


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
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April 3, 1976



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National Intelligence Bulletin

April 3, 1976

CONTENTS

LEBANON: Cease-fire being honored by all sides 1

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SOMALIA-FRANCE: Siad will not assure respect for FTAI sovereignty 5




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EC: Meeting non-productive 7

USSR-EGYPT: Moscow acknowledges economic and political problems exist 9


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
SPAIN: Government cracks down on political demonstrations 14

ITALY: Military unrest increases 15

25X1



COLOMBIA: Stronger security measures to maintain public order 18



25X1

25X1



National Intelligence Bulletin

April 3, 1976

LEBANON

The ten-day cease-fire in Lebanon went into effect yesterday and is generally being honored by all sides. There is some sporadic firing in sections of Beirut and outlying areas.

Both Muslim and Christian leaders have expressed concern that warring factions, poised for renewed fighting, could interfere with the convocation of parliament. The speaker of parliament has recalled an announcement issued early yesterday that parliament would convene on Monday, and has said that the chamber will not meet until the effectiveness of the cease-fire is assessed.

Syrian-controlled Palestinian forces reportedly were to provide security for the parliament building in Beirut. We have no evidence, however, that they have taken up their positions. Similar delays have caused the collapse of previous cease-fires, and this truce—for which there is no provision for enforcement—is especially vulnerable.

Syrian President Asad and the head of the Maronite Church reportedly have guaranteed President Franjyah's resignation in an effort to calm leftist leader Kamal Jumblatt and his allies, who remain skeptical. Franjyah has not been heard from in days, but is presumed to be in Juniyah awaiting action by parliament. His silence is almost certainly contributing to the tense atmosphere throughout the country.

Although the situation in Lebanon has improved, it is anticipated that some elements of Syrian military forces will remain on a higher than normal state of alert until Lebanon's internal unrest is successfully resolved. The US defense attache reported that Syria's 3rd Armored Division may again be in an increased readiness posture. [redacted]

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Next 3 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975A028800010006-6

National Intelligence Bulletin

April 3, 1976

SOMALIA-FRANCE

President Siad has declined to give formal assurances to France that Somalia will respect the sovereignty of the French Territory of the Afars and Issas (FTAI) after it becomes independent. Siad's refusal to cooperate will probably not deflect France from proceeding with plans to hold an independence referendum sometime this year, but it will reinforce Paris' determination to obtain guarantees of the territory's sovereignty from the OAU, Arab League, and perhaps the UN.

Siad made his position clear during a discussion on Wednesday in Mogadiscio with Jean Francois-Poncet, the French secretary of state for foreign affairs. According to the French official, Siad would only give oral assurance that Somalia would respect the sovereignty and independence of a new government in the territory. Francois-Poncet was seeking formal or written guarantees.

The Somali government's official statement on the meeting indicates a wide divergence of views between Mogadiscio and Paris concerning the future of the FTAI. The Somalis said the French had come to the talks with proposals "which were not in the interest" of the people of the territory and did not satisfy Somali demands for its "complete and unconditional" independence—Somali codewords for a French military withdrawal and transfer of power to a new government dominated by pro-Somalis. Siad is opposed to the current pro-French territorial government led by Ali Aref Bourhan.

Recent conciliatory moves by France evidently have had no effect on Siad. Last month France said that it was willing to discuss the question of its military presence in the territory and agreed to call a meeting of the two political parties in FTAI and two rival liberation movements—one backed by Somalia and the other by Ethiopia—to plan for independence.

The Somali-backed group—the Front for the Liberation of the Somali Coast—has also announced a strongly anti-French stand. On the same day that Siad was meeting with the visiting French envoy, the Front issued a statement accusing France of launching its diplomatic offensive to conceal its true aim of transferring power to Ali Aref after holding a sham referendum.

Before going to Mogadiscio, Francois-Poncet visited Cairo, Nairobi, Kampala, and Addis Ababa to sound out the Africans and Arabs on the prospects for securing Arab League and OAU guarantees for the territory's independence. He also wanted to discuss the French proposal that the Arab League and OAU send observers to monitor the independence referendum. An OAU fact-finding mission will visit the territory later this month.

National Intelligence Bulletin

April 3, 1976

At the Arab League foreign ministers' meeting last month, many of the participants—led by Egypt and Kuwait—reportedly urged Somalia to follow a cautious policy in the Horn of Africa. The more moderate Arab states are concerned about Soviet penetration into Djibouti, if Somalia gains control of the territory. According to an Egyptian Foreign Ministry official, these states generally favor a continuing French military presence in the territory after independence.

