

ROUTING

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE

Tuesday 1 August 1978      CG NIDC 78/178

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[Redacted box]

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION  
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

State Dept. review completed

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NAMIBIA: UN Representative

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[redacted] //The South African Government yesterday invited UN Secretary General Waldheim to send a special representative to Namibia to prepare recommendations for implementing the Western settlement proposal. The South Africans, however, continue to reject the UN Security Council's resolution on Walvis Bay and have implied that they will not go through with the settlement unless Waldheim's recommendations are acceptable to them.//

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[redacted] //Following the Security Council's vote last Thursday, South African Foreign Minister Botha charged that the resolution on Walvis Bay is not in accord with the South Africans' agreement with the five Western sponsors of a settlement for Namibia. The Security Council called for an early union of Walvis Bay with Namibia, but the Western foreign ministers declared that they will support negotiations between Pretoria and the government of Namibia that is elected in accordance with the Western proposal.//

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[redacted] //Botha also said in New York that Waldheim's representative would not be permitted to visit Namibia until Pretoria reconsidered the Western proposal. In April, South Africa announced its acceptance of the proposal.//

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[redacted] //South African Prime Minister Vorster has said publicly that Pretoria would negotiate with a duly elected Namibian government concerning Walvis Bay. Vorster--and other cabinet members--no doubt resent Western support for the resolution on Walvis Bay that was initiated by the African members of the Security Council.//

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[redacted] //It seems likely, however, that Vorster intends to use the resolution to justify holding out for reassurances-- from Waldheim and also from the Western members of the Council-- concerning the UN task force to be set up in Namibia. [redacted]

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[redacted]

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National Intelligence Daily Cable for Tuesday, 1 August 1978.

The NID Cable is for the purpose of informing senior US officials.

CONTENTS

LEBANON: Christian Militiamen Page 1

USSR-PAKISTAN: Kosygin Visit Page 4

AFGHANISTAN: Growing Opposition Page 5

BRIEFS: Page 6

- China-Albania
- Cambodia-China
- Argentina
- Turkey

## LEBANON: Christian Militiamen

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[redacted] *The new crisis in southern Lebanon illustrates the important role played by Christian militiamen and their leaders along the Israeli border. The militias in the south are largely independent of any outside control, although they do have some links with the Christian groups in the Beirut area.*

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[redacted] The 4,000 Christian fighters in southern Lebanon are divided into several factions--including Phalangists and members of the Shamunist National Liberal Party. About 400 of the Christians are nominally members of a Lebanese Army unit that took control of several towns in the south when the Army disintegrated during the civil war in 1976.

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[redacted] No one completely controls the militiamen, but the major figure in the Christian camp is the 41-year-old extreme rightist, Major Saad Haddad, a Greek Catholic and native of Marj Uyun. A career Army officer trained in France and the US, Haddad assumed control of the Christian military unit that remained in the south near Marj Uyun when the Lebanese Army fell apart.

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[redacted] Although Haddad still is paid by the Army and says he represents the Lebanese Government, Beirut has no influence over him. Haddad regards President Sarkis as a Syrian puppet and has often publicly expressed contempt for him. Haddad has good relations with former Lebanese President Camille Shamun.

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[redacted] Even Haddad's Israeli allies profess to find him hard to control. Although the Israelis have told US officials in the past that they cannot stop Haddad from conducting foolish operations when he is determined to act, they do control his supply lines and probably could rein him in if they wanted to.

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[redacted] Since the Israeli invasion of the south in March, Haddad has proclaimed himself the commander of the "Army of South Lebanon" and has ordered compulsory military service for all males aged 18 to 45. His efforts to broaden his base of support to include Shia Muslims--southern Lebanon's majority sect--have not, however, been notably successful. He seems to enjoy broad support among the Christians in the south, but he does not have complete control over his followers, and the various militias are likely to follow him only as long as he adheres to a hard line.

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted] Almost every observer who meets with Haddad, including Christian politicians, comes away describing him as a fanatic, and his public statements are often inflammatory. According to unconfirmed press reports, he is responsible for killing dozens of Muslim civilians during the Israeli invasion.

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[Redacted] Major Sami Shidiak, also a Christian and a career Army officer, controls the western half of the Christian buffer zone, while Haddad runs the eastern section. Born in northern Lebanon, Shidiak is related to Camille Shamun and last year married an Israeli. He is a member of the Phalanges Party and keeps in contact with the party leadership.

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[Redacted] Neither Haddad nor Shidiak welcomed the arrival of the UN forces in the south; Haddad initially tried to stop their deployment by force. Both would have preferred that the Israelis stay. Under Israeli pressure, the Christians agreed to try to work out a modus vivendi with the UN, but they have not given up their control over the buffer area.

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[Redacted] The Lebanese Government has been unable to exert any authority in the south since 1976. It would like to replace Haddad and Shidiak with trusted officers--and get them out of the country--but Sarkis cannot regain power until he stations reliable Army units in the area. Even then, the Israelis want their allies to remain. Lebanese leftists and Muslims, as well as the Syrians and the Palestinians, regard Haddad and Shidiak as traitors who should be punished.

