


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
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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE

Saturday February 5, 1977

CG NIDC 77-029C




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National Intelligence Daily Cable for Saturday, February 5, 1977.



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USSR: US Newsmen Expelled, Dissident Arrested

25X1 [] The official expulsion notice served yesterday to Associated Press Moscow correspondent George Krinsky and the arrest on Thursday of human rights activist Aleksandr Ginzburg are clear signs of rising Soviet irritation with human rights activism in the USSR and with Moscow's bad press on this issue in the West.

25X1 [] The expulsion of Krinsky--the first of an American journalist since 1970--follows the rehashing by the Soviet press of charges of illegal financial transactions and other transgressions first levied against him and two other US newsmen last summer. Soviet officials used these charges during unsuccessful diplomatic attempts over the past two weeks to have Krinsky recalled, but there is little doubt that it was Krinsky's fluency in Russian and his extensive contacts in the dissident community that caused his ouster.

25X1 [] The same issue of the journal *Literary Gazette* that attacked Krinsky on Wednesday carried a harsh attack on Ginzburg and other leading members of the unofficial group set up last May to monitor Soviet compliance with the Helsinki accords. The group has been subjected to increasing harassment and public accusations, especially since KGB searches of several members' apartments in late December and early January. Police reportedly planted foreign currency, possession of which is normally illegal in the USSR, in some of the apartments including Ginzburg's.

25X1 [] Ginzburg and other leading human rights activists defiantly met with Western newsmen following Wednesday's press attacks to express their concern but also their determination to carry on their work. Ginzburg publicly acknowledged that he has managed the Moscow end of a fund set up in 1974 by exiled author Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn to aid Soviet political prisoners and their families, but he denied all charges of illegal foreign currency transactions.

25X1 [] Ginzburg reportedly has been taken to a provincial town south of Moscow where he is a legal resident. His friends fear that he will be charged not for his political crimes but

[redacted]

for foreign currency manipulation, a serious criminal offense. The founder of the group, physicist Yury Orlov, reportedly has fled Moscow in an effort to avoid arrest.

25X1 [redacted] Ginzburg's friends feel strongly that Moscow was emboldened to arrest Ginzburg by what they view as signs of confusion in the US over how to treat Soviet violations of civil rights. They hope to stir up enough Western publicity to forestall further action against Ginzburg. At a press conference in Moscow yesterday, they accused the US of betrayal on the human rights issue.

25X1 [redacted] Whether or not recent events signal a serious effort to curb the monitoring group and other dissidents, the arrest of Ginzburg and the expulsion of Krimsky seem designed at a minimum to intimidate the dissident community and those Western newsmen who provide it with a voice abroad. [redacted]

25X1

AFRICA-RHODESIA: OAU Meeting

25X1 [redacted] The Patriotic Front of Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe yesterday received the backing of the OAU's 22-member African Liberation Committee. The committee stopped short, however, of exclusive recognition of the Front, leaving the door open for OAU members to deal with other Rhodesian nationalist factions. The committee's decision probably will be subject to confirmation by the OAU Council of Ministers, which is scheduled to meet later this month in Togo.

25X1 [redacted] The issue of recognizing the Patriotic Front has been a controversial one. None of the OAU countries wants a repetition of the Angola situation in which the OAU could not agree on a single faction to back. As a result, members found themselves on opposing sides in an African civil war.

25X1 [redacted] Nigeria played a key role in opposing a determined effort by Liberia, Ghana, and several other countries to give equal status to all Rhodesian nationalist factions. Nigeria probably provided the formula that was finally adopted. Although most African leaders would prefer to see the various factions unite, this is unlikely to occur.

[Redacted]

25X1

[Redacted]

The front-line presidents wanted to give exclusive backing to the Patriotic Front because of its fragile nature. The clearly secondary role ascribed to Bishop Muzorewa's African National Council and to Ndabaningi Sithole will help keep the Front from splitting. The support given the Front also will strengthen its hand and that of the front-line states in any future negotiations.

25X1

[Redacted]

The Patriotic Front apparently now will be the recipient of any additional military assistance to the Rhodesian struggle offered by OAU members. Nigeria reportedly pledged a substantial sum, variously reported as \$1.5 million and \$5 million. The Nigerians probably will designate at least some of their aid for use by liberation groups from Namibia and South Africa. OAU states still are free to deal with any of the liberation groups they choose; the action by the liberation committee has the force only of moral suasion.

25X1

[Redacted]

Still undetermined is the question of military assistance for Mozambique, which has borne the brunt of attacks by Rhodesian security forces against Rhodesian guerrillas. A meeting of the OAU defense commission was to have taken place immediately following the liberation committee session to discuss Mozambique's problems, but many countries refused to attend.

