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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE

Thursday March 17, 1977      CG NIDC 77-062C

State Dept. review completed

[Redacted]

**NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION**  
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

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National Intelligence Daily Cable for Wednesday, March 17, 1977.

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] The NID Cable is for the purpose of informing senior US officials.

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CONTENTS

ZAIRE-ANGOLA: Situation Report Page 1

LEBANON: Jumblatt Assassination Page 2

USSR: Katushev's Appointment Page 3

[REDACTED]  
USSR: Sakharov Letter Page 5

25X1

[REDACTED]  
USSR: Tenth Five Year Plan Page 7

25X1

[REDACTED]  
COSTA RICA: Primary Elections Page 9

25X1

CHINA: Provincial Politics Page 9

USSR - WEST GERMANY: Talks Page 11

PAKISTAN: Opposition to Bhutto Page 12

25X1

ZAIRE-ANGOLA: Situation Report



25X1 [redacted] //The Katangan force is continuing to move eastward  
along the southern axis toward Mutshatsha; it captured Masaji  
yesterday. In the north, [redacted]  
25X1 [redacted] the Katangan column that took Kapanga on the first day  
of the operation may be moving through the countryside toward  
Kamina.//

25X1. [redacted] The Zairian military has dispatched a battalion from  
Kolwezi to reinforce Mutshatsha, where the remnants of the com-  
mando battalion involved in earlier fighting have taken up  
defensive positions.

25X1 [redacted] The Zairian command is taking additional steps to  
reinforce Shaba Province. Four companies reportedly were sched-  
uled to be airlifted to Kamina from the Kinshasa area and

Kisangani yesterday. The new troops apparently will be used either to reinforce points along the southern invasion route or to counterattack along the northern axis.

25X1 [redacted] Zairian military operations are still being hampered by fuel shortages. The Mirage aircraft at Kamina reportedly are grounded because of a lack of fuel, and fuel supplies in the Kinshasa area are low. The military's fuel stocks in Kasaji were captured earlier this week.

25X1 [redacted] There is growing apprehension among US citizens working for a US construction firm in Kolwezi, and some of the 51 men are eager to leave. Dependents of this group were evacuated to the north on Tuesday. The Zairian government reacted adversely to this action, apparently because it fears that a departure by US citizens might trigger panic in Kolwezi.

25X1 [redacted] The Zairians are continuing to play down the Shaba situation in their domestic media. This policy could backfire if the Katangans advance much farther, as they seem likely to do.



LEBANON: Jumblatt Assassination

25X1 [redacted] The assassination of Lebanese leftist leader Kamal Jumblatt near the home village of right-wing Christian leader Camille Shamun has already led to numerous reprisals against Christians by members of Jumblatt's Druze constituency. Jumblatt's killers have not been identified.

25X1 [redacted] Murders and kidnappings that are occurring in both Beirut and in Christian villages in the predominantly Druze

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province of Shuf will not be easily contained. Syrian peace-keeping forces, however, should be able to prevent serious clashes between Christians and leftist forces.

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[redacted] Jumblatt, a hereditary chieftain of Lebanon's Druze community and head of the Progressive Socialist Party, had played a prominent role in Lebanese politics since the 1940s and was the pivotal figure in the making and breaking of several Lebanese governments. He was unique among Lebanese politicians in being both the feudal leader of the conservative Druze community, which comprises 10 percent of the population, and an avowed socialist with a strong following among the working class of Beirut.

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[redacted] Because of his stature and his determination to destroy the old confessional political system that favored the Maronite Christians, Jumblatt became the rallying point and recognized leader of a disparate group of Muslim leftists and radicals at the height of the fighting last year. He was an implacable foe of Syrian efforts to resolve the crisis by political means and a staunch opponent of Syrian military intervention and continued involvement in Lebanon, until he was forced to acquiesce under pressure from both Syria and his Palestinian allies.

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[redacted] Because of his continued opposition to Syria, some of his followers are certain to conclude that the Syrians had a hand in his assassination. His death does remove a major irritant and impediment to the efforts of the Sarkis government and the Syrians to work out an eventual political settlement. There is no one with the stature to replace him; his death thus leaves the Lebanese left significantly weaker. [redacted]

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USSR: Katushev's Appointment


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[redacted] The appointment yesterday of Konstantin Katushev as a deputy premier and Soviet delegate to the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance opens an important vacancy in the party secretariat. Katushev has been the party secretary responsible for relations with East European parties since April 1968, working under the supervision of General Secretary Brezhnev

and senior party secretary Suslov. Precedent calls for a secretary to relinquish his party post when named to a full-time government portfolio.

