

Top Secret

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE

Wednesday 21 December 1977 CG NIDC 77/295C

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National Intelligence Daily Cable for Wednesday, 21 December 1977.

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The NID Cable is for the purpose of informing senior US officials.

CONTENTS

25X1

[Redacted]

INTERNATIONAL: Antarctic Fishing Page 5

25X1

[Redacted]

EAST GERMANY: Far East Tour Page 8

OPEC: Pres. Perez Opens Meeting Page 10

BRIEFS: Page 11

25X1

[Redacted]

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Approved For Release 2005/07/28 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030400010114-7

Next 3 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2005/07/28 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030400010114-7

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INTERNATIONAL: Antarctic Fishing

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[redacted] *Industrialized countries with large distant-water fishing fleets whose scope of operations is being curtailed by the proliferation of national 200-mile coastal fishing zones are showing increased interest in krill. These tiny planktonic crustaceans are the largest single source of animal protein left on earth. They live in great abundance in the seas off Antarctica.*

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[redacted] The Japanese this year sent a fleet of 10 trawlers and support ships to Antarctic waters to refine harvesting and processing techniques in preparation for full-scale commercial krill fishing. At least three other nations are also sending fleets to the area, causing concern among the Antarctic Treaty nations about the possibility of uncontrolled exploitation.

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[redacted] It is estimated that at least 100 million tons of krill could be harvested annually without endangering the stocks. This quantity would be nearly half again as great as the 69-million-ton fish harvests the world has averaged annually over the past five years.

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[redacted] Krill harvesting and processing, however, have so far proven expensive and difficult. Tremendous amounts of fuel are required to reach the remote southern ocean, sea ice and storms make navigation hazardous, and the very size of an individual krill and the rapidity with which it decomposes upon removal from the near-freezing sea are problems requiring the development of whole new processing techniques.

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[redacted] The Japanese have conducted a pilot fishery for krill each austral summer since 1972. Last year a Japanese fleet of five ships delivered 12,000 tons of frozen krill to markets in Japan. The fleet of trawlers and support ships that left Japan on 18 November plans a four-month voyage to the Antarctic fishing area to catch some 8,000 tons.

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[redacted] The USSR, which has fished off Antarctica since 1967, began concentrating on krill in 1971. The Soviets market a variety of krill products including a sandwich spread, a high protein food additive, and whole frozen krill, but consumer reaction is mixed. Descriptions of the products' taste range

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from like lobster to like engine oil. The Soviets appear to be preparing their Bellinghausen research station in the South Shetland Islands as a support base for their Antarctic fishing fleet and will undoubtedly send a fishing fleet to the area this season.

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[redacted] *West Germany* and *Poland*--two countries with severely truncated coastal fishing zones--are also expected to survey the Antarctic krill resource. Two West German ships experimented with a variety of harvesting and on-board processing techniques during the 1975-76 season, and the Germans are confident that a viable krill fishery is possible. The Poles also began a krill fishery in the 1975-76 season with two ships. Last season they sent five ships and constructed a permanent research and support base in the South Shetlands.

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[redacted] *Chile* and the *Republic of China* have fished for krill on a lesser scale. The Chileans sent one ship in 1975 and the Chinese sent one last season. The two countries have explored the possibility of a joint venture in which the Chinese would provide the expertise and the Chileans, who are closer to the fishing area, would provide land-based support and processing facilities.

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[redacted] *Norway* may continue a krill survey begun last season as part of the country's renewed interest in the natural resources in its Antarctic claim. Norway feels little pressure for quick development of an Antarctic krill fishery, however, because it has exclusive control over rich fishing grounds in the Barents and Norwegian Seas by virtue of its 200-mile coastal fishing zone.

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[redacted] The 13 nations signatory to the 1961 Antarctic Treaty and charged by it with responsibility for conserving and preserving Antarctic living resources are concerned about uncontrolled exploitation of krill. The signatories agreed at their most recent consultative meeting in September to negotiate an international conservation convention to regulate Antarctic fishing before the end of 1978. Such a treaty would probably allow any nation willing to sign it and abide by its rules to fish off Antarctica, but first the negotiators must agree on how to manage the resource, allocate it equitably, and enforce the treaty.

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EAST GERMANY: Far East Tour

25X1 [redacted] East German party and state chief Honecker, accompanied by other senior officials, visited Vietnam, the Philippines, and North Korea earlier this month. The stop in Hanoi evidently went reasonably well, but differences of opinion became evident in Manila and especially in Pyongyang.

25X1 [redacted] The trip was part of East Germany's efforts to drum up trade, show the flag, and appear independent and sovereign. Economic discussions played a part at each stop, but it is unlikely that increased East German exports to these countries would have a significant impact on East Germany's total foreign trade. While Honecker was in the Far East, other high-level East Germans were touring the Middle East and Africa.

