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Top Secret 219

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE

Tuesday 15 November 1977

CG NIDC 77/265C

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

State Dept. review completed

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National Intelligence Daily Cable for Tuesday, 15 November 1977.

The NID Cable is for the purpose of informing senior US officials.

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- South Africa
- USSR
- [Redacted]
- Afghanistan
- Portugal
- North Korea - Japan
- Philippines

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CHINA-US: Public Criticism

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[redacted] *The increase since August in criticism of the Carter Administration in the Chinese media represents the most sustained Chinese public complaining about the US since the end of the Vietnam war.*

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[redacted] Peking appears to be taking out its frustrations over recent developments in US-Soviet relations by giving its propagandists license to be more open and personal in their criticism of the Carter administration. Chinese propagandists have refrained from criticizing President Carter and other top administration officials by name, however, and in this sense the recent criticism has not exceeded the level of that directed against the previous administration.

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[redacted] For the most part, the criticism has focused on such subjects as Presidential Review Memorandum-10, the joint US-Soviet statement on the Middle East, and most particularly the improvement in the atmosphere surrounding the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. The Chinese appear to see these developments as part of a dangerous trend toward closer US-Soviet cooperation.

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[redacted] Peking has signaled its unhappiness by broadcasting a series of reports that juxtapose official US policy statements with critical commentary from the Western press and from the Carter administration's domestic critics. Last Wednesday, for example, Chinese radio broadcasts cast in an unfavorable light State Department Special Adviser Marshall Shulman's testimony to a Congressional subcommittee.

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[redacted] The broadcasts contrasted excerpts from Shulman's testimony with tough anti-Soviet statements contained in a paper delivered recently by former Under Secretary of State Eugene Rostow. Chinese propagandists used the same technique in their coverage of President Carter's address to the UN General Assembly and his speech in Des Moines.

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[redacted] Two recent reports in the Chinese media appear to go beyond past practice. Last Wednesday, Peking broadcast a report noting the cancellation of President Carter's planned trip

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abroad, and then gratuitously cited an editorial that appeared in a West German newspaper giving an unfavorable review of the President's first 10 months in office. This was the first Chinese criticism not linked directly to US-Soviet dealings.

25X1 [] On 30 October the authoritative Chinese Communist Party newspaper *People's Daily* printed an article that appears to be directed personally at President Carter. The article discusses the supposed tenets of "certain religious believers," observes that "man's affairs are far more complex than the religious dream world," and concludes with a diatribe against those who attempt to "appease" the Soviets. The Chinese have been warning about an alleged "trend of appeasement in the West" with increased urgency since the controversy over PRM-10 began in early August. []

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EGYPT-ISRAEL: Sadat is Willing

25X1 [] *Egyptian President Sadat's statement in a US television interview last night that he is willing to go to Jerusalem within a week adds substance to what may well have begun as an exchange of rhetoric between Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Begin. Yesterday, Begin said he would issue an invitation to Sadat through the US embassies in the two countries and would cancel a trip to the UK next weekend in order to receive Sadat.*

25X1 [] Although both sides are now treating the prospect of such an unprecedented visit more seriously, there is still considerable posturing by both. It is possible that Sadat is using the exchange with Begin as a way of pressing the Syrians and Palestinians to be more flexible on procedural matters in order to arrange terms for going to Geneva. Moreover, the Egyptian press, attempting both to reassure other Arab countries and to avoid any misunderstanding in Israel, has been emphasizing that, if any such visit takes place, Sadat will be speaking for all Arabs and that no separate Israeli-Egyptian peace settlement is possible. []

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USSR: Western Communist Parties

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[redacted] the ceremonies commemorating the 50th anniversary of the October Revolution in Moscow indicates that the gap between the Soviet party and the Euro-communists is not narrowing.

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[redacted]

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[redacted] The published text of the speech Berlinguer delivered on 2 November supports the claim that little of substance was changed. Berlinguer rejected the notion of "leading and led parties," and said that the Italian Communists wanted to create a society that would "guarantee all personal and collective freedoms, the nonideological nature of the state, and the possibility of the coexistence of different parties."