25X1 [redacted] No replacement has been named for Katushev, however, nor has he been formally relieved of his post in the secretariat. Both moves can only be announced at a meeting of the party Central Committee. Such a meeting could be held at any time but need not be convened until April, six months from the previous such meeting.

25X1 [redacted] The timing of this announcement is puzzling. Katushev, as the responsible secretary, has been playing a conspicuous role in the current Soviet effort to achieve a coordinated position with the East European parties on human rights issues in preparation for the conference this summer in Belgrade to review implementation of the Helsinki agreement. The Politburo may have removed him because of dissatisfaction with his performance. [redacted]



USSR: Sakharov Letter

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[redacted] Dissident spokesman Andrey Sakharov has sent a letter to the *New York Times* rebutting recent Soviet accusations against him, condemning specific instances of antidissident repression, and appealing for foreign--especially US--support.

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[redacted] The letter was forwarded to the *Times* on Monday, according to the US embassy in Moscow, which obtained a copy. It presumably will be published shortly.


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[redacted] Sakharov's letter is in response to an article by Soviet Deputy Procurator General Gusev published by the *Times* on February 23. The article sought to document a Soviet legal position against Sakharov's activities.

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[redacted] Sakharov charges that Gusev's article was an attempt to test Western resolve in support of human rights, and expresses confidence that no one in the West, including President Carter, "will permit himself to be diverted from the consciously chosen and principled path of active defense of human rights throughout the world.

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
 The dissident Soviet physicist may have felt that he could not let Gusev's legalistic arguments go unanswered in the Western press. Gusev's article and other public signs that Moscow may be constructing a legal case against Sakharov indicate that the Soviets may ultimately present Sakharov with a choice of prosecution or expulsion from the USSR. The timing of Sakharov's letter suggests that he probably intended it to be published on the eve of Secretary Vance's visit to Moscow.

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
 Sakharov yesterday led a group of 21 Soviet dissidents in issuing a public appeal to President Carter to stand firm on human rights and to express concern over the arrest on Tuesday of Anatoly Shcharansky, the Jewish activist prominent in the campaign to monitor Soviet compliance with the Helsinki agreements. 

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USSR: Tenth Five Year Plan

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[redacted] The head of a USSR State Planning Committee (Gosplan) department, V. V. Mordvinov, recently confirmed that Moscow does not plan to publish a detailed book on its tenth five-year plan (1976 to 1980). He asserted that Gosplan specialists are all occupied with drafting the 15-year plan for 1976 to 1990.

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[redacted] Failure to publish a detailed study on the current plan could open the USSR to criticism that it is acting contrary to the spirit of the provision in the Helsinki accords that promotes the exchange of economic data. Gosplan published the detailed version of the ninth five-year plan in 1972.

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[redacted] Soviet economic and political difficulties may be a basic reason for unwillingness to publish the current five-year plan.

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Mordvinov stated that economic data could be obtained from articles published in the Soviet press. He added that perhaps too much is now published in Soviet journals, suggesting that in the future less may be revealed in these sources as well.

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[REDACTED] Mordvinov also said the 15-year plan was being re-drafted to take account of Soviet "successes and failures" in 1976 and is scheduled to be finished in May for internal Soviet discussion. He did not say whether the final version would be made public.

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[REDACTED] A Soviet official in Mordvinov's department commented that present difficulties between the US and the USSR are causing many complications for him in dealing with US trade in the 15-year plan. He was noncommittal, however, when asked if this was not contrary to the traditional Soviet view that political differences should not be allowed to interfere with trade.

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[REDACTED] The USSR had hoped to draw heavily on US equipment, technology, and credits in developing natural resources. General agreements had been signed with US firms for multibillion dollar natural gas projects in eastern and western Siberia. The restrictions on US Eximbank lending and the subsequent Soviet decision to abrogate the US-USSR trade agreement, however, have significantly reduced the chances of obtaining US participation in such projects. [REDACTED]

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
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COSTA RICA: Primary Elections

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 Costa Rica, one of the few remaining democracies in Latin America, held primary elections on Sunday to choose candidates for the presidential election to be held in February 1978. The primaries--the first in Costa Rica's history--were peaceful and honest.

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 Luis Alberto Monge, leader of the governing National Liberation Party's "progressive" wing, won his party's nomination over a more conservative opponent. Monge's control of the party's machinery brought out a heavy vote in his favor.

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 The opposition candidate will be Rodrigo Carazo, a journeyman politician who calls himself a Christian Democrat. He won nomination under the banner of the Opposition Unity, a collection of small parties.

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 Monge and Carazo will not offer the voters a clear choice. Both espouse the social democratic philosophy that has dominated Costa Rican politics in recent years. 


