


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
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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

State Department review  
completed

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE  
RELATING TO NATIONAL SECURITY



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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\*Dominican Republic: (Information as of 4:30 AM EDT) Loyalist leader Imbert's move yesterday to increase his domestic and foreign support has placed the rebels on the defensive.

On Tuesday the loyalist Government of National Reconstruction (GNR) announced its willingness to let the Organization of American States (OAS) set the date and make all arrangements for free elections. According to the communique, all democratic parties recognized by the national elections board would participate. Presumably this would include former President Bosch's Dominican Revolutionary Party and Joaquin Balaguer's Reformist Party. Members of the GNR would not be candidates in the elections.

The proposal is likely to be vetoed by the rebels since it carries an exclusive Imbert stamp and does not deal with the question of getting rebel leader Caamano's agreement. It also fails to specify the nature of any provisional government to serve during an interim period.

Both sides also agreed yesterday to the neutralization of the area around the National Palace. This agreement, which will go into effect at 12:00 noon EDT today, has lessened the possibility of renewed fighting in that area.

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Meanwhile, the OAS has voted to send a three-member committee of mediators to the Dominican Republic. The committee reportedly will be composed of representatives of the United States, El Salvador and Brazil.

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\*Vietnam: (Information as of 4:30 AM EDT)

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Air Strikes in North Vietnam: On 1 June US aircraft inflicted heavy damage on a railway yard, an ammunition depot and a major bridge. Armed route reconnaissance missions also achieved good results against a variety of targets. Two RF8A planes and one pilot were lost to ground fire during post-strike photoreconnaissance missions.

US Air Force planes again attacked the Hoai An ammunition depot 45 miles south of Hanoi and reported damage to 90 percent of the installation.

US Navy aircraft struck the Vinh railway yards, damaging the passenger terminal and adjacent tracks. One RF8A aircraft was lost but the pilot was picked up at sea. US Navy aircraft also dropped one span of the Dong Phong Thuong rail and highway bridge with air-to-surface missiles. An RF8A and pilot were lost in this attack.

US Air Force armed route reconnaissance missions reported sinking a patrol boat and a ferry, destroying or severely damaging three bridges, and damaging a truck refueling area and a barracks. US Navy aircraft conducted numerous strikes on seven probable naval vessels camouflaged along the banks of the Gianh River. Five were reported destroyed and two damaged.


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Communist Political Developments: An article in the Peiping People's Daily on 1 June takes a more threatening tone than previous warnings to the US in connection with Vietnam, suggesting that the Chinese anticipate increased North Vietnamese intervention in the south and hope by their warnings to deter the US from countermoves. Peiping does not, however, go beyond existing commitments to aid the Vietnamese Communists.

The People's Daily article enumerates recent US moves to increase pressure on Communist forces and claims that "in all likelihood" the US will escalate to a "Korea-type localized war." Terming this a "dramatic change" in the situation, the article declares that it requires warning to the US in "plain unequivocal terms."

In an implied threat that the Communists may react elsewhere in the area, the 1 June article asserts that US moves have made a "farce" of the boundaries between Laos, Vietnam and Thailand. This represents a closer linking of Thailand to the Vietnam problem than has previously been made by Peiping.

The Military Situation in South Vietnam: A major government operation is underway in pursuit of the Viet Cong regimental-sized force which over the weekend inflicted heavy losses on three government battalions around the headquarters post of Ba Gia in Quang Ngai Province. So far, however, the operation, involving five government battalions, has reported no contact with the withdrawing enemy units. Meanwhile, a Viet Cong squad early yesterday penetrated the defenses of Quang Ngai town, attacked the provincial police headquarters with grenades and explosives, and wounded one policeman.

In Pleiku Province, southwest of Quang Ngai, the Viet Cong yesterday ambushed an army convoy moving to relieve a district headquarters under attack near the Cambodian border area. Two US army advisers with the convoy were killed and a third wounded.

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Political Developments in South Vietnam: The conflict in Saigon over Premier Quat's cabinet reshuffle continues at an impasse despite further pressure on Chief of State Suu yesterday to withdraw his legalistic objections to two still unconfirmed appointees. Quat and the chairman of the National Legislative Council, General Chieu, reportedly detected some give in Suu's position late yesterday, but Suu has on several recent occasions retracted what appeared to be partial concessions. Barring any sudden breakthrough, Premier Quat plans to take his case before the public today, offering to withdraw his two nominees, and placing the onus squarely on Suu for any adverse effect on future government performance.