The resolution adopted by the Arab League, however, was strongly pro-Somali. It expressed the solidarity of all Arab countries with Somalia and said any aggression against Somalia would be considered as aggression against all Arab countries. The resolution also referred to the territory as the "Somali coast," the term favored by Somalia.

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National Intelligence Bulletin

April 3, 1976

EC

The nine EC heads of government, meeting in Luxembourg on April 1-2, apparently failed to come to grips with urgent economic and monetary issues or make progress toward instituting the direct election of deputies to the European Parliament, thus decreasing the likelihood that these can take place in 1978.

Discussion of ways to cope with the effects on the EC of disparate economic conditions and policies dominated the proceedings. The need for closer coordination of economic policies was again conceded by all, but some leaders later announced a "total" inability to agree on implementing steps. French President Giscard apparently was discouraged from pressing for a restructuring of the EC's joint float after Chancellor Schmidt persuaded him prior to the meeting that Bonn would insist in return on binding pledges for better coordination of economic policies.

The participants decided not even to issue a statement reiterating a commitment to eventual economic and monetary union; rather, they merely charged the finance ministers with examining Commission proposals for strengthening economic and monetary policy cooperation. Prime Minister Wilson—in an off-the-record briefing of British journalists—said that none of the leaders favored the Commission's ideas, however, and that they will probably be buried by the finance council.

London's principal goal in Luxembourg was to discuss a possible Community approach to unemployment, presumably to include EC financing of schemes to increase employment and aid the jobless. Although pressing for a coordinated approach in other areas, Schmidt—backed by Giscard—reportedly told Wilson that EC countries should individually attack the problem by imposing more discipline on their economies.

The leaders were equally ineffectual on the question of apportioning seats in a directly elected European Parliament. Giscard, surprisingly, recommended that the Nine simply agree to elect a parliament with the same size—198 members—and distribution of seats as the present one thus, in effect, backing down from previous French insistence on stricter proportionality. He got strong backing from Schmidt; Ireland, Luxembourg, and Belgium also accepted the idea. Although Denmark, the Netherlands, and the UK agreed to study the plan further, Wilson privately told the press that Britain could "never" go along with it because Britain's share of seats would be inadequate to meet regional demands. Italian Premier Moro also firmly rejected the proposal.

National Intelligence Bulletin

April 3, 1976

The prospect that elections can be held in 1978, as had been accepted in principle, has receded as a result of the summit. Nevertheless some observers—among them German Foreign Office officials—believe that the elections can still be held as originally planned if agreement is reached later this year, perhaps at the next European Council in July.

The adverse political fall-out from the unproductive meeting seems likely to fall heaviest on Giscard; neither of his "European" proposals were accepted—the compromise to permit the elections, and his monetary proposals for a more flexible float including all EC members, a common currency reserve fund, and a deutsche mark revaluation. He is thus increasingly vulnerable to charges of not only misjudging his colleagues' reactions but also of failing to get concrete assistance in ameliorating French economic problems. Schmidt, in contrast, will not lose credit for having resisted new attempts to get Bonn to "bail out" those members experiencing economic difficulties. His failure to achieve any successes for the EC may be more criticized in the press than by public opinion.

The virtual shunting aside of Belgian Prime Minister Tindemans' report on European Union—originally intended as the centerpiece of the meeting—may further set back attempts to improve Community decision making.

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National Intelligence Bulletin

April 3, 1976

USSR-EGYPT

Moscow has raised the level of its polemics against Cairo by publishing both the Egyptian accusation of Soviet subversion and the text of its own official statement of March 31 on abrogation of the Soviet-Egyptian friendship treaty.

In its official statement, the USSR frankly admitted for the first time that its relations with the Sadat regime have been strained, but defended the "straightforwardness" of Soviet policy. It accused Cairo of distorting the truth, thereby misleading both domestic and world opinion.

In its first acknowledgment of differences with Egypt over Cairo's debt to the USSR, the Soviet Union argued in the statement that it allowed Sadat "considerable extension" of payment deadlines and "easier conditions" for debt rescheduling. While Moscow had on occasion admitted the existence of Cairo's financial difficulties, the Soviets had studiously avoided until now any reference to their own relationship to these difficulties.

Moscow also admitted for the first time that there have been disagreements with Cairo on the question of providing military spare parts and repairing Soviet-built equipment in the Egyptian inventory. The statement claimed that the Soviet Union only recently offered to discuss this problem with Egypt. It reminded Sadat of the role played by Soviet arms in 1956, 1967, 1973 wars.

The Soviet statement reminded Egypt of the technological support that the USSR continues to furnish. This may suggest that the Soviets will not retaliate economically against Egypt because of Sadat's abrogation of the treaty and termination of Soviet access to the naval facility at Alexandria. Moscow may be concerned that any economic sanctions could work to Sadat's advantage, with Egyptian workers blaming the USSR for their resulting plight.

