castro on 28 April is part of Moscow's all-out effort to counteract the lingering resentment he probably still harbors over Soviet actions during the missile crisis.

The presence of Minister of Economy Boti in Castro's entourage suggests that the Cuban and Soviet leaders are likely to discuss matters relating to economic assistance. Also accompanying Castro are Deputy Minister and Chief of Staff Sergio del Valle and other military aides.

25X1 25X1

There is no evidence to support press speculation that Castro is to travel on to Communist China.

25X1

[redacted] Algeria is to be the only stop after Moscow.

The US Embassy in Algiers expects Castro to arrive there on or about 12 May, although no dates have been officially announced. Algerian Premier Ben Bella told Ambassador Porter on 26 April that it was Castro who had initiated the idea of the visit to Algeria. Castro probably will return to Cuba by the end of May. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

[redacted]

Sweden: The first official policy statement of Foreign Minister Torsten Nilsson, made on 23 April, suggests he is unlikely to give Sweden's historic neutrality policy a more pro-Western orientation--something many observers anticipated when he took office last September.

Nilsson avoided any phraseology helpful to US positions, e. g., on disarmament, and did not say anything which might annoy Moscow. An official of the Soviet Embassy in Stockholm expressed great satisfaction with the statement, which included a strong endorsement of "peaceful coexistence," even though this was defined in terms of an "open society." Nilsson interpreted the Cuban crisis in such a way as to prove the current importance of the nuclear-free-zones plan of former Foreign Minister Uden.

The US Embassy in Stockholm comments that the most charitable explanation of the statement is the desire to pave the way for a hearty welcome for Nilsson next month in Moscow. Nilsson also apparently desired to mollify Uden's left wing of the ruling Social Democratic Party. A Swedish official said that Nilsson would act more independently later but for the time being had to nod to Uden.

25X1

25X1

29 Apr 63

DAILY BRIEF


7

25X1

25X1

NOTES


25X1



Turkey-Greece-Cyprus: Anti-Turkish feeling is still running high in Greece, even though Cyprus President Makarios' moderate response to last week's court ruling which nullified ethnic municipal councils on Cyprus may pave the way for a compromise solution of that problem. A major issue is Turkish delay in issuing a passport to the Greek Orthodox patriarch of Istanbul, Athenagoras, who wishes to take part in religious ceremonies in Greece. The Greeks widely suspect that this delay is politically inspired, and their emotional public discussion of it may further harden the Turkish position on all questions relating to relations with Greece.

25X1

25X1




UK-USSR: Negotiations which may lead to a break in Western restrictions on the sale of large-diameter pipe to the USSR are being continued by a British firm in Moscow. There is no indication that the British Government will retreat from its position that it has no legal authority to stop shipments. The government of Japan, which as a non-member of NATO did not participate in the "embargo" decision, indicates it expects extreme pressure to permit resumption of pipe sales.

25X1

25X1



25X1



29 Apr 63

DAILY BRIEF

8

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/08/05 : CIA-RDP79T00975A007000040001-9

Approved For Release 2003/08/05 : CIA-RDP79T00975A007000040001-9

Approved For Release 2003/08/05 : CIA-RDP79T00975A007000040001-9

THE PRESIDENT

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Counsel to the President

The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Under Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant Secretary of Defense

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

Commander in Chief, Atlantic

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director, The Joint Staff

The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Department of Justice

The Attorney General

The Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

The Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

The National Security Agency

The Director

The United States Information Agency

The Director

The National Indications Center

The Director

Approved For Release 2003/08/05 : CIA-RDP79T00975A007000040001-9

Approved For Release 2003/08/05 : CIA-RDP80-01070A0007000040001-9

TOP SECRET

Approved For Release 2003/08/05 : CIA-RDP80-01070A0007000040001-9

TOP SECRET