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USSR-PAKISTAN: Kosygin Visit

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[Redacted] *Soviet Premier Kosygin has accepted an invitation to visit Pakistan--his first trip to Islamabad in nearly 10 years.*

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[Redacted] The invitation was apparently extended during the visit to Moscow last week of a high-level Pakistani economic delegation headed by Minister of Finance and Planning Ghulam Ishaque. The Pakistani Minister announced that Semon Skachkov, Chairman of the USSR State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations, will also visit Pakistan later this year.

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[Redacted] The Pakistani mission signed an agreement with Moscow to provide substantial debt relief for the Soviet-sponsored Karachi steel mill.

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[Redacted] The coup in Afghanistan in April and a shift in the South Asian balance of power in favor of the USSR have created concern in Islamabad, and the Kosygin and Skachkov invitations are presumably designed to provide opportunities to probe Soviet intentions, to explore the possibility of closer ties, and to demonstrate to the West the possible consequences of failing to support Pakistan at this critical time. [Redacted]

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
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AFGHANISTAN: Growing Opposition

25X1 [redacted] After three months in power, internal security remains the top priority of the Afghan Government. Violent resistance is generally confined to the eastern tribal provinces and, for the moment, presents no serious threat to the regime, but opposition appears to be growing within the military and the population in general.

25X1 [redacted] Since the leftist "revolution" on 27 April, self-proclaimed opposition groups, both within Afghanistan and in neighboring Pakistan, have been growing in number. There are numerous unconfirmed reports of antiregime activities such as

25X1 assassinations, attacks on army installations, and coup plotting.

25X1 [redacted] //We do not know the size or strength of the various rightist and religious opposition groups. They appear, however, to lack the cohesive leadership and support within the military necessary to challenge the regime.// The eastern tribal provinces have always been difficult for any central government to control.

25X1 [redacted] Disillusionment within the military could eventually prove more dangerous to President Taraki's regime than the dissatisfaction of either rightwing opposition groups or tribal dissidents. Disaffection within the armed forces could arise if Taraki's policies appeared to be anti-Muslim or if the regime allied itself too closely with the Soviet Union. Continued action against the tribemen--some of whom are relatives of military officers--could also provoke a military coup.

25X1 [redacted] //Taraki has attempted to consolidate his control over the military through purges of suspected opponents, mandatory indoctrination courses, and close civilian supervision of officer assignments down to the brigade level.// The civilian party leadership appears to be engaged in a campaign to downgrade the military's contribution to the April revolution; the military is not represented on the important Political Bureau of the ruling party's Central Committee.

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#### BRIEFS

##### China-Albania

25X1 [redacted] The lengthy Albanian statement issued last weekend attacking China for "political and economic betrayal" probably presages an increasingly intense war of words between the two former allies. The document provides a detailed response to the announcement last month that China would terminate all economic and military assistance. China had attributed its decision to cut off aid to Albania's persistent demands for more economic assistance, but the Albanian statement calls attention to longstanding political disagreements with Peking and accuses the Chinese of employing both political and economic pressure to bring Tirana to its knees.

25X1 [redacted] The economic setback likely to result from the Chinese move will probably prompt the Soviets, who sponsored Albania's economic development in the 1950s, to intensify their efforts to reconcile their differences with the Tirana regime. The USSR would probably hope not only to regain influence in Albania, but eventually to gain access to naval facilities there.

25X1 [redacted] The Albanian document stresses, however, that Tirana hopes to minimize the economic effect of the break by relying on its own resources. The fact that the Albanian charges focus on China's rapprochement with the US and on China's alleged willingness to seek a reconciliation with Moscow suggests that at least for the time being the Albanians will not respond favorably either to a Soviet approach or to any exploratory gestures by the US. [redacted]

Cambodia-China

25X6 [redacted] Son Sen, Cambodian Vice Prime Minister for National Defense, arrived in Peking on Friday at the head of Cambodia's first military delegation to China. The visit, which coincides with China's Army Day celebration, symbolizes continued Chinese support for Cambodia in its conflict with Vietnam. It comes at a time of sustained Vietnamese military operations along the Cambodian border and in the immediate aftermath of an agreement between Hanoi and Peking to begin high-level negotiations on the question of Vietnam's overseas Chinese community. The Cambodians were given an elaborate welcome, including an audience with party Chairman and Premier Hua Kuo-feng. [redacted]

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Argentina

25X1 [redacted] President Videla retires from the military junta today and turns over command of the Army to General Roberto Viola. The Argentine Government has described the move as a major step in the gradual return to civilian rule; it separates the presidency from the junta and extends Videla's term for three more years.

25X1 [redacted] Despite the ease with which the change has been carried out, the still-undefined relationship of the presidency to the junta could cause future tensions. Videla wants to be free to decide major policy issues that do not directly concern

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the armed forces; the service chiefs, backed by ultraconservatives within the military, are insisting that the junta retain broad veto powers.

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Turkey

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The Turkish Government has announced that President Koruturk was hospitalized last Friday for treatment of circulatory problems. A source close to Koruturk's family told the US Embassy in Ankara that the President was suffering from coronary insufficiency.

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If Koruturk is unable to continue in office, Sirri Atalay--the President of the Turkish Senate--would be named deputy president and act until a successor could be elected by the Grand National Assembly, which has adjourned until November. If a vacancy in the presidency occurred, however, the Assembly would immediately reconvene to elect a successor.

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