


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
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2 November 1965

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

C O N T E N T S

[Redacted]

25X1

2. Indonesia: The army's campaign against the Communists in Central Java continues. (Page 3)
3. Cyprus: Greece and Cyprus apparently are testing US and Turkish reaction to possible installation of Soviet SAMs on Cyprus. (Page 4)
4. Notes: Dominican Republic; Sudan; [Redacted] (Page 5)

25X1


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Next 3 Page(s) In Document Exempt

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2 Nov 65 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map



Indonesia: The army's campaign against the Communists in Central Java continues.

The army claims to have killed, captured, or arrested hundreds of Communist youths in the area during the past week. Yesterday Sukarno confirmed the earlier declaration of a "state of war" by the Central Java military command. Sukarno had been reluctant to take public note of armed Communist activity.

[redacted] the army believes it can control the military aspect of the Communist problem, at least for the present. The army doubts that the Communists are in a position to wage a serious guerrilla campaign.]

[redacted] the army's major concern now is the country's basic social and economic problems, which contribute to the growth of Communist strength. Most immediately, the army is uncertain of how to deal with the thousands of persons who lost their jobs after the 30 September coup attempt because of their Communist connections. Some means must be found to secure them employment and prevent the Communists from exploiting their disaffection.]

Economic prospects have been dimmed by a protracted dry season which has delayed the planting of rice and corn in Java. The critical time will come during January-March, when rice will be in short supply. Unless grain imports offset the expected shortage, the Communists will have another issue to exploit.

2 Nov 65

3

Cyprus: [Greece and] Cyprus appear to be testing US and Turkish reaction to the possible installation of Soviet surface-to-air missiles on Cyprus.

In a speech on 28 October the president of the Cypriot House of Representatives claimed that Cyprus must have "antiaircraft rockets" for defense against Turkey. This appears to be the latest in a series of statements by Cypriot officials seeking to justify the importation of Soviet missiles. [Acting on instructions from Athens, the Greek ambassador on 29 October gave the US seven reasons why Greece should help Cyprus install the SA-2s.]

Last winter the USSR shipped a number of missiles to Egypt for transshipment to Cyprus. Athens, apparently fearful of possible US and Turkish reactions to their installation, blocked delivery from Egypt. [The Greeks may now feel that they must support Greek Cypriot revival of the issue or lose their influence on the island.]

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2 Nov 65

4

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NOTES

Dominican Republic: Garcia Godoy hopes to announce on 3 November a "package" which will include changes in the military high command, removal of several leftist officials such as Attorney General Morel, and departure from the country of a few rebel military leaders. The success of this plan is likely to depend on the President's decisiveness, powers of persuasion, and skill in laying the groundwork. As of 30 October he apparently had not broached the question to the service chiefs, whose cooperation is essential.

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[Redacted]

Sudan: National Union Party (NUP) chief al-Azhari has said that his party intends to remain in opposition to the generally conservative Umma government "for the time being."

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[Redacted]

The rural-based Umma will have difficulty trying to run the government without the backing of the urban NUP, but some Umma leaders are reluctant to dump Mahjoub.

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[Redacted]

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2 Nov 65

5

[Redacted]

25X1

THE PRESIDENT

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Counsel to the President

The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Under Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant Secretary of Defense

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U. S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

Commander in Chief, Atlantic

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Department of Justice

The Attorney General

The Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

The Administrator

The Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

The National Security Agency

The Director

The United States Information Agency

The Director

The National Indications Center

The Director

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