


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State Dept. review completed

DIA review(s) completed.



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
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NIGERIA

In his first speech since Tuesday's coup, Nigeria's new leader, Brigadier Murtala Mohammed, sought to project a dynamic image for his regime. He justified the coup, saying that in order to give the country a sense of direction Gowon had to go.

Mohammed reaffirmed Nigeria's friendship with all countries and announced that foreign investments would be respected. He also promised that Nigeria would honor all existing obligations with foreign governments. Mohammed did not indicate that any sweeping structural changes in the existing military government were in the offing. He announced that all incumbents on the Supreme Military Council, including Gowon and their state governors, had been retired with full benefits. All cabinet heads have been dismissed.

Gowon, he said, is free to return to Nigeria. Gowon yesterday said in Kampala that he "accepted" the coup and called on Nigerians to support the new regime in the interest of national unity.




The US embassy's preliminary estimate of Nigeria's new leaders also portrays them as "doers." Their backgrounds, however, suggest they may be no better equipped to deal with Nigeria's pressing economic problems than their predecessors were.

The regime lacks experience in governing and may try to knock heads together in the hope of producing quick results. The new government has not yet indicated what role it has in mind for the civilian technicians who held key positions in the old government.

The embassy feels the regime is favorably disposed toward the West and does not expect any abrupt changes in US-Nigerian relations. The embassy does not sense any basic shift in Nigeria's oil policies or attitudes toward American-owned oil companies, but believes that Nigeria's new rulers will take a more strident and vocal stand on southern African issues.

The embassy does express some concern over the possible adverse effect that Brigadier Mohammed could have on Nigeria's internal stability. By virtue of his personality and background, he is painted as an impetuous, ruthless man who at this point is more openly identified with the interests of Nigeria's Muslim north than with the broader interests of the country as a whole.



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Inasmuch as Mohammed's part in the coup is still unknown, it is too soon to assess the role he will play in the new government, and it is unknown what kind of relationships he has formed with the other new members of the regime.

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KOREA-UN

South Korea's renewed application for UN membership yesterday is likely to present the Chinese and Soviets with difficult decisions in the Security Council.

North Korea has opposed dual membership for the two Koreas, arguing that it would tend to ratify division of the country. In the past, Moscow and Peking have supported Pyongyang's position.

South Korea has not raised the membership issue since 1973. This year, however, Seoul saw a possibility of linking its bid with those of the two Vietnamese states—which have also applied for UN membership recently. The US has told the South Koreans that it will veto the Vietnamese applications if the Chinese or Soviets veto Seoul's.

The Chinese and Soviets are thus likely to come under conflicting pressures from the North Koreans and the Vietnamese. Pyongyang almost certainly will urge Peking and Moscow to veto South Korea's application, while the Vietnamese will probably ask them to avoid taking any action that would jeopardize their own applications.

The Soviets have been noncommittal on whether they would support UN membership for both Koreas in return for membership for the two Vietnams. The Chinese have been moving closer to the North Koreans in recent years, and they will be unwilling to jeopardize their equity in the North by parting with Pyongyang on this key issue. If Peking is placed in the position of having to choose between the Vietnamese and the Koreans, it almost certainly will side with Pyongyang. In the meantime, the Chinese will continue to resist attempts to link the Vietnamese and South Korean UN applications.

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PORTUGAL

Portugal's new executive triumvirate met for the first time yesterday following the return of General Otelo de Carvalho from Cuba, presumably to discuss the new government.

The Revolutionary Council, now reduced to an advisory role, met for 12 hours last night to discuss Prime Minister Goncalves proposed cabinet. The meeting was attended by Foreign Minister Antunes and other moderates, who had refused to participate in the meeting last week of the Armed Forces Assembly that had turned over power to the triumvirate. According to Radio Lisbon, a communique issued after the session last night declared that the members of the Revolutionary Council have delegated all their powers to the triumvirate. A Council spokesman said that the composition of the new government has not been decided. He said that because President Costa Gomes is departing for the Helsinki summit tomorrow, the new government would not be sworn in for the next few days.

