


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18 May 1963

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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*Cuba: (Earlier this month the Cuban Government assigned an officer to Paris to direct recruitment of industrial and agricultural technicians there and in several other Western European countries.)

(The officer, Armando Garcia Otero, has indicated that he was personally selected for the post by Minister of Industries Che Guevara and that he is to act independently of the Cuban embassies in Europe. He said his assignment is to recruit in France, West Germany, and the Benelux countries, and that two other Cuban officials have been selected for similar assignments in London and in Rome.)

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(Garcia says he was told that he may use his own discretion whether to seek assistance from European Communist parties in locating suitable technicians. Candidates should be "progressives," but not necessarily Communists.)

(The program to recruit Western technicians, decided upon by the Castro regime last February, is evidently designed to supplement--not replace--technicians from the Soviet bloc. The campaign is [redacted] high on Castro's personal list of priorities, and appears to be an effort to compensate for the thousands of trained Cubans who have left their country in the past several years.) [redacted]

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DAILY BRIEF

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Soviet Bloc: (The first secretaries of all Soviet bloc parties are to meet in Moscow in June, [redacted] to consider a number of unresolved problems. This meeting, if it is held, will be the first since June 1962.)

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[redacted] is attaching a great deal of importance to this year's meeting, which is expected "to significantly affect the [redacted] economy." It seems likely that the first secretaries will discuss outstanding problems of economic integration, particularly the recent resistance of Rumanian leaders to certain plans of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA.)

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[redacted] (The meeting would probably follow the important Soviet party plenum on ideology, which is scheduled to begin on 18 June. The USSR's attempts to restrain its more liberal intellectuals have caused repercussions in most of the satellite regimes, and new ideological formulations which are developed at the Soviet party plenum may also be discussed at the first secretaries' meeting.)

(The bloc party bosses would probably also be briefed on planned Soviet tactics toward the Chinese Communists. The Soviet leaders will want to demonstrate the unity of their East European followers before they open negotiations with the Chinese on 5 July.)

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*UAR-Syria: The line now being taken by the controlled Cairo press in its attacks on the Syrian Baath Party may foreshadow an end to Egypt's union negotiations with Syria and Iraq.

On 17 May Nasir's press declared that Egypt cannot deal with the Syrian Baath in forming the new United Arab Republic. One paper accuses the Baath of having "completely violated" the Cairo unity proclamation of 17 April.

An editor close to Nasir has written that relations between Egypt and the Baath have reached "the point of no return" and that the Egyptians cannot "even live with it in peace."

The regimes in Damascus and Baghdad continue to proclaim their firm intention to proceed with unification measures, although they oppose taking practical steps in that direction which would increase Nasir's influence.

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USSR-Iraq: Moscow is renewing its economic activity in Iraq, apparently in response to indications that the new government intends to make relatively few changes in the Soviet aid program.

An unknown number of technicians left after Qasim's fall, but some--probably replacements--are now arriving. Shipments of industrial equipment for a number of development projects are being expedited. Although Iraq apparently will cancel some proposed Soviet projects, it appears that a steel plant--one of several major projects still under review--will in fact be built with Soviet assistance.

The Soviet military aid program also has been under review by the Iraqi Government. Some military shipments are continuing and at least [] MIG-21 jet aircraft are scheduled for June delivery. However, Baghdad apparently has not yet decided how large a Soviet surface-to-air missile program it wants. []

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***Dominican Republic:** President Bosch appears to be facing some risk of losing the support of major elements of his Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD) because of friction with PRD president Angel Miolan.

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[redacted] Miolan, a leftist who has ambitions to succeed Bosch, has threatened to lead the PRD into opposition unless Bosch replaces certain "reactionary" cabinet members, including Foreign Minister Freites. Miolan is presently in the US, and apparently has given Bosch an ultimatum that he will do this unless cabinet changes are made soon after he returns to the Dominican Republic.

Bosch has been relying heavily upon Miolan as party chief and political troubleshooter, but apparently distrusts him. Any significant challenge to Bosch's leadership from within his own party, would probably lead to renewal of political unrest.

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[redacted]

Indonesia: (Sporadic rioting against local Chinese merchants in western Java continues to create difficulties for the Indonesian Government.)

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(The government still appears uncertain as to the real cause of the outbreaks. They may originally have been a genuine expression of economic distress, but there are reports that rightist army elements and nationalistic students are now promoting the riots to show their strength and embarrass Sukarno.)

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]
[Redacted]
the rioting must be carefully controlled to avoid serious spontaneous attacks by "have-nots" against "haves" in the area.)

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Common Market: (The US ambassador to the EEC reports "disquieting signs" that the Common Market is increasingly "soft" in its support of the most-favored-nation principle in negotiating commercial arrangements with countries on the EEC's periphery. In recent talks with the EEC, both Turkey and Iran have succeeded in obtaining preliminary agreement of the EEC to give preferred access for additional export items. Ambassador Tuthill believes the EEC is now more vulnerable to such pressures because it is eager to accomplish something tangible in the foreign relations field.) (

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The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

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Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

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The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

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