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CHINA: Provincial Politics

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 Several officials in Liaoning Province in northeastern China were apparently purged last week, and a nationally known leftist spokesman, Chang Tieh-sheng, was arrested there on Monday.

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
25X1 [redacted] The group has been charged with supporting the four leftist Politburo members purged last October and with obstructing the nationwide campaign to root out their followers. These moves and major personnel changes in other provinces suggest Peking now feels confident that other troubled provinces are sufficiently under control to allow it to concentrate on Liaoning.

25X1 [redacted] The purges and the arrest broke a stalemate that had existed in Liaoning between local political factions since last fall. Additional criticism of local officials may threaten the political standing of the current first secretary of the province, Tseng Shao-shan, and two military members of the Politburo. The two are Li Te-sheng, commander of the Shenyang Military Region, which has its headquarters in Liaoning, and Chen Hsi-lien, the former commander of the region who now commands the Peking Military Region.

25X1 [redacted] Li has been commander of the military region since 1974 and could be held responsible for Liaoning's propaganda support of leftist causes in 1976 and its tepid support of the antileftist campaign this year.

25X1 [redacted] //A local radio broadcast has noted, however, that Li directed and delivered instructions to the stormy provincial party committee meeting at which the purges took place. A reference in the broadcast to some people in Liaoning daring Peking to "lay a finger on Liaoning" seems to imply that a military threat might have backed up local resistance to Peking's directives. In addition, a deputy commander of the region had been included in a cabinet list allegedly drawn up by the "gang of four."//

25X1 [redacted] //Chen Hsi-lien was commander of the Shenyang Military Region and Liaoning party first secretary when Chang Tieh-sheng first appeared in 1973 in the province as a "model student" in opposition to the conservative education policy. Provincial propaganda, which was presumably under Chen's control, took the lead in praising Chang's refusal to complete a college entrance examination. Chang has since been denounced throughout China for interfering in the local affairs of many provinces on behalf of the leftists on the Politburo.//




25X1 [redacted] //The younger Mao was also secretary to his uncle and a Liaoning provincial party secretary and military region political commissar prior to his arrest in Peking last year. Up to now, provincial progaganda has focused on Mao Yuan-hsin, although without naming him, as the root of Liaoning's problems. Provincial leaders not yet accused of complicity with the left may seek to use Mao as a scapegoat.// [redacted]

USSR - WEST GERMANY: Talks

25X1 [redacted] A senior member of the West German Foreign Office, Assistant Secretary Guenther Van Well, is scheduled to go to Moscow next week with the hope of paving the way for high-level West German - Soviet talks later this year.

25X1 [redacted] Van Well will propose another round of negotiations on two of three pending bilateral agreements--a cultural protocol and a scientific and technological cooperation pact. He does not plan to suggest talks on the legal assistance agreement.

25X1 [redacted] Economic issues are not likely to receive much attention. The Soviets recently rejected a proposal for a meeting this month of the West German - Soviet economic commission and have not yet responded to alternative dates suggested by the West Germans.



25X1 [redacted] If progress is made toward concluding the bilateral agreements, Van Well will tentatively propose a visit by Foreign Minister Genscher to Moscow in June. He will also probe the Soviets about a date for the much-postponed visit of General Secretary Brezhnev to Bonn.

25X1 [redacted] A Foreign Office source told the US embassy in Bonn that he does not expect the Brezhnev visit to occur until the end of the year. [redacted]

PAKISTAN: Opposition to Bhutto

25X1 [redacted] The US embassy expects that it will be unclear for several weeks whether the Pakistani opposition alliance can pose a genuine threat to Prime Minister Bhutto.

25X1 [redacted] The opposition strategy apparently is to erode Bhutto's position through continuing demonstrations. It probably hopes the military will eventually intervene. Should widespread civil disorders appear likely to continue, the army might well choose to move against Bhutto rather than against the demonstrators.


25X1 [redacted] The security situation so far is not serious enough for the military to consider removing Bhutto. Demonstrations may lead to greater violence, however, with both demonstrators and police becoming more inclined to use force. The army has been called into several cities to back up the police.



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25X1 [redacted] Bhutto is trying to avoid giving the opposition any new issues, and he apparently hopes the campaign will eventually die. Most opposition leaders were arrested Monday but quickly released. Lower level opposition workers, whose arrests are less likely to bring strong popular reaction, are being jailed; their absence from the campaign will hamper the organizing of demonstrations.

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
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[redacted] Bhutto is seeking to divide the opposition, and is having some success. Opposition leaders reportedly cannot agree on whether to negotiate on Bhutto's offer to hold the provincial assembly elections a second time. The secretary general of the opposition alliance was forced to resign because of rumors that he had met with Bhutto. [redacted]

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