Upon his arrival in Lisbon, Carvalho repeated comments he made several weeks ago to the effect that it is no longer possible to carry out a socialist revolution in Portugal by peaceful means and that he is prepared to use force. Even allowing for his flamboyant personality, Carvalho's remarks sound ominous and may intimidate the moderates.

The three-day national labor congress that ended on Sunday confirmed the determination of the Communists to retain their grip on the upper echelons of the trade union movement. The congress was convened at this time in order to install a Communist-dominated national leadership before the individual unions—in which the non-Communists have been showing some strength—could hold their internal elections.

The congress approved with only minor changes an "orientation and action" program prepared by the national confederation and heard a speech from Prime Minister Goncalves [redacted] in which he said that the unions' struggle is a "fight to the death against capitalism."

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GREECE

The Greek air force has made significant progress in improving its combat capability since the Turkish invasion of Cyprus a year ago. The inability of the air force to assist Greek forces fighting on the island, plus the ensuing rounds of personnel purges, severely lowered air force morale. The US air attache in Athens reported last week, however, that the Greek air force has been able to reverse the downward spiral through a combination of effective leadership, a new sense of mission, and most important, the introduction of large quantities of modern aircraft and other equipment.

Two squadrons of US F-4E fighter-bombers—totaling 35 aircraft—have recently reached operational status. In addition, the Greeks have on order 60 US A-7H attack aircraft, 12 C-130 transports, and 40 French Mirage F1-C all-weather interceptors. The initial cadre of pilots and support personnel have just completed their training on the A7s and F1s, and initial delivery for both types of aircraft is scheduled for August. The first C-130 will arrive in September.

By late 1977, all of these aircraft will be in operational units. The F-4Es and the A-7Hs eventually will replace all of Greece's obsolete F-84 attack aircraft, while the Mirage F1-Cs will replace the aging F-102 interceptors. The C-130s will add a new dimension to the air force's limited transport capabilities.

These newer aircraft will enhance significantly the Greek air force's ability to support combat operations in the Aegean Islands. The A-7H attack aircraft, which are to be assigned to Crete, will also give the Greeks a better, but still limited, capability of flying attack and close support missions over Cyprus.



Despite its improved outlook, the Greek air force is not without its troubles. For the next several years, the air force will be saddled with large numbers of obsolete aircraft. Weaknesses and vulnerabilities will center around this outdated equipment, which will become increasingly harder to maintain. The Greek air force, already suffering from a shortage of fully trained technicians, has placed many of

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the more highly skilled ones in training programs for the new aircraft. Consequently, maintenance of existing aircraft will suffer further. The US air attache believes the air force's major problem for the future will be to maintain maximum combat readiness in existing air units while the new A-7s and F1 aircraft are being brought into the inventory.

Ankara, meanwhile, is looking with increasing alarm at the growing Greek air combat capability at a time when its own air force has been cut off from new US aircraft and the spare parts necessary to keep existing planes operational.

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
RHODESIA

Rival leaders of Rhodesia's African National Council have threatened to resume guerrilla warfare if Prime Minister Ian Smith does not agree by October to a constitutional conference outside Rhodesia.

Recent recruiting inside Rhodesia indicates that the nationalists are building up their guerrilla strength. The stepped-up recruiting effort is one result of the factional competition for control of the Council's liberation army. The Zimbabwe African National Union, responsible for most of the guerrilla units active in northeastern Rhodesia since late 1972, commands the largest and most effective insurgent force. The People's Union, which has fielded few guerrillas since 1970, is now trying to build up its forces to challenge the military predominance of the National Union.

Several hundred recruits recently arrived in Botswana from the northwestern provinces of Rhodesia, where the People's Union draws most of its strength. The nationalists have been militarily inactive there since 1970.

In the southeast near the Mozambique border, four local Council officials have been arrested for recruiting African students as guerrillas. This recruiting activity seems likely to reinforce the National Union, most of whose recruits go directly to Mozambique through infiltration routes controlled by the National Union. Last week, Rhodesian authorities imposed a curfew along the border with Mozambique in an attempt to halt the passage of recruits across the border.



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
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