


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State Dept. review completed

DIA review(s) completed.

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
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
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
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TURKEY

Turkey yesterday took over a number of US-run joint defense installations without incident. The take-overs included [redacted]

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[redacted] major facilities at Diyarbakir, Belbasi, Karamursel, Sinop, and Kargaburun. The Turks have also ordered that all non-NATO activity at Incirlik be suspended.

[redacted]

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US officials believe that the inclusion of the Kargaburun navigational aid station was a mistake on the Turks' part, as was their failure to include Izmir as a port of entry for US goods and supplies. Activities at Kargaburun have now been suspended.

In a speech yesterday to a special meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels, Turkish ambassador to NATO Eralp neither clarified Ankara's long-range intentions nor specifically asked NATO allies to help out with military sales. He did say that his government was prepared to negotiate with the US on a new basis of cooperation that would ensure a continuous and sufficient defense support to Turkey.

Publicly, Eralp has taken a harder line, implying that he did not know whether his government would agree to talk while the arms embargo continues. He has said that US personnel at the facilities in Turkey will remain "merely to show Turkish forces how to operate the bases" and to maintain equipment.

In Cyprus, the Turkish Cypriots, doubtless at Ankara's behest, decided yesterday to place restrictions on three US installations that have been shut down since last summer. The Turkish Cypriot order prohibits US personnel from entering the installations or flying the US flag and turns the guarding of the facilities over to Turkish Cypriot military units. [redacted]

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NIGERIA

The overthrow of General Gowon in yesterday's bloodless military coup appears to have been successful. No overt opposition to the coup among the military or civilian population has yet surfaced. Gowon apparently is still in Kampala, Uganda, where he had been attending the OAU summit meeting.

Several changes in Nigeria's military government have been announced, with more likely to come. The new chief of state and commander of the armed forces is Brigadier Murtala Mohammed, a 37-year-old Hausa tribesman from northern Nigeria. He played a key part in the July 1966 coup that eventually elevated Gowon to power and has since had a checkered history of allegiance to Gowon.

Other key appointments include:

- Brigadier Obasanjo, a Yoruba, as chief of staff at supreme headquarters.
- Third Infantry Division commander Brigadier Danjuma, a minority tribesman from northern Nigeria, as army chief of staff.
- Mohammed Yusufu, a Fulani from northern Nigeria, as inspector general of police.

The appointments that have been announced thus far seem to reflect a balance of Nigeria's competing tribal and regional interests. Colonel Garba, the head of the Brigade of Guards who first announced the coup, has not yet been named to a position.

None of the appointees served under Gowon on the Supreme Military Council, Nigeria's highest decision-making body. Although they have not made any policy statements thus far, what little is known of some of the appointees suggests they may be inclined to pursue a somewhat more nationalist and less conservative course than did the Gowon regime.

Nigeria's new military rulers may have moved against Gowon because of what they regarded as his indecisive style of leadership and their own exclusion from policy-making positions. They may have been spurred to action by Gowon's procrastination in shuffling Nigeria's 12 state governors, a move he first promised to accomplish last April. Middle-grade officers have complained for some time that the incumbent governors had monopolized the fruits of military rule too long.

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The coup also came at a time when grumbling was increasing among both civilians and the military over the government's seeming drift in the face of accumulating economic problems, such as inflation, commodity shortages, and unemployment.

The status of Gowon's former senior colleagues on the Supreme Military Council and the commanders of the army's other principal units is unclear. Nigeria's fragile post - civil war political stability could be undone if the new regime does not receive broad support from other army leaders. Gowon's role in maintaining stability rested in large part on the fact that he came from a minority tribe and took a consensus approach to try to solve Nigeria's domestic problems.