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[redacted] The Soviets presumably could have accepted Berlinguer's defense of his party's independence, since they ritualistically deny any claim to leadership over the international movement. Berlinguer's support for "pluralism" and for a "nonideological state," however, are clearly sensitive points for Soviet leaders, whose power rests on a one-party dictatorship and who seem to feel themselves beset by external and internal critics.

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[redacted]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] In spite of Brezhnev's vocal indignation, he could hardly have been surprised by Berlinguer's failure to mention these two Soviet shibboleths. The Italian party's efforts to distance itself from both concepts are well established. Brezhnev's uncharacteristic stance may have had something to do with the intricacies of Soviet politics and with the presence of Suslov, the Soviet party's senior spokesman on questions of ideology, who has publicly and privately maintained an uncompromising attitude toward the Western Communists.

[REDACTED] In spite of this exchange, there is no sign that the Soviets want to push the quarrel with the Italian Communists.

[REDACTED] the Soviets considered Berlinguer to be a "good adversary" and went on to wish the Italians luck in their efforts to gain power. The Soviets presumably do not want to push the Italians into the position of open hostility already occupied by the Spanish Communists.

[REDACTED] Berlinguer is benefiting domestically from his refusal to budge on those points. In Italy, his speech is generally viewed as a firmer and more credible statement of the party's independence than similar speeches last year at the 25th Soviet party congress and at the Conference of European Communist Parties. Only one small party--the Republican--has cited Berlinguer's statement as evidence that the Communists should be admitted to the government, but nearly all of the parties have commented favorably on the speech. The Christian Democrats' official journal, in fact, said that it seemed to "confirm the irreversible" nature of the Communists' evolution away from Moscow.

[REDACTED]

NIGERIA-RHODESIA: Garba's Policy

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[redacted] Nigerian Foreign Minister Garba strongly defended his government's support for the Anglo-American proposals on Rhodesia at a press conference last Friday before departing for the UN. He was responding to recent criticism of the government's position by the Nigerian media and by members of the civilian constituent assembly who are using that body's debate on Nigeria's draft constitution to speak out on other issues.

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[redacted] Garba decried what he called comments by the press and "so-called radicals" conveying the impression that Nigeria has bent over backward to accept the UK-US proposals in total and that Nigeria has now abandoned the armed struggle against white minority rule. He reiterated that Nigeria backs the proposals, despite reservations, as the basis for further negotiations while continuing to support the nationalist struggle. He wondered why Nigeria should be criticized when the proposals have also been endorsed by the frontline states.

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[redacted] The criticism is a reminder that many influential Nigerians, especially in press, academic, and intellectual circles, still harbor strong suspicious of US and Western motives toward Nigeria and Africa. They are skeptical of closer cooperation with the US, particularly with respect to US initiatives in southern Africa, and they fear Nigeria risks losing influence in the region should these initiatives fail.

25X1 [redacted] Some members of the ruling Supreme Military Council reportedly share these sentiments, and Garba may have been directing his remarks in part at their behind-the-scenes criticism. His press conference nonetheless would seem to indicate that Head of State Obasanjo and a majority of the Council are still squarely behind the UK-US proposals on Rhodesia. [redacted]

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WEST GERMANY: Nuclear Industry

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[redacted] *The outlook for West Germany's hard-pressed nuclear energy industry, potentially the country's most important growth industry, has recently brightened.*

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[redacted] The Iranian Atomic Energy Organization last week sent a letter of intent to purchase four more 1,200-MW nuclear power plants from Kraftwerk Union, the leading producer of nuclear power plants in West Germany. The Iranian contract, with an estimated value of around \$5 billion, is the largest order booked by the company since its controversial contract last year with Brazil for the supply of a complete nuclear power cycle.

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[redacted] New export orders are vital to ensure continued employment for the professional and technical staff at Kraftwerk Union, because work on a number of its domestic nuclear power projects has been interrupted and new domestic orders delayed by court actions and citizens' initiatives. Even so, prospects for breaking the stalemate on domestic nuclear power construction are improving.

