


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
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9 September 1963

DAILY BRIEF

South Vietnam: The situation remains tense despite government efforts to give the impression that conditions are returning to normal.

The regime has intimated that it intends to lift martial law shortly. However, the antigovernment demonstrations by high school students in Saigon on 7 September will probably have the effect of prolonging the emergency restrictions.

(Coups plotting reportedly continues within the military, particularly in the specialized units. Rumors that the government plans cabinet changes suggest an effort to placate dissatisfied military elements, and to give the appearance of willingness to broaden its base of support. *On the other hand, the rumors could forecast a move to replace some cabinet members with officials whose loyalty to Diem is above suspicion.)

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In the countryside, most aspects of the war effort seem little affected by the crisis. Government military operations in August were sustained at close to July's high rate.

An increase in the number of Viet Cong attacks in the past two weeks reflects no change in tactics. They may be actions originally planned to disrupt the National Assembly elections which were scheduled for 31 August, but postponed because of martial law.

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Malaysia: Internal squabbling and Indonesian hostility continue to darken the prospects of the Malaysia federation which is scheduled to be formed on 16 September.

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(Singapore's Prime Minister Lee is threatening to seek independence outside the Malaysia framework unless Singapore's demands with respect to tariffs and other issues are met.) Malayan Prime Minister Rahman, in turn, has warned that he will cut relations with Singapore, "regardless of consequences," unless Lee acts more temperately. Rahman has also accused Sarawak of highhandedness for insisting on a local tribal candidate to be its first governor rather than accepting a Malay.

These quarrels provide Djakarta new encouragement for undercutting Malaysia. Indonesia has now clearly indicated it will reject a finding by Secretary General U Thant, expected later this week, that the peoples of Sarawak and North Borneo are in favor of joining Malaysia. Indonesian leaders, however, apparently are undecided on the political course of action to take, and it is uncertain whether or not they will introduce the Malaysia question into the UN General Assembly.

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NOTES

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[redacted] USSR-Egypt: [redacted] The Soviet ship Sergei Botkin delivered [redacted] additional MIG-21 jet fighters for the UAR Air Force on 5 September. [redacted] These aircraft, as well as [redacted] other MIG-21s delivered late last month, probably are part of a Soviet-Egyptian arms deal concluded in June. At least [redacted] MIG-21 fighters have been delivered to the UAR during the past year and a half.

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[redacted]

South Korea: One-time security chief Kim Chae-chun's abrupt exile from Korea on 7 September marks another setback for junta moderates. Just prior to his departure, Kim had a series of meetings with the dominant Kim Chong-pil group at which he presumably was coerced into leaving or perhaps was bought off. In a departing statement, Kim announced his withdrawal from the Liberal Democratic Party and dissociated himself from that party's recent nomination of Song Yo-chan, an outspoken critic of the regime, for the presidency. [redacted]

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DAILY BRIEF

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Congo (Brazzaville): Important elements in the Congo are dissatisfied with the Massamba-Debat provisional regime, and many of them appear to favor the return of deposed President Youlou, according to the American Embassy. Most of this opposition is tribal, but it also extends into the labor and youth movements as well as the army. The embassy feels that the opposition groups are not united and that the regime may thus be able to remain in power by playing them off against each other.

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Somali Republic: There is increasing public dissatisfaction over the Abdirascid government's inability to obtain concessions in the territorial disputes with Ethiopia, Britain, and Kenya. Abdirascid, unhappy at the failure of recent talks in Rome on the subject and anxious to shore up his prestige, may take a more aggressive propaganda line on the issue of a "greater Somalia." He may also authorize substantial assistance to Somali dissidents in Ethiopia and Kenya.

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Greece: The major non-Communist opposition party in Greece, the Center Union, is still threatening to boycott next November's national elections unless Premier Pipinelis' caretaker cabinet is replaced by one that is more politically neutral.

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the Center Union may attack the monarchy itself if the King fails to dismiss Pipinelis. Representatives of the Communist-front United Democratic Left, meanwhile, are participating in Center Union rallies and meeting with opposition leaders in pursuit of their long-sought goal of a popular front.

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DAILY BRIEF

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The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

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U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

Commander in Chief, Atlantic

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director, The Joint Staff

The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

* The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Department of Justice

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