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PORTUGAL

Prime Minister Goncalves is continuing his efforts to form a new government—the fifth since the April 1974 coup—and will probably announce the results within the next day or two. The new cabinet was expected to be named earlier this week, but was probably delayed until General Otelo de Carvalho's return from Cuba today. [REDACTED]

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Carvalho, besides being named to the three-man executive created last week by the Armed Forces Movement, is still being rumored as a probable deputy prime minister. Two key government positions as well as control of the internal security forces will make Carvalho one of the most powerful men in Portugal. He claims to be impressed by the Cuban system of "popular organizations," but is believed to be strongly anti-Communist. Many reports over the past several months have linked him to groups of the extreme left wing, but his political views are not very precise and it is doubtful that he is adamantly connected to any one of these groups.

Another name mentioned as a candidate for the second deputy prime minister is Dr. Teixeira Ribeiro, a well-known moderate academician. Ribeiro has already come under attack from Socialist leader Soares in his press conference on Monday. Soares criticized Ribeiro for collaborating with the Salazar and Caetano regimes. Ribeiro is closer to the center-left Popular Democrats.

President Costa Gomes has postponed his departure for the Helsinki summit until Friday, probably to attend the swearing in of the new government. Presumably the new foreign minister—Major Antunes is not expected to be reappointed to that position—will accompany Costa Gomes to the summit.

Press reports indicate that Admiral Rosa Coutinho is a leading candidate for foreign minister: Coutinho, who headed the governing junta in Angola until last January, has not made particularly favorable impressions in his foreign contacts. He attended the NATO summit in Brussels in May and traveled to West Germany last month. Although pleasant, he was regarded as naive. The Germans considered him uninformed on foreign policy matters. Coutinho, according to past reports, is of vague left nationalist political views and is primarily interested in furthering his own career.

Aside from the meeting between Costa Gomes and Antunes on Monday, moderates in the military have maintained a low profile, touching base with friendly military units. We do not exclude the possibility that the moderates may also still be hoping for support from Carvalho against Goncalves even though Carvalho is a long way from being in the moderates' camp.

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CUBA - LATIN AMERICA

Fidel Castro will be watching the US closely for any sign of a change in Washington's economic denial program now that the sanctions of the Organization of American States against Cuba are no longer formally in effect—a result of the decision yesterday by the organization in Costa Rica. Should a part of the "blockade" be lifted, he most likely would respond quickly, perhaps by releasing some US citizens jailed on political charges.

Castro did not hurl brickbats at either the US or the OAS during his speech last Saturday, Cuba's national day. He apparently decided to avoid creating pointless obstacles to an improvement of his ties with the countries of the Western Hemisphere, and the US in particular, just before the OAS vote. While he has no intention of rejoining the OAS, he does want to gain access to US trade and technology before early 1976, fearing that little progress will be made toward a reconciliation once the election campaign gets under way in the US.

In past blasts at the OAS, Castro had hoped to contribute to the organization's demise, but he has now apparently realized that he underestimated its durability. Hindsight may have convinced him that a less aggressive, less negative policy toward the OAS might have relieved Cuba of the OAS sanctions some time ago.

Castro probably recognizes that Cuba can perhaps make important foreign policy gains in the post-sanctions period. He will work to resume diplomatic relations with Ecuador, Honduras, and Costa Rica. The presence of a Cuban delegation at the meeting tomorrow to create a Latin American Economic System provides a new opportunity. [REDACTED]

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CHILE

Despite official claims that internal security procedures have been liberalized, recent developments strongly suggest that illegal detention and repression continue.

Instructions sent to all Directorate of National Intelligence personnel on May 12 warned that maltreatment of detainees would result in dismissal and ordered that wholesale break-ins and detentions cease. A subsequent directive limited detention power to only 80 individuals working on express orders of the director. Under a May 5 law on the right of habeas corpus, families of detainees are to be notified within three days of the charges lodged against the detainees.

These directives often have been disregarded. Eleven copper unionists have been held since July 18 on suspicion of sabotaging production. Efforts to gain their release have been unsuccessful. After arrest and release, another copper union leader claimed he was beaten and subjected to electric shock during interrogation.

An advertisement published by the Interdenominational Committee for Peace in a Chilean paper on July 28 contains the names of 119 persons associated with the Movement of the Revolutionary Left who reportedly have died—some while in Chilean custody—or disappeared. The Peace Committee advertisement, which has a strong antigovernment flavor, calls for the appointment of a magistrate to look into the above charges.