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[redacted] Indications are that the Social Democratic Party, the senior partner in the governing coalition, will adopt a moderate line toward nuclear power plant construction. While liberals, environmentalists, and youth in the party continue their strong

[redacted]

opposition, the party leadership from Chancellor Schmidt on down is firmly committed to a nuclear construction program. Fear of rising unemployment if electric power supplies prove inadequate in the future is also moving labor increasingly into the pro-nuclear power camp.

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[redacted] Last week, the Free Democratic Party, the junior partner in the coalition, rejected a nuclear moratorium and endorsed a program calling for the construction of several nuclear power plants beginning next summer. Under this program, building permits are to be issued if the federal government and the lower house of parliament approve provisions for storing and disposing of the radioactive waste. The Free Democrats consider the conditions required for storage of the material fulfilled by a recent report of the government nuclear safety commission.

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[redacted] While political opposition to renewed nuclear power plant construction appears to be easing, the ultimate fate of the program depends in part on the attitude of the courts.

[redacted]

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ECUADOR: Elections Postponed

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[redacted] //The Ecuadorean military government's postponement of the presidential election scheduled for next spring appears designed to thwart the front-running populist candidate, Assad Bucaram. The postponement, announced last Friday, was supported by most of Ecuador's other political leaders. Ironically, it could provide an opening for a takeover by military officers opposed to President Poveda's plan to return Ecuador to civilian rule via a popular election.//

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
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[redacted] The postponement decision suspends the electoral provisions of two constitutional drafts that are to be submitted to a referendum on 15 January. Among the suspended provisions

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are those detailing presidential qualifications. //Two constitutional commissions had earlier resisted requests by the military to disqualify Bucaram as a candidate on such grounds as the foreign birth of his parents or his lack of a university education. New election guidelines will now have to be issued, and these could disqualify Bucaram.//

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CUBA-FRANCE-MOROCCO: Warning


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 //Cuba, in a move that signals its willingness to risk a further deterioration in its relations with France and Morocco, has strongly protested the recent French military deployments in North Africa that followed the seizure of French citizens by the Polisario Front. Cuba appears genuinely concerned that Morocco--with French support--might undertake military strikes against Algeria. The Cubans probably view the present situation as an ideal opportunity to strengthen ties with Algeria in preparation for the 1979 nonaligned summit in Havana.//

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 //Cuba's relations with France and Morocco declined rapidly after those two countries helped thwart the Cuban-aided invasion of Zaire's Shaba region last spring. Until this month, however, Cuba had avoided provoking an open split with either country. Now, after 10 days of alarmist reporting in the Cuban press, the lead editorial in the 10 November edition of the Communist Party newspaper stressed Cuba's solidarity with Algeria and the people of Western Sahara in the face of threats of military action by France and Morocco.//

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25X1 [redacted] //The editorial emphasized that France would not be permitted to "exercise a role as gendarme in Africa with impunity." A high-level Cuban official told US diplomats in Havana, however, that the editorial was directed at Morocco and was designed to underscore the seriousness of Cuba's commitment to Algeria.//

25X1 [redacted] //The Castro government values its relations with France and would not jeopardize them lightly. Havana has tried to smooth over difficulties that have arisen with Paris in the past over such issues as Cuban contact with international terrorists and Cuba's military intervention in Angola.//

25X1 [redacted] //The Cubans clearly view the present imbroglio between France and Algeria as an ideal opportunity to demonstrate their solidarity with President Boumediene. As fellow Third World radicals, Cuba and Algeria have sided together on a range of issues, and Cuba considers Algeria its closest ally in the Arab world. Nonetheless, President Castro has not been able to develop the personal relationship with Boumediene that he enjoyed with his predecessor, Ahmed Ben Bella.//

25X1 [redacted]

25X1 [redacted] //We have no confirmation that any Cuban military advisers are serving with the Polisario Front, the Algerian-backed guerrilla movement that is seeking independence for Western Sahara. The Polisario presence in Havana apparently consists only of 20 students pursuing nonmilitary studies.