25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

EAST GERMANY: Mobilization Exercise

25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

[Redacted] a major East German reserve mobilization exercise, probably lasting about four weeks, will take place in late spring or early summer.//

[Redacted]

[REDACTED]

25X1

[REDACTED] such mobilization exercises have occurred irregularly over the past several years. Past exercises have caused considerable economic disruption in affected areas, and severe disruptions undoubtedly would accompany any nationwide mobilization.

[REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

[REDACTED] //Activity in and around East Berlin remains normal. Reports of barriers being erected west of Berlin and engineering activity north of the city were unfounded. A report that travel restrictions were placed on foreign diplomatic travel also has been proven incorrect.//

25X1

[REDACTED] //East German party leader Honecker is in Romania this weekend for talks with party chief Ceausescu. Honecker's absence from East Germany at this time is a further indication that the situation in the country is normal and the leadership is carrying on business as usual. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

25X1
25X1

TANZANIA-KENYA: Increased Friction

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[REDACTED] Tanzania's temporary closure of its border with Kenya is the latest in a series of developments reflecting rising tensions between the two countries. Tanzania also has placed restrictions on the movement of aircraft and vehicles registered in Kenya that are in Tanzania.


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[REDACTED] //Last weekend, small Tanzanian military units apparently took up positions along the Kenyan border. Kenyan observers reportedly have spotted the Tanzanian troops, and the Nairobi government has sent some of its military personnel to the border.//

25X1

[REDACTED] The friction between the two countries grew out of the recent collapse of East African Airlines, a regional company jointly owned by Tanzania, Kenya, and Uganda. The Kenyans impounded the assets of the company because of debts owed by the other two.

[REDACTED]



25X1



//Kenya has announced that it is setting up its own national airline, and Tanzania is likely to follow suit. Tanzanian President Nyerere apparently intends to give up his remaining economic ties in the East African Community, an economic organization formed under the aegis of the British linking Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda. Nyerere prefers economic links with Zambia and Mozambique, with which he has established close political ties.//

25X1



//Tanzania's reaction to the airline dispute reflects embarrassment over the fact that many foreign dignitaries invited to celebrations this weekend sponsored by the Tanzanian ruling party were forced to change their travel plans. Tanzanian security officials, moreover, have been increasingly edgy over coup rumors and the possibility of political unrest during the party celebrations, some of which are to take place in a town near the Kenyan border. Tanzania's military forces have been on alert since Christmas.//

25X1



Neither of the two countries is likely to initiate military action over the dispute, and the situation along the border may return to normal soon after the Tanzanian festivities. Tanzania seems to be using its tough actions as a vent for domestic pressures. 

25X1

ETHIOPIA: Mengistu in Charge

25X1



Military council First Vice Chairman Mengistu is in charge in Ethiopia in the wake of the fighting and executions on Thursday when several council members were killed. Yesterday, speeches by Mengistu and others at a rally and a statement issued by the council blamed Ethiopia's problems on Mengistu's enemies in the council, domestic insurgents, and their alleged foreign backers including Sudan, Somalia, and Saudi Arabia. Mengistu promised to crush opposition to the revolution.

25X1



The statements may foreshadow an increased effort to deal with the various opposition groups and seem to indicate that there will be no change in policies that have led to a deterioration in Ethiopia's relations with most of its neighbors.



25X1

[redacted] There apparently are no signs thus far of any serious opposition to the new leadership in military units in the provinces, although the executions probably have made Mengistu some new enemies there. The latest turmoil in Addis Ababa could, however, make government troops even less willing to fight widespread insurgency.

[redacted] There appears to be no immediate threat to Mengistu from the remaining council members and there are unconfirmed reports that Second Vice Chairman Atnafu, Mengistu's main remaining rival, has been arrested. Press reports indicate that a number of top civil servants in the information and foreign ministries also have been arrested.

[redacted] Mengistu, a 33-year-old former ordnance officer, is the leader of the council faction that has pushed for the swift transformation of Ethiopia along radical Marxist lines. //He favors a tough stand against the regime's opponents and is personally responsible for many of the arbitrary arrests and executions carried out since the military came to power 28 months ago.//

[redacted] //Mengistu advocates closer ties to communist countries--especially the USSR--at the expense of ties with the US. He probably will press Moscow to implement quickly a military sales agreement worked out last December. The Soviets reportedly have already expressed satisfaction to Ethiopian officials over the failure of the alleged "coup attempt."// [redacted]

CHINA-BURMA: Chou's Wife to Burma

[redacted] //Chou En-lai's widow, Teng Ying-chao, arrives in Rangoon this weekend as head of a Chinese "goodwill" delegation. This is the first high-level Chinese visit to a Southeast Asian country since the purge of China's leading leftists last October.//

[redacted] //Although little in the way of substantive discussion is likely, China hopes the trip will underscore the importance it attaches to friendly official relations with Burma and with other countries in the region.//



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
 //The Chinese also may be using the visit to balance the unusual attention they gave to the exiled leaders of the Burmese Communist Party in Peking shortly after Mao Tse-tung's death and the purge of the leftists. Since then, the new Chinese leadership has been eager to affirm its revolutionary credentials, especially to the "fraternal" parties it has long supported in Southeast Asia.//