Chilean officials admit to having detained 672 persons so far this year, with 74 of these in indefinite confinement.

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SUDAN-ETHIOPIA

Ethiopian media reports of fighting in southern Sudan appear to be exaggerated and may be related to the recent deterioration in Ethiopian-Sudanese relations.

Addis Ababa claims that since early July nearly 12,000 Sudanese have fled into Ethiopia from fighting that has broken out in southern Sudan between tribes. One tribe, according to the Ethiopians, is receiving modern weapons from the northern-dominated Sudanese army.

According to a UN official who has visited the border area, the refugees say they left Sudan because of continuing strife between northerners and southerners. They have made no mention of a civil war.

Although the black, Christian, and animist southern Sudanese are fearful that Khartoum will push for the "Arabization" of the region, there has been no evidence that the long civil war, which ended in 1972, is being renewed. There was a mutiny in March at Akobo, near the Sudanese-Ethiopian border, in a battalion manned by former southern rebels, but it reportedly was an isolated incident. Some mutineers apparently did take to the bush.

Southern Sudan has still not recovered economically from the effects of the protracted civil war; Khartoum has been unable to come up with the resources necessary to reconstruct the region. The US embassy in Khartoum believes some of the Sudanese refugees may have entered Ethiopian territory looking for better living conditions.


Ethiopia's handling of the refugee story may be an attempt by Addis Ababa to force a change in Khartoum's foreign policy. Relations between the two countries were close following the Ethiopian military take-over last year, but they have deteriorated in recent months.

The Ethiopians believe Sudan is giving sanctuary to Eritrean secessionists and allowing men and materiel to move across its territory into Eritrea.

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ANGOLA Clashes Between Popular Movement and National Front Troops



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ANGOLA

Fighting between the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola and the National Front for the Liberation of Angola has died down in the area of Caxito, but clashes between the two groups are taking place across much of northern Angola.

The fighting appears to be taking place in towns where neither group has predominant local support. The Portuguese have pulled most of their troops out of the affected areas and are unable to confirm reports of victories by the two liberation groups.

The National Front is making no effort to push on from the Caxito area to Luanda and appears to be awaiting results of the fighting elsewhere. The Popular Movement is apparently cutting routes out of Caxito by destroying bridges and mining roads.

Nevertheless, these National Front units are within striking distance of Luanda's power lines and water supply—located in the Caxito area—and will strengthen any Front efforts to bargain its way back into the capital.

In Luanda, friction between the Portuguese military and the Popular Movement has been increasing as a result of recent clashes between the two sides. The Popular Movement is refusing to surrender several of its troops, who attacked Portuguese commandos last weekend, and has demanded that Lisbon withdraw its forces from the territory immediately.

The Portuguese military commander is trying to uphold a policy of strict neutrality and probably will not allow the current standoff to escalate into a major confrontation.

The transitional government appears to have broken down completely, and there is little chance that it can be reorganized in the near future.

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INDIA

The Soviet-oriented Communist Party of India is trying to take advantage of the current political crisis and the Ruling Congress Party's call for cooperation from "like-minded parties" to improve its political position.

Communist leaders hope to make Ruling Congress politicians, including Prime Minister Gandhi, more willing to cooperate with them by publicly supporting her recent controversial political moves and her new economic program. The Communists would like to move the central government further to the left and apparently believe they can exploit working arrangements with the Ruling Congress Party to widen differences between its left and right wings.

The Communists are energetically courting Ruling Congress Party organizations at the state level. So far, they have succeeded in establishing "joint action" programs with them in seven of India's 22 states. In Manipur, the Ruling Congress Party has invited the Communists to join the government.

Prime Minister Gandhi apparently believes she can gain immediate advantage from closer association with the Communists at little cost. Cooperation with them serves to strengthen her "progressive" credentials, represents a good-will gesture to Moscow for its public support, and tends to preserve the long-time split in India's Communist movement.

Gandhi knows that the Communists are aware that the Ruling Congress Party, with secure majorities in most states, does not need Communist support in order to rule. The Prime Minister, in fact, has resisted overtures from the Communists in states where her party's majorities are thin.