[redacted]

[redacted]

25X1 [redacted] The Algerian Charge in Havana--echoing his country's longstanding policy--recently told US diplomats there that his country wants only Cuba's political, not military, support. 25X1

GUYANA: Sugar Strike Stalemate

25X1 [redacted] //The sugar strike that the Guyanese Government vowed to end several weeks ago is now over 80 days old. Prime Minister Forbes Burnham has held to his no-compromise negotiating position against the stiff demands of the opposition-led Guyana Agriculture and General Workers' Union. His hard-line strategy has not worked, increasing his fears that his ruling People's National Congress will be defeated in approaching parliamentary elections.//

25X1 [redacted] The strike has become a bitter political showdown between Burnham and his Marxist arch-rival, Cheddi Jagan, the leader of the opposition People's Progressive Party. The government, moreover, can no longer hope to recover the heavy economic losses from a 40-percent cutback in sugar production during the strike.

25X1 [redacted] //Burnham, who has been worried about his sagging popularity for months, apparently hoped that a firm stand against Jagan's strike would restore his political fortune. His uncompromising stance and strong-arm tactics, however, have increased tensions between the strikers and the government, angered influential Guyanese church leaders, and won support for the strike from unions in the UK and Trinidad.//

USSR: Ultra High Voltage Lines

25X1 [] *The cost of distributing electrical power in the USSR may increase as a result of regulations proposed in response to growing concern over health hazards associated with ultra-high-voltage power transmission lines. The proposal, now under consideration by the Ministry of Power and Electrification, would restrict land use by prohibiting the exposure of unprotected civilians to the electric fields beneath and adjacent to such power lines. If adopted, the proposal would introduce major problems in power line routing as well as increase power distribution costs. The proposal seems overly restrictive, and the Soviets may ultimately adopt a less stringent standard.*

25X1 [] The concern stems from health problems reported by agricultural workers tending fields under 765-kilovolt power transmission lines. Since the lines were first put into service several years ago, Soviet farmers have reported headaches, fatigue, unpleasant sensations from discharge currents encountered when using ungrounded agricultural equipment, and shocks from spark discharges.

25X1 [] The proposal would prohibit exposing unprotected citizens to electric fields from transmission lines greater than 0.5 kilovolts per meter. The Soviets say this will in effect prohibit access to areas within 20 meters of 330 kilovolt lines, 30 meters of 500 kilovolt lines, and 40 meters of 750 kilovolt lines.

25X1 [] As of 1976, about 7 percent of the USSR's 638,000 kilometers of power transmission lines carried voltages of 330 kilovolts or higher. The proposed standard would restrict access to roughly 3,000 square kilometers of land adjoining these lines, much of which is in the most densely populated, European part of the USSR. Recent rates of power line construction would subject about 1,000 square kilometers of additional land to restricted use every five years.

25X1 [] Preliminary scientific evidence suggests that the proposed regulations may be overly strict. The group that drew up the proposed regulations consistently has advocated the most stringent safety standards in the USSR for the related area of microwave radiation. Its recommended standards on exposure to electric voltage probably represent the strongest restrictions under consideration, and those eventually adopted may be less strict. []

SOUTH KOREA: Prisoner Release

25X1 [redacted] //Efforts by the South Korean Government to work out a compromise with opposition leaders on release of political prisoners have run into a snag.//

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25X1 [redacted] //The government's inclination to stiffen its position is probably being reinforced by the recent flareup of student demonstrations in Seoul, where additional demands for reform have been aired. The demonstrations are not a serious threat to President Pak, but he may want to avoid making any concessions now that might appear to be the direct result of pressures. [redacted]

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BRIEFS

South Africa

25X1 [redacted] The main building of one of South Africa's oldest and most prestigious Afrikaans primary schools was destroyed by fire in downtown Cape Town on Sunday. The incident appears to be the latest of a series of politically motivated arson attacks on government buildings in Cape Province.