25X1

 Teng, a vice chairman of the National People's Congress standing committee, is a popular figure in China and in recent weeks has met frequently with foreign visitors in Peking. //China's new leaders probably are using Teng to symbolize the continuity in major foreign policies, most of which have been closely identified with Chou. This symbolism is especially appropriate in the Burmese case because of the frequent trips Chou made to Burma in the 1960s and Burmese President Ne Win's long friendship with Chou.//

(S NF) //Ne Win, who met with Chou in Peking in late 1975, reportedly is "delighted" with Teng's visit and has personally taken a hand in the preparations.//(SECRET NORFORN, ORCON)


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USSR-IRAQ: Joint Communique

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[redacted] The joint communique issued after Iraqi leader Saddam Husayn's visit this week to Moscow reflects a markedly improved relationship. Soviet and Iraqi leaders may have completed agreement on a major new military aid package that was negotiated last summer.

25X1

[redacted] Saddam Husayn last visited Moscow in 1975 when there were signs of strain between the two states. During that visit, Saddam did not meet with Soviet party chief Brezhnev, and the visit was cut short without explanation. Moscow at that time was concerned that the rapprochement between Iraq and Iran would mean a diminution of the USSR's influence in Iraq, and Saddam apparently did little to calm Soviet anxieties.

25X1

[redacted] //Premier Kosygin's visit to Baghdad last spring apparently resulted in an agreement in principle for sizable quantities of Soviet military and economic assistance, but the talks did not appear to resolve long-standing political differences such as the Baathist party's treatment of Iraqi Communists.// The joint communique described the meetings as "cordial and frank," an implicit but reliable admission of discord.

25X1

[redacted] The statement issued on Thursday, however, indicates that the two sides have decided to reduce their political squabbling and concentrate on strengthening economic and military ties. One result could be an increase in the Soviet presence in Iraq.



[redacted] //The communique explicitly referred to military assistance. The last time a Soviet-Iraqi document referred to military aid was in 1974, when they concluded a \$850-million agreement for jet fighters, medium tanks, and surface-to-air missile battalions. It now seems that the two sides have signed or on the verge of signing another major agreement.//

[redacted] The most significant political aspect of the communique was Moscow's willingness to give its blessing to the Baathist "revolutionary experiment." This indicates for the first time in several years that the Soviet leaders are not haranguing Saddam over his treatment of the Iraqi Communist Party.

[redacted] The Baathist-Communist relationship has been uneasy at best, but at this point the Soviets apparently do not want to try to induce better relations among Iraq's bickering political groups, a position that will not please Iraqi Communists.

[redacted] The resurgence of Moscow's interest in Iraq is explained in part by Soviet setbacks in Egypt and Syria. Significant Soviet influence in the Middle East now appears confined to Iraq and Libya.

[redacted] The Soviets still have long-standing disagreements with these states, however, over an approach to Arab-Israeli peace talks with Moscow insisting on renewal of the Geneva peace conference. Soviet summitry with Iraq and Libya has not narrowed these differences, but Moscow is content to ignore the divergent approaches.

[redacted] The Soviets used Saddam's visit to take swipes at both Egypt and Syria. The joint communique condemned "outside interference" in Lebanon, which is the standard Soviet formulation aimed at Syrian activities there. Kosygin's address at a banquet for Saddam in the Kremlin on February 1 stressed that Soviet economic programs abroad did not constitute a "charitable activity" and that Moscow would have to take into account "mutual interests and requirements," an obvious warning to Cairo. [redacted]

TURKEY: Continuing Violence

25X1 [] The Turkish government is increasingly concerned about continuing violence between militant young rightists and leftwingers, which resulted in 21 deaths last month alone.

25X1 [] The governing coalition is coming under attack for failing to halt the violence, particularly since one party in the coalition--the extreme-right Nationalist Action Party--is held responsible for most of the civil disorders caused by rightist students. Prime Minister Demirel had been unwilling to rein in party leader Turkes, who is a deputy prime minister, but last week he reportedly did strip him of his general supervisory responsibility for internal security.

25X1 [] Following a regular meeting of the Turkish General Staff this week, President Koruturk issued a statement warning that failure to handle the unrest adequately could have unfortunate effects on democratic stability--as was the case in 1971 when the military intervened. There are no indications, however, that the present violence has triggered preparations or even talk about military intervention.

25X1 [] Civil disorder has become an important issue for the fall election, with opposition leader Ecevit charging that the government is unable to ensure internal security.

25X1 [] Controversy over the handling of the disorders also has helped to inspire rumors of an early parliamentary election. Leaders of both major parties are now speaking positively about such an election, but each has conditions that the other is unwilling to accept. The US embassy believes that the odds on the election date being changed from October to May or June are no better than even. []

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