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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE

Tuesday May 31, 1977 CG NIDC 77-125C

[Redacted]

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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

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National Intelligence Daily Cable for Tuesday, May 31, 1977.

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[REDACTED] The NID Cable is for the purpose of informing senior US officials.

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RHODESIA-MOZAMBIQUE: Incursion

25X1 *The Rhodesian military incursion into Mozambique over the weekend occurred the same day the joint US-UK team arrived in Mozambique for talks with black Rhodesian nationalists and was apparently intended in part to underscore Prime Minister Smith's willingness to support his tough negotiating position with military action. The Rhodesians have probably known the location of the guerrilla camp struck in the raid for some time.*

25X1 [redacted] The joint US-UK team arrived in Maputo on Sunday for talks with Robert Mugabe, the most militant of the black Rhodesian nationalist leaders. The team has been seeking the views of all parties to the Rhodesian problem on possible terms for a peaceful settlement and had just completed talks with Smith last week in Salisbury.

25X1 [redacted] The latest Rhodesian cross-border operation is only the third one officially announced by Salisbury and is the largest such action since a three-day operation in northwestern Mozambique last November. The guerrilla camp is in the Rhodesia - Mozambique - South Africa triborder area, and at last report the Rhodesian attack was continuing even deeper inside Mozambique. According to press reports, some 20 guerrillas have been killed and a large quantity of war materiel has been seized.

25X1 [redacted] Rhodesian government policy requires that all potentially sensitive cross-border operations be cleared by the prime minister. Smith undoubtedly approved the present operation to dramatize Rhodesia's determination to carry the war to the insurgents for as long as possible and to demonstrate his willingness to back his tough negotiating stance with strenuous military action. [redacted]

ANGOLA: Discontent Growing

25X1 [redacted] //Angolan President Neto may have quashed the coup attempt of last Friday but discontent with his regime is growing. [redacted]

25X1 [redacted] Luanda was calm this weekend, although a heavy guard was maintained around the presidential palace, the radio station, and other strategic positions. The government announced that the finance minister, four other members of the central committee of the ruling Popular Movement, and a senior official of the internal security forces were killed by the dissidents. Press reports estimate that more than 100 people may have died in the fighting. Nito Alves and Jose van Dunem, leaders of the dissidents who staged the coup attempt, apparently have escaped.

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[redacted] //Despite the failure of the coup attempt, Alves probably can still rally support among Luanda's poor and he may seek allies among other dissidents in the military and the party.

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[redacted]

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[redacted] //Many believe the Active Revolt faction is the only viable alternative to the Neto government. It reportedly has been gaining strength in recent months. The Active Revolt is thought to have disseminated the anti-Neto pamphlets that appeared in Luanda last month.//

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SOUTH AFRICA - Namibia: Execution

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[redacted] *South Africa's execution yesterday of a convicted murderer who had been active in the South-West Africa Peoples Organization may seriously hamper efforts to achieve a peaceful settlement in Namibia.*

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[redacted] The South Africans convicted Nduvuu Philemon Nangola of murder in two incidents in late 1975 and early 1976 in northern Namibia in which three white adults and one child were killed. They dropped a terrorism charge, perhaps because Nangola refused to admit his SWAPO connection.

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[redacted] //Five Western powers--the US, UK, West Germany, France, and Canada--which have been involved in trying to achieve a peaceful transition to black majority rule in Namibia had appealed strongly for a stay of execution, but Prime Minister Vorster was adamant that it was an ordinary murder case and that Nangola had defected from SWAPO before the incidents occurred.

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[redacted]

SWAPO and most UN members will view the execution as a political act. SWAPO sent a telegram last Wednesday to the five Western nations, UN Secretary General Waldheim, the UN Commission on Human Rights, and the International Commission of Jurists seeking help in getting a stay of execution for Nangola.

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[redacted] By deciding to go ahead with the execution without delay, South Africa reaffirmed its policy of no amnesty for convicted criminals. The execution and the widespread international condemnation it is expected to arouse will make it much more difficult for the parties involved in the Namibian question to reach compromise solutions.

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ISRAEL: The Dayan Controversy

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[redacted] *The Likud party executive committee in Israel has passed a resolution requiring party head Menahem Begin to submit all his cabinet nominations to the committee after he is formally designated to form a government sometime next month.*

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The resolution, temporarily freezes Begin's offer of the Foreign Ministry to former defense minister Moshe Dayan, and party leaders hope it will placate the Democratic Movement for Change, which broke off coalition talks last week in opposition to the Dayan nomination. The Democratic Movement, however, may demand more concessions in return for its cooperation.

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[redacted] The reaction of the Democratic Movement remains uncertain, especially since Begin seems determined to bring Dayan into his cabinet eventually. Leaders of the Democratic Movement planned to meet yesterday to discuss the possibility of resuming coalition talks.

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[redacted] Democratic Movement leader Yigael Yadin and other party officials said repeatedly last week that the party would not resume coalition talks with Begin unless he withdrew his offer to Dayan. Yadin and his colleagues fear that with the conservative Dayan in charge of the Foreign Ministry, the Democratic Movement would be unable to exert a significant, moderating influence on Likud's hardline negotiating stance.

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[redacted] The Democratic Movement might demand control of key domestic ministries as the price for acceptance of Dayan as foreign minister.

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[redacted] Leaders of Likud's Liberal wing, who protested that they were not consulted about the offer to Dayan, appear satisfied with the new arrangement by which the Likud executive committee, in which all party factions are represented, must approve cabinet appointments. This is only a face-saving device for the Liberals, however, since Begin's Herut contingent and other party groups that support the Dayan nomination enjoy a majority in the executive committee.

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LEBANON: Negotiations Deadlocked

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[redacted] Sarkis believes that if the Palestinians are disarmed he will have grounds for demanding that Christian forces disarm. He hopes this will enhance his authority and lay the groundwork for future political negotiations between the Christian and Muslim communities.

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[redacted] Over the weekend, Christian leaders denounced the Cairo agreements as "null and void" and urged the Arab League to resolve the "illegal Palestinian presence in Lebanon." The Christians clearly are trying to increase the pressure on Sarkis and other Arab leaders to force the Palestinians to accept a tough interpretation of the Cairo accords.

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[redacted] Palestine Liberation Organization chairman Arafat fears--with justification--that disarming the Palestinians would allow the Syrians to gain control over the movement and leave the guerrillas vulnerable to Christian retaliation.

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[redacted] The Syrians side with Sarkis but have shunned using force which would:

--Meet stiff and costly resistance from the Palestinians.

--Antagonize the Saudis and Kuwaitis, who are subsidizing Syrian operations in Lebanon and do not want Syria to gain unilateral control over the PLO.

--Undermine Syria's broader interests at present in projecting an image of Arab unity during negotiations with Israel.

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[redacted] As a result, Syria has had to try to strike a compromise between the PLO and Sarkis by diplomatic means. Syrian leaders recently have entertained a procession of Lebanese and Palestinian leaders in Damascus, apparently in hopes of devising a formula that would satisfy Sarkis and still be palatable to the mainline fedayeen groups.

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[redacted] Fighting in the south, meanwhile, has settled down into a routine exchange of artillery fire between Palestinian and Christian forces in the area. [redacted]

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