The statement also referred to Egypt's "present" leadership, which may be a signal that Moscow is now prepared to move politically against the regime. On March 30, Tass described Sadat's political position as "unenviable," and *Red Star* reported "unrest among Egyptian workers."

As might be expected, Moscow's statement evoked a strong protest in Cairo. According to the Egyptian press on April 1, Cairo rejected the communication as an "unwarranted interference" in the country's internal affairs.



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Next 3 Page(s) In Document Exempt

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National Intelligence Bulletin

April 3, 1976

SPAIN

The Spanish government has prohibited both leftist and rightist demonstrations planned for this weekend, but some trouble remains likely.

Left Christian Democratic leader Ruiz Gimenez issued a statement asking his associates to respect the ban, saying the opposition might schedule an alternate activity such as a meeting in a Madrid theater. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

The leader of the rightists agreed "in principle" to respect the ban. Advance publicity urging a large turnout may be difficult to turn off, but security authorities do not expect the rightists to defy the ban.

Violence appears most likely in Barcelona where a pro-amnesty demonstration was also banned. Leftist leaders claim they will march tonight in defiance of the government ban.

The fate of the proposed coalition between the Communist-dominated Democratic Junta and the Socialist-led Platform of Democratic Convergence may be decided this weekend during the scheduled congress of the Christian Democratic Left, which is to vote on whether it will join the new coalition. Christian Democratic leader Ruiz Gimenez supports the merger, but has admitted the proposal faces strong opposition among Christian Democrats and says he will support the will of the majority.

Should the Christian Democrats fail to ratify the decision to join the Democratic Coordination, such action might cause the key Socialist Workers Party to reconsider its membership. The Socialists want a broad coalition that cannot be dominated by the Communists. [REDACTED]

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National Intelligence Bulletin

April 3, 1976

ITALY

A recent rash of demonstrations, primarily by noncommissioned officers, reflects increasing unrest in the armed forces over inadequate pay and slow promotions. The government, already faced with severe economic problems and constant political infighting, appears unlikely to take measures sufficient to deal with the problem.

Late last summer air force noncommissioned officers demonstrated in Rome. Protests appeared to intensify in February, perhaps as a result of the delay in pay raises caused by the fall of the Moro government. On February 19, 18 sergeants at an air base near Pisa were indicted or received summonses for publicly criticizing air force chief General Ciarlo. Nearly 500 other sergeants subsequently claimed equal responsibility for the derogatory remarks. The top two base officials have either ignored the protests or overreacted, contrary to Ciarlo's somewhat lenient instructions for treating dissenters. Nevertheless, attempts to remove the two officials have been overridden due to their alleged ties to influential politicians. Ciarlo appears to have lost control of the situation and rumors of his imminent dismissal are increasing.

In the past week, dissident military activity has occurred in eight cities, including Rome, Milan, and Naples. Several significant developments were revealed by these incidents:

- The dissidents, especially in the air force, appear more extensively organized than previously thought.
- Dissent appears to be growing in the army and navy.
- The Socialist Party and the non-communist labor confederations are beginning to support the protests.
- Press coverage is increasing, thus assuring greater public awareness of the issue.

The Communist Party has for the most part failed to support the protests publicly, perhaps reflecting its concern that the dissidence could give impetus to unionization of the military. The Communists fear that unionization would hinder their efforts to achieve a larger role for parliament in the formulation of military policy—a development which would enhance the party's ability to influence the situation.

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Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975A028800010006-6

National Intelligence Bulletin

April 3, 1976

COLOMBIA

The recent upsurge of student violence, labor unrest, kidnapings, and assassination attempts has prompted the Lopez government to adopt even stronger security measures in an effort to maintain public order. Yesterday, the government closed three universities in Bogota, including the national university, and reportedly is considering closing others throughout the country. Further, the army commander authorized his troops to fire on anyone attacking police or army forces. The measure comes after three days of violent student demonstrations in Bogota and elsewhere that have resulted in injury to hundreds of security personnel.

Two weeks ago, the government decreed that any student engaged in disorders would be expelled from school and that government employees who walk off the job would be fired. The sanctions apparently have not deterred the students, although they have had some effect on government workers and teachers. Student grievances center mainly on the government's alleged repressive policies on campus, while the government workers and teachers are demanding sizable wage increases that the administration has refused to grant.

The wave of violence—now two months old—has caused some grumblings of discontent among the military, and for the first time in recent months there is open talk that the armed forces may have to intervene if the government cannot maintain public order. While there is little immediate danger of military intervention, continued violence would further alienate the armed forces and could eventually precipitate serious plotting.

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