Suu, meanwhile, remains under heavy pressure from militant Catholic circles who yesterday repeated their demands for Quat's replacement. There are signs that they may draw support from South Vietnam's principal labor union, which believes the government is favoring its rivals.

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USSR - North Korea: The agreement on Soviet military aid to North Korea, announced on 31 May, provides further evidence of Moscow's determination to reassert its influence in Asia at the expense of Peiping. ↙

This is the first public announcement of such a program for North Korea. Pyongyang received substantial military assistance from Moscow prior to 1961. In that year aid was apparently reduced as North Korea moved closer to Peiping in the Sino-Soviet dispute. [The last known Soviet shipments were delivered in late 1962, although some items may have been provided since.]

The promise of Russian assistance "to strengthen further the defense potential of the DPRK" follows Soviet claims of success in improving relations with Pyongyang. Unlike the Chinese, the Korean leaders since Khrushchev's ouster last fall have refrained from the vehement anti-Soviet attacks they launched when he was in power.

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Egypt: Nasir's speech of 31 May on the Palestine problem suggests that he is on the defensive in his relations with the other Arab states.

The speech was largely an apologia for Egypt's failure to retaliate for recent Israeli strikes against Syria and Jordan. Nasir in effect committed himself to a continuing nonviolent confrontation with Israel. He revealed a deep-seated fear of war and warned that the road to Palestine "is not strewn with flowers; it is covered with blood."

The Egyptian president rebutted his critics by stating that Arab action can come only after achievement of Arab unity, which is now prevented by internal dissension and conflict of interest. He noted that the present military capabilities of some Arab states are inadequate for even defensive purposes.

Nasir pointed out that with 50,000 Egyptian troops committed to the Arab cause in Yemen he is in no position to undertake an offense against Israel. He also contended that Egypt was severely handicapped by the willingness of the "imperialist" countries to supply arms to Israel while bringing economic pressure on Egypt.

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Bolivia: The military hierarchy seems uncertain how best to implement reform measures in the nationalized mines.

Junta co-president Barrientos is determined to push ahead with a thorough overhaul of the mine system and the ousting of leftist-extremist mine union leaders. He has indicated that force will be used if necessary to enforce mine reform decrees which went into effect yesterday.

Other junta members and public opinion appear to support Barrientos. [redacted]

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The truce agreement called for withdrawal by 29 May of all troops from those mines that had been occupied.

Both General Ovando, the other co-president, and army commander La Fuente have stated publicly that troop retirement would, in fact, take place as soon as the miners ended their strike. La Fuente, however, denied that further conditions for a withdrawal--such as the surrender of extremist union leaders and the miners' weapons--were contemplated.

To date, no general withdrawal has been ordered by the government despite the fact that most miners have returned to work. [redacted]

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France-Canada: [Paris is refusing to accept any restrictions on the use of uranium oxide it is presently negotiating to buy from Canada.]

[A Foreign Ministry official has indicated that France will not be budged from its position that there will be no deal unless the Canadians give the French equal treatment with that given the US and UK. Canada does not require either country to meet the safeguard provisions which require that the uranium be used only for peaceful purposes.]

[In an attempt to meet French demands for non-discriminatory treatment, Canada has proposed to Washington and London that all future contracts for Canadian uranium contain inspection safeguards. It is questionable, however, whether France would find even this arrangement acceptable. Prime Minister Pompidou told Canadian Trade Minister Sharp in late May that the French would not accept controls "in any form."]

[Officials in Ottawa have frequently indicated that domestic pressures are pushing the Pearson government to try to break the impasse. Paris is feeding these pressures by asserting that it has uranium reserves that will last until 1970 and that alternative sources of supply are available.]

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NOTE

France-NATO: France has officially informed the US that it opposes construction of a proposed permanent SHAPE headquarters near Paris. Top French officials were reportedly surprised in April to learn that NATO had plans for such a building. The timing of the French decision to oppose the new construction was probably dictated by the circumstances of this particular case, and does not necessarily reflect a change in De Gaulle's apparent intent to put off direct moves against NATO until after the presidential elections at the end of this year.

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