

**Top Secret** 219

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE

Wednesday 9 August 1978

CG NIDC 78/185

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**NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION**  
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Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030800010016-2

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National Intelligence Daily Cable for Wednesday, 9 August 1978

The NID Cable is for the purpose of informing senior US officials.

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ROMANIA-USSR: Crimean Meeting

25X1 [redacted] *The communique issued after the meeting on Monday between Soviet party leader Brezhnev and Romanian party chief Ceausescu suggests serious differences over Romania's free-wheeling foreign policy and its growing contacts with China.*

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[redacted]

25X1 [redacted] The wording of the communique betrays a lack of agreement on most foreign policy issues and suggests that the atmosphere was even less warm than during last year's meeting.

25X1 [redacted] The complete lack of reference to relations among Communist parties probably resulted from the Kremlin's disapproval of Romania's growing economic and political ties with China, symbolized by the coming visit of the Chinese party Chairman to Romania. Ceausescu's continued friendly contacts with the Eurocommunist parties of Western Europe may also account for the omission. In recent weeks, while Brezhnev was meeting Warsaw Pact party chiefs in the Crimea, Ceausescu talked with heads of the Italian, French, and Spanish parties who were vacationing in Romania.

25X1 [redacted] Brezhnev may also have been incensed by Ceausescu's call, before a gathering of Romania's state and party functionaries last week, for excluding outside military interference in Africa--an obvious criticism of Cuba and the USSR. Ceausescu also defended the Eurocommunist parties' right to formulate independent policies at home.

25X1 [redacted] The Romanian leader further stressed his opposition to the term "Marxist-Leninist." The Soviets may read this as a defense of the Eurocommunist stance and an attack on Soviet leadership of the Communist movement. Equally galling was Ceausescu's call for periodically organizing meetings of European Communist parties. The Soviets consider such an initiative to be their own privilege.

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ECUADOR: Stress Increases

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[redacted] //Ecuador's armed forces still appear divided over what to do about Jaime Roldos--winner of the first round of the presidential election on 16 July and protege of the military's archfoe, Assad Bucaram. Opposition to Roldos is said to be growing among general officers, but there is also mounting international and domestic pressure on the government to proceed with the second round--which Roldos should win handily. Battle lines are now being more tightly drawn [redacted]

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[redacted] //Roldos unofficially polled a surprising 31-percent plurality in the first round, and Supreme Council member General Duran and other military officers opposed to Roldos' leftwing views have allegedly considered a variety of ways to deny him the presidency. These have ranged from hand-picking Roldos' second-round opponent to voiding the entire election. Most of these schemes involve some manipulation of the first-round results by the ostensibly independent Supreme Electoral Tribunal, most members of which were chosen by the military for their political "reliability."//

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[redacted] //Rumors of these machinations, plus an inordinate delay in the tribunal's tabulation of the returns, have prompted an outcry from civilian political leaders and the press. They have also caused foreign observers to mistrust the Ecuadorean leaders' commitment to return to constitutional rule. President Poveda, however, has assured US emissaries that the election will proceed without hindrance.//

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[redacted] //Duran's supporters, armed with funds from the oligarchy, are reported to be paying huge sums to influential officers to join their conspiracy. If they intend to prevent Roldos' election by force, they could take advantage of a large influx of military equipment into Quito and Guayaquil for military day ceremonies tomorrow.//

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[redacted] //Although the Ecuadorean public has remained relatively quiet during the past six years of military rule, an obvious attempt to steal the election from Roldos could

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trigger widespread popular unrest. Roldos, a leader of student demonstrations that toppled the then-ruling four-man junta 12 years ago, has said privately that he will encourage popular demonstrations on his behalf if necessary.

BELGIUM-ZAIRE: Simonet Visit

*Belgian Foreign Minister Simonet and Zairian President Mobutu did little to resolve basic differences between their countries during their meetings in Kinshasa last week, and each side remains suspicious of the other.*

//Mobutu again criticized the Belgian Government for not stifling attacks on him and his government by Belgium's Socialist Party leaders and the Belgian media. He scored Belgium for not curbing the activities of Zairian dissidents in Belgium. He also criticized the Belgians for failing to consult with the Zairian Government or armed forces when Belgian forces went into Shaba Region after the Katangans invaded this year. Finally, Mobutu expressed his displeasure because the Belgians, unlike the French, have insisted there be adequate security in Shaba before their technicians return there.//

Simonet said he and his government would be more sensitive in the future to Zairian Government concerns, but otherwise he remained firm. He repeated the Belgian Government's position that Mobutu must continue political and economic reforms as a pre-condition for obtaining Belgian help in implementing the aid package known as the Mobutu Plan. Simonet asked in particular about certain political reforms with human rights implications.