Gandhi still has not moved against the opposition "People's Front" government in Gujarat which, last Saturday, mounted a large demonstration in open defiance of emergency regulations.

The Front holds only a slim majority in the state legislature and is weakened by strong internal differences. Gandhi could remove the People's Front and rule Gujarat directly by declaring president's rule. She is more likely, however, to try to achieve the same end by working to topple the coalition government. [REDACTED]

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LEBANON

In his first major policy statement since becoming prime minister early this month, Rashid Karami proposed on July 27 that Lebanon discard the system of confessional balance on which the country's unwritten "national covenant" is based. The existing system, which is built on the fiction that Christians outnumber Muslims in Lebanon, has served to ensure Christian control of the presidency and the army.

Karami, a Sunni Muslim, declared that he considers himself a candidate for the presidency. This may be more an effort to focus attention on the confessional problem than a serious declaration of intent to seek the office. Parliament will pick a successor to President Franjyah next year.



Army commander Iskandar Ghanim may be one casualty of these changes. Although he has long been a confidant of the President, Ghanim recently has come in for especially heavy criticism from Lebanese leftists and Muslims and from the Palestinians.



Karami also announced an ambitious housing program and unspecified economic assistance for poor areas of Beirut. Residents of these areas, disenchanted with previous governments, offered sanctuary to some leftists responsible for the recent civil unrest in the city.

The Prime Minister's proposals constitute an unusually forceful attack on Lebanon's political and economic problems, although at present they represent only his hopes rather than a concrete program. Their novelty and expense will draw opposition in parliament, and it is doubtful that Karami will be able to change much in the short run.

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Parliament only last week approved an annual budget that includes what for Lebanon is a rarity—deficit spending. Committees of parliament are now considering how to increase taxes to cover the deficit, but they will be reluctant to go beyond present commitments to risk backing Karami's innovative policies.

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WEST GERMANY

The failure of West Germany's exports to mount a sustained advance underlies Chancellor Schmidt's suggestion that the major developed countries synchronize stimulative economic measures this fall.

After a precipitous decline in the first three months of this year, the volume of Germany's exports recovered only slightly in the second quarter. The small pickup in sales occurred because the EC countries reduced inventories of goods imported from Germany in the first quarter. Despite the small upturn, however, sales are still some 10 percent below a year ago. New orders for West German exports were down in the second quarter, auguring continued slow sales through September.

Chancellor Schmidt is encouraging the other EC countries—with the exception of inflation-ridden Britain and Italy—to follow Bonn's announced intention to legislate stimulative fiscal measures this fall. Although synchronized action would give German exports a boost, Schmidt argues that all members' exports would receive a lift and would reinforce each others' recovery efforts.

Because foreign markets normally buy nearly two fifths of West German industrial output, continued stagnation in the developed countries would limit West Germany's recovery. In addition, the growth of exports to OPEC countries has slowed considerably, and sales to the Communist countries are unchanged.

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FOR THE RECORD



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CYPRUS: The annual rotation of Turkish troops to the mainland is currently taking place, but Turkey's armed forces on Cyprus are expected to remain at their present strength of 32,900. Transfers are being made on an individual basis for all units except those of the commando brigade and the Jandarma, which are being replaced on a unit-for-unit basis. There has been no Greek Cypriot reaction to the rotation.



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TAIWAN-JAPAN: The Nationalist Chinese are supporting their claims to the Senkaku Islands by conducting regular naval patrols in the area. A recent influx of South Korean and Japanese fishing boats may have prompted the Nationalists to establish these patrols. Since then, foreign trawlers have stayed outside Taiwan's claimed three-nautical-mile territorial limit. The Japanese, too, claim the islands, based on the US reversion of Okinawa and other territory to Japan in 1972. Tokyo has police patrols in the area to support its claim. Both countries have played down the territorial dispute since early 1972, but the Nationalist patrols could rekindle the controversy. Although the islands are uninhabited, potential oil deposits increase the importance of the sovereignty issue.



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