


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* Kashmir: (The Indian Government now has officially ruled out as impractical any third-party mediation of the Kashmir dispute at the present time because of Pakistan's growing closeness with Communist China.)

(Nehru's return to a hard line on the Kashmir issue--a safe political position in India--presumably results from his unwillingness to risk his prestige on mediation at a time when his government is under fire in Parliament on a variety of other issues.)

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(In his letter to President Kennedy on the subject, Nehru said he was changing his mind on the US-sponsored mediation proposal because of the deterioration of Indian-Pakistani relations and Pakistan's "threats to act in concert with China against India." His decision, however, will add further to the deterioration and make it that much more difficult to establish the "better climate" which he contends is necessary for such a mediation effort.)

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Dominican Republic: (President Bosch plans several changes in his cabinet in late August, and perhaps other moves, aimed at staving off the growing possibility of a coup.)

(Bosch probably will replace several ministers who are generally acknowledged to be incompetent or otherwise unacceptable. He may bring members of other parties, possibly the left-of-center Revolutionary Social Christian Party, into the government. However, he continues to refuse to restrict growing Communist political activity. Opposition charges on this score are frequently aimed at fostering an atmosphere favorable to a coup, but the US Embassy has reported that many Dominicans are genuinely concerned.)

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(A three-man commission of respected Dominicans is trying to mediate between Bosch and opposition leaders, a move which could give Bosch valuable time and help ease public tension.)

(Bosch's willingness to make needed cabinet changes, coupled with prompt action on reform, might help to restore public confidence. His stand on Communism, however, could be the crucial issue on which his regime will stand or fall.)

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Congo (Brazzaville): Rioting broke out in Brazzaville on 13 August as a result of a general strike protesting the one-man rule of President Youlou, who now faces a major crisis.

Youlou was aware of the growing discontent among labor leaders during the past two months. He had sought to pacify them by announcing that he would form a single party with collective leadership on 15 August, Congo's independence day. In the face of further demands from the dissidents, Youlou announced that representatives from all major interests in the country would convene to set up provisional agencies to devise a new constitutional structure.

Trade union leaders, apparently dissatisfied with the role offered them in this procedure, called the general strike despite government warnings against such action. Labor's demands include the establishment of a single party with strong labor participation, an all-powerful political bureau, and a new constitution under which Youlou's power would be greatly reduced.

The chief of staff of the Congolese Army stated last week that his forces could not control widespread rioting without outside assistance. He indicated that he would hesitate to seek assistance from French Army units, however, because they contain large numbers of African troops.

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UN-Congo: (The Congo Army's initial success in occupying the Katangan town of Kasenga, following limited engagements with remnants of Tshomé's gendarmerie, will probably strengthen U Thant's determination to withdraw UN troops from the Congo by the end of this year. The US Embassy in Leopoldville is concerned that the uncertainty of the UN role after 31 December will destroy the UN forces' usefulness even before that date.)

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Pakistan: (Some opposition leaders are reportedly pressing former Prime Minister Suhrawardy, who is in London in poor health, to return home and re-establish his leadership over the badly divided opposition parties. They think--probably mistakenly--that they can exploit growing internal and external pressures on Ayub without provoking another crackdown on political activity. Many of these politicians are dropping the anti-Western line they have taken in recent months and now oppose Ayub's rapprochement with Communist China on the ground that it might lead the US to cut off aid.)

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