The Belgian Foreign Minister applauded recent Zairian efforts to achieve better relations with Angola and raised the possibility of Zaire's including Zambia in talks to resolve problems of border security. Mobutu did not appear interested in such discussions with Zambia.

Simonet seemed reassured that Zairian economic reforms are proceeding on schedule. Three Belgian experts arrived in Kinshasa last week to assist the governor of the central

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bank prepare for negotiations with officials of the International Monetary Fund in Washington this week. An IMF official who will direct the Zairian bank will soon arrive in Kinshasa. Belgium's IMF executive director has begun to help Zairian Finance Ministry officials develop parts of the Mobutu Plan. Progress on these fronts should put Zaire in a favorable position for the follow-up meeting on the plan to be held in Brussels in October.

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[redacted] //Despite the candid exchanges between Simonet and Mobutu, suspicions on both sides persist. In the past Mobutu has used ruses to win concessions from the Belgians, but Simonet hinted during his stay that the Belgians will watch Mobutu more closely. Simonet's personal misgivings about Mobutu and his determination to maintain a multilateral front among the Western allies involved with Zaire may make him less pliable than previous Belgian foreign ministers.// [redacted]

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NIGERIA: Intelligence Memo

(S NF) //The Daily prints the principal judgments of an Interagency Intelligence Memorandum, "Nigeria: The Evolution of Foreign Policy and Civilian Rule," approved for publication this week.//

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[redacted] //We believe that the quality of Nigerian relations with the US during the next 18 months or so will depend primarily on US policy, with a strong but not completely exclusive focus on US policy toward southern Africa. Other Nigerian concerns in relations with the US--oil prices, availability of development capital and technology, North-South and non-aligned issues, inter-African security problems, perceptions of Soviet and Cuban activity in Africa, US arms sales--will be secondary.//

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[redacted] //Nigerian policy will remain relatively straightforward on the southern African problem. The Nigerians will continue to support negotiations in the southern African context, but only as long as these negotiations hold serious promise of achieving the objective the Nigerians hold in common with other Africans--the dismantling of white minority governments in favor of rule by or in the name of the black populations.//

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[redacted] //The Nigerians will simultaneously support the liberation groups--though not by significant direct military intervention--and the tactical flexibility that a Nigerian regime shows in its day-to-day relationships should not be taken to mean that it has moderated its objective.//

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[redacted] //On the secondary issues, we expect to continue to see a good deal of pragmatism from the Nigerians. The amount of pragmatism, however, will be influenced by the atmosphere created by perceived US action or inaction in the main arena.//

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[redacted] //We do not now see a civilian regime doing much to alter these basic approaches. While there is certain to be a substantial amount of vocal militancy--which will be sincerely felt regarding southern Africa--the fundamental elements in Nigeria's economic, social, and demographic situation argue for continuity and compromise as against sudden and radical change.//

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[redacted] //In our view, the odds still favor a successful transition to civilian rule in Nigeria, meeting the October 1979 deadline to which the military leaders remain committed. There will surely be turbulent periods during this passage, and we make no forecast now as to how long civilian rule will last once it is installed. But we believe that the process will have at most only a peripheral effect on Nigerian foreign policy during the coming 15 months.//

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[redacted] //Specifically, we believe that Nigerians:


- Will work with the US on the Rhodesia problem, but will not accept any arrangement that is not also acceptable to the Patriotic Front and will do relatively little more under present circumstances to persuade the Front leaders to moderate their positions.
- Will work similarly with regard to Namibia.
- Will view with grave suspicion any appearances that the US is expanding areas of cooperation with South Africa in any field--political, economic, or nuclear.
- Will gradually become more uneasy about the role of Cubans and Soviets in Africa but will be reserved toward efforts to construct an international African security force.

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- Will not turn further toward cooperation with the USSR in international arenas unless Western efforts in southern Africa collapse utterly.
- Will continue in their domestic affairs to function so that--within the limits imposed by nationalistic political requirements--they will attract foreign investment and assistance.
- Will, in the UN, the Organization of Petroleum-Exporting Countries, and other international forums, seek ways to make visible their sense that their country, given its size and resources, should continue to play a leading role in African and Third World affairs.

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