


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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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
26 April 1965

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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2. Dominican Republic: Military leaders opposed to Bosch appear to be gaining over pro-Bosch elements. (Page 3)
3. India-Pakistan: Situation more ominous as result of increased fighting in Rann of Kutch. (Page 4)
4. USSR: Report for first quarter shows continued sluggishness in economy. (Page 6)
5. Note: Yemen. (Page 7)



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*Dominican Republic: (Information as of 0430 EDT)
Military leaders opposed to the return of former president Bosch appear to be gaining the ascendancy over pro-Bosch elements in the army who engineered the 24-25 April coup.

Serious civil violence is a distinct possibility, however, before the situation is stabilized. The army rebels are receiving militant civilian support in the capital where Bosch still retains important popular support. Well-organized Communist and other extremist groups, as well as Bosch's own Dominican Revolutionary Party, were quick to lend their support to the army rebels. These groups evidently control most of the weapons that were indiscriminately handed out to groups of civilians by the rebels yesterday.

Ranking military leaders, who were unwilling yesterday to defend President Reid's government in the face of the determined effort against him by junior army officers, quickly came to recognize the Communist threat after his resignation. The air force chief of staff, General de los Santos, gained the backing of ranking army and navy officers for a decision to fight rather than to accede to the rebel demand that Bosch immediately be recalled from exile in Puerto Rico and reinstated as president.

[redacted] military leaders were trying to form a military junta acceptable to most elements in the armed forces to govern the country until presidential elections could be held.

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
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
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INDIA AND PAKISTAN



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26 Apr 65 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map

India-Pakistan: The situation in the desolate Rann of Kutch has grown more ominous as a result of a sharp upswing in fighting.

The pattern of intermittent firing and patrol activity was broken last week by a step-up in artillery exchanges and, on 21 April, by a Pakistani attack on an Indian post some 20 miles east of the scene of clashes earlier this month. [redacted] Pakistani forces returned to the attack on the 24th in the original area of confrontation but were beaten back.

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Pakistan has admitted the 21 April attack, but claims it was pre-emptive and denies the Indian charge that tanks were used. The status of fighting on the 24th is less clear, but intermittent firing was reported continuing through the 25th.

Both sides have considerably stiffened their negotiating terms for a cease-fire as each has become increasingly hobbled by its own rhetoric and by considerations of face. This is particularly true on the Indian side where parliament is in session.

*The Indian Defense Minister said today he had ordered an alert of the Indian armed forces, but Indian reports of full mobilization on the Pakistani side are unsubstantiated.

[Precise strength figures on both sides are not known. However, each side could probably bring 6,000-7,000 men to bear on very short notice. In addition, Pakistan has probably deployed at least 36 medium tanks (one regiment) to the general area.]

The subject of US-supplied materiel has again arisen in a charge by the Indian Army chief about Pakistan's alleged use of American-supplied tanks. He presumably hopes that American intercession on this question can ease pressures on him to reply in

(continued)

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kind. The nature of the terrain on his side, the distance his tanks must travel to get there [and the poor condition of his armored corps] would put him at a considerable disadvantage.

As a result of the incidents in the Rann of Kutch, pressure may mount in India to pick a more favorable spot along the border for retaliation.

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USSR: Later and more detailed information on the Soviet economic plan report for the first quarter of 1965 shows no change in the sluggish performance of the past few years.

The text reveals that the claimed nine percent increase in industrial production [redacted] is largely attributable to the recovery of the processed food industry. This sector of the economy turned in an exceptionally poor performance during the first quarter of last year because of the grain disaster in 1963.

A continuation of the slowdown in growth rates for heavy industry was recorded. The rate of increase in machine building output, including production of military hardware, is less than one half the rates claimed as late as 1960-62, and now stands at the lowest figure since the Korean war years, 1951-52. In addition, light industrial manufacturing failed to register any improvement over its low performance of last year.

While observing that the industrial plan was fulfilled only "as a whole," the report criticizes the "significant number" of enterprises that failed to meet their plan target. [redacted]

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NOTE

Yemen: Premier Numan has succeeded in putting together a cabinet composed largely of "third-force" anti-Egyptian republicans. The new minister of interior is a major tribal leader, and Numan will attempt to gain further tribal support for his government at a conference of northern tribes scheduled to be held shortly. Elements who feel their future is bound up with a continued Egyptian presence in Yemen have distributed pamphlets in Taiz attacking Numan, but significant opposition to the new government has not yet developed.

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THE PRESIDENT

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Counsel to the President

The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Under Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant Secretary of Defense

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

Commander in Chief, Atlantic

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Department of Justice

The Attorney General

The Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

The Administrator

The Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

The National Security Agency


The Director

The United States Information Agency

The Director

The National Indications Center

The Director



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