25X1 [redacted] Several other schools, including one of the best known high schools for coloreds (people of mixed race) and a black primary school, have been burned down during the past month by young black militants. These youths have also begun a campaign of urban terrorism focused on black police, school principals, and teachers whom students view as supporting the system. More than half a dozen homes of black school officials and police have been firebombed recently, and a young child died last week in the burning house of a teacher who had argued with students against school boycotts.

25X1 [redacted] Police have stepped up arrests throughout the province in an effort to stamp out the arson. The number of those detained, which includes several children, is small in comparison to the large number arrested last week for causing disturbances in a black Pretoria township, but the arrests will further polarize relations between young blacks and the authorities.

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[redacted]
USSR

25X1 [redacted] A regular session of the USSR Supreme Soviet will convene on 14 December to approve the economic plan and budget for 1978, according to an official announcement yesterday. The session is also likely to elect a new USSR Supreme Court. The five-year term of the 19-man court expired in September but was extended until this Supreme Soviet session.

25X1 [redacted] The Supreme Soviet normally meets twice a year--once during the summer, and once in December or sometimes earlier to consider the economic plan and budget for the coming year. This year, it met in October for an extraordinary session to approve the country's new constitution.

25X1 [redacted] The coming session will probably be preceded by a one- or two-day meeting of the party Central Committee. In past years this Central Committee meeting has been the occasion for a major report by General Secretary Brezhnev on economic and foreign policy matters. Last year, a text of his speech was made public for the first time, perhaps setting a precedent to be followed this year.

25X1 [redacted] A Central Committee plenum would also provide an opportunity to make some changes in the top leadership. Since the Central Committee met as recently as October and made some changes at that time, however, no further personnel actions appear likely in December. [redacted]

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[redacted]

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Afghanistan

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[redacted] //Five or six members of the Afghan cabinet, including the minister who handles foreign affairs, reportedly have submitted their resignations to President Daoud. We do not know whether they have been accepted. The US Embassy in Kabul believes that the cause of the resignations is probably political jealous over the recent appointment of four fellow ministers to the newly created central council of Afghanistan's only legal political party.//

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[redacted] Daoud is in complete control of the government, and the reported discontent in the cabinet presents no immediate threat. Membership on the party's central council carries little real power, but prestige is involved and council membership also could be important in the long run in determining who succeeds the 68-year-old President. Under the constitution, the party--ruled by the council--nominates all presidential candidates.

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Portugal

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[redacted] //The National Council of Portugal's Social Democratic Party voiced "unanimous and massive support" for former party chief Francisco Sa Carneiro at a special session last Thursday. Sa Carneiro was magnanimous in victory, making no mention of the differences that had brought on his resignation earlier this week.//

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[redacted] //Sa Carneiro's return marks a toughening of the party's position toward the Socialist minority government, and it defeats a move by the party's Political Committee toward accommodation with the Socialists. The Social Democrats are now less likely to back away from their insistence on a coalition government with the Socialists, a proposition that Prime Minister Soares has steadfastly resisted. [redacted]

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North Korea - Japan

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[redacted] North Korea's seizure last Thursday of a Japanese fishing boat in the Sea of Japan is not likely to lead to any serious repercussions in North Korean - Japanese relations. In September, North Korea agreed on an interim basis to permit Japanese fishermen to fish in its newly established 200-mile economic zone off the east coast but refused to grant the Japanese access to the security zone that extends some 50 to 60 miles out to sea.

[redacted] Pyongyang probably calculates that the seizure will serve to discourage other Japanese fishing boats from drawing too close to the security zone. [redacted]

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Philippines

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[redacted] //The capture last Thursday of Jose Maria Sison, the chairman of the Maoist-oriented Communist Party of the Philippines, is another major setback for the party's paramilitary arm, the New People's Army. The organization's top two

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military commanders had been captured by the government during the past year. The group has somewhat more than 2,000 armed men in widely separated units in Luzon and in the central and southern islands.//

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