


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CAMBODIA: The Vietnamese Communists appear to be having increasing trouble maintaining good relations with some villagers under their control.

25X1 [redacted] the movement of North Vietnamese Army (NVA) troops into northern and northeastern Cambodia in early May was initially well received by local villagers. Many of them were still loyal to Sihanouk and accepted assurances from NVA troops that they were merely paving the way for Sihanouk's return.

[redacted] by late summer villagers had begun to resent restrictive travel controls imposed by NVA troops and their heavy demands for rice and money for themselves and for transient NVA forces.

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Similarly, NVA troops [redacted] soon soured their relations with their hosts when they also set up travel controls and began requisitioning rice. Subsequently, [redacted] Cambodian Communist elements assumed control over the village and began restricting the NVA rice levies. [redacted] by mid-October the villagers had become disenchanted with the NVA presence and had doubts that Sihanouk would indeed return.

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25X1 Although these instances are localized, the development of bad relations between Vietnamese Communist troops and Cambodian villagers may become more widespread as it becomes more apparent that Sihanouk is still nowhere in sight, and that his "liberation movement" is so strongly dependent on and subservient to Hanoi's forces. [redacted]

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UN-NPT: Pakistani concern over India's nuclear potential is surfacing again in a way that could pose problems for implementation of the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).

A Pakistani official at the UN has told the US and USSR that his government believes India, an NPT nonsignatory, is virtually certain to manufacture and test a peaceful nuclear explosive (PNE) device by 1972. Rawalpindi, which will not sign the treaty until India does, has therefore drafted a resolution that would have the UN General Assembly declare any such test equivalent to a proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Pakistanis also claimed that in such event they too would have no alternative but to proceed in this direction.

India is considered to have sufficient plutonium--under international safeguards--and technological expertise to produce a low-yield nuclear device within a year of a decision to do so. While New Delhi has talked of the necessity of studying PNE technology seriously, Prime Minister Gandhi has denied repeatedly that India intends to test a PNE. Pakistan does not possess a near-term nuclear weapons capability.

The negotiation of the NPT was a delicate process, and the US had to fight hard to ensure that PNEs would be available to non-nuclear countries only under international controls. A Soviet official at the UN expects Moscow will share the US hope that Pakistan will not reopen this contentious issue while there remain significant holdouts and the International Atomic Energy Agency lacks internal agreement on its position for the safeguards negotiations required by the treaty. The Pakistani resolution would also place greater pressure on the superpowers to carry out their commitment--under Article 5 of the NPT--to provide PNE services under international controls.

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LAOS: The government has apparently accepted the Communist position that the next stage in the peace talks will be conducted by representatives of the "two princes." Vientiane had heretofore objected to this formulation because it failed to recognize the legitimacy of the Laotian Government. This concession, expressed in a telegram to the chief Pathet Lao negotiator and carried by the Lao domestic radio, would appear to remove a major stumbling block in the path of the long-stalled talks. A special envoy from the Communist side is expected to return to Vientiane after 7 November to arrange details for the negotiations which are to take place at Khang Khay. [REDACTED]

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
JAPAN: Prime Minister Sato's almost uncontested fourth-term election as party president and his decision not to reorganize the cabinet, contrary to usual practice, reflect both his and the party's unwillingness to precipitate a showdown over his successor. The decision not to distribute cabinet portfolios to the many hopefuls will provoke considerable resentment but will ensure that Sato is not treated as a "lame duck." In Thursday's election Sato's sole challenger, his former foreign minister Takeo Miki, did rather better than expected and will thus remain in the running when Sato steps down within the next two years. [REDACTED]

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NIGERIA-SWITZERLAND: Bern, pressed by Lagos, has turned down former Biafran leader Ojukwu's request for asylum in Switzerland. Ojukwu will probably have difficulty finding refuge elsewhere and may have to remain at least temporarily in Ivory Coast, where he has been living since the Nigerian civil war ended last January. The federal government, which has recently been playing down Ojukwu's importance, may prefer such an arrangement. Lagos is especially concerned that Ojukwu be denied a political base from which he might be able to rally secessionist sentiment.

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