25X1 [redacted] The stop in the Philippines was Honecker's first official visit to a non-Communist nation, while the visits to Vietnam and North Korea were his first to those countries. He has now visited every Communist country except China and Albania.

25X1 [redacted]

25X1 [redacted] The visit to Vietnam from 1 to 6 December was the longest one of the tour and evidently the most successful from East Germany's point of view. Its highlight was the signing of a 25-year treaty of friendship and cooperation. This is the first such treaty between Vietnam and an East European country. The two countries also signed a trade agreement calling for a 15-percent increase in trade for 1978.

25X1 [redacted] While in Vietnam, Honecker used every available public opportunity to praise the Soviet Union and President Brezhnev. He also supported the Vietnamese position that the US, under Article 21 of the Paris Agreement, is obligated to carry out postwar reconstruction in Vietnam.

25X1 [redacted] The visit to the Philippines from 6 to 8 December, apparently initiated by the East Germans, was largely ceremonial. A small trade agreement was signed. Some differences of opinion apparently arose; there was no reference to full agreement on all points discussed, and there was no reference to the Middle East or to the Quadripartite Agreement--topics found in the communique with Hanoi.

25X1 [redacted]

25X1 [redacted]

25X1 [redacted] The stop in Pyongyang from the 8th to the 11th was evidently the low point of the trip. East Germany probably hoped to discuss economic problems during this stop, and perhaps act as a spokesman for Soviet policies at a time when Soviet - North Korean relations are in a downward swing.

25X1 [redacted] The North Koreans treated Honecker correctly, but with less warmth than they have recently shown other top-level visitors from Communist countries. Differences of opinion were reflected in speeches by Honecker and President Kim il-Song and in the joint communique. For example, there were no references to the Middle East nor any mention of "complete agreement" on subjects of mutual interest.

25X1 [redacted] Communiques issued after Kim's talks with other Communist leaders in recent years have made reference to expanding or developing relations. The North Korean news agency's version of Honecker's speech omitted several references praising the contributions of the Soviet Union.

25X1 [redacted] There have been economic problems between the two. In 1976 North Korea fulfilled only 50 percent of its export commitments to East Germany. The East German case is not unique, however, because Pyongyang has not fulfilled export plans with other states. [redacted]

OPEC: Pres. Perez Opens Meeting

25X1 [redacted] //Venezuelan President Perez opened the ministerial meeting of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries yesterday by calling for a 5- to 8-percent increase in oil prices for 1978 and using the additional revenues to reduce the massive external debts of the developing countries. While there is no chance that the cartel will accept the proposal, it saves Perez from the embarrassment of either backing away from support for a price hike or directly confronting the strong pressure for a price freeze. By citing humanitarian reasons for his proposal, Perez may have hoped to steal some of the favorable international publicity that proponents of a freeze have generated.//

25X1 [redacted] //Perez was on the spot as he played host to the opening session. His public support for an increase in crude oil prices has made a last-minute concession politically difficult. At the same time, continuing pressure by Saudi Arabia, Iran, and others to force a price freeze has made the Venezuelan position a losing proposition.//

25X1 [redacted] //In his address, Perez apparently was trying to minimize his potential political losses. He may even have been seeking to keep alive the possibility that OPEC will approve a price increase this week. He knows, however, that he stands alone in suggesting that the additional revenues be given away.//

25X1 [redacted] //Perez has proposed similar schemes in the past, including a plan to discount oil prices for developing countries, but all have been rejected by OPEC price hawks and moderates alike. Members of the cartel have repeatedly said that distribution of aid to non-OPEC developing countries is not a proper function of the cartel.//

25X1 [redacted] //Proponents of a freeze are arguing that economic recovery in the major industrial countries would be endangered by a price increase now. Perez has countered by asserting that channeling the extra revenue into poorer countries would create new markets for industrial economies. His reasoning will help him politically at home and in other developing nations, and that may be all that he really expects. [redacted]

BRIEFS



USSR

25X1 [redacted] TASS issued a generally positive commentary yesterday on the recent round of US-Soviet talks on the Indian Ocean. It stressed, however, that these talks were only a first step and that the USSR is still pushing for more "daring and radical" measures to ensure peace in the region.

25X1 [redacted] The commentary reiterated Soviet criticisms of conservative groups in the US that are opposed to the talks, and again called for the dismantling of foreign military bases in the Indian Ocean, such as the US naval communications facility at Diego Garcia.

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[redacted] The TASS release also accused China of "anti-Soviet twaddle" and reaffirmed the USSR's dedication to arms limitation in the Indian Ocean. The Chinese recently asserted that Moscow's participation in the Indian Ocean negotiations is "an intolerable subterfuge" aimed at establishing "overt and covert military bases" and dividing the region into US and Soviet spheres of influence. [redacted]

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