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[redacted] meetings took place between h[redacted] German officials and high-ranking Soviet officers. Among those [redacted] ilhelm Pieck, Walter U[redacted], Ernst We[redacted] eral N. M[redacted] al Andrey Antonovich Grechko, and possibly [redacted] A. Dengin. App[redacted] y 30 East German officials participate[redacted] such as this one are arranged approximately every three months to establish a general line of conduct for the coming quarter. This meeting was conducted in absolute secrecy. The site of the meeting was changed every day, sometimes twice a day. No journalists were admitted except during the first session, when a representative of Neues Deutschland was permitted to attend but not to write a news story on the meeting.

2. The general line of discussion concerned preserving the East German régime and defense against internal and external attempts to overthrow it. The following points were among those discussed: 25X1

a. It was decided that an immediate conversion of Soviet [redacted] throughout East Germany should take place; they would bec[redacted] control over all types of military forces in their areas in the event of unrest or an uprising. All Soviet and Volkspolizei units, and all groups of activists, SED members, etc. would fall under their command. Es[redacted] conversion were being carried out in July 1954 in the [redacted] ry staffs consisting of specialists from all branches of [redacted] plans for coordination and action in case of need.

b. The conference decided that any open expression of dissatisfaction on the part of the population would be treated with especial severity, in order to prevent any organized opposition from getting started. Any dissatisfaction expressed with insufficient pay, excessive work norms, deficiencies in consumer goods, etc., is to be regarded as an attempt to organize a resistance organization, and is to be severely punished.

c. During the meeting, reports were read by Wollweber and [redacted] on anti- [redacted]

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out espionage, sabotage, and diversionary activities. Wollweber's report lasted two hours - Dybrova's twenty minutes. In conclusion, all participants in the conference were charged with the responsibility of insuring that the East German population was informed that any participation whatever in the work of such organizations, even if only consisting of a general expression of sympathy with the Anglo-American propaganda line, was to be severely punished, up to and including life imprisonment and the death penalty.

d. Special attention, in connection with the above reports, was given to the Russian émigré organization NTS. It was stated that the security organs of East Germany had long known about the harmful activities of this organization, but in view of the rule that only absolutely true, fully known, and correct facts were to be publicized, the decision to mention this organization in the press had been taken only after the defection to East Germany of the prominent NTS leader Alexander Trushnovich, who had disclosed all the activities of the organization. One of the conference participants expressed a desire to meet Trushnovich in order to obtain necessary details from the original source. This was promised, with the reservation that Trushnovich's health might prevent him from appearing for consultation. It was stated that he was kept in Karlshorst under heavy guard, to prevent violent attempts on him from the West, and that his place of residence and guards were often changed. Trushnovich did not appear at the conference, nor did he speak at the Second Deutschlandtreffen, although this had also been announced.

e. In discussing the strength available to the East German authorities, Wollweber stated that he was unable to guarantee the dependability of Volkspolizei units, with the exception of certain special ones such as those in Rostock and East Berlin, which train with Soviet officers and live under special conditions. Dybrova, in turn, also stated that he could not depend on the absolute obedience of all units of the Soviet occupation forces; he had taken measures to replace certain units in East Germany with fresh units unacquainted with East German conditions and not demoralized by contacts with the population and hostile propaganda.

3. In private conversations among the participants, interest was expressed in the Eisenhower-Churchill conference. Various theories were expressed concerning the proportion of propaganda to actual plans in the conference communiqué.

4. Also in private conversation, developments in the Far East were discussed. Dybrova expressed alarm about the conduct of Chinese Foreign Minister CHOU En Lai. He remarked that CHOU En Lai was trying to create an Asiatic bloc of 800 million people, fully dependent on Communist China, and independent of the USSR. Possibly the thought exists of incorporating into this bloc some of the territories of the USSR, populated with Asiatic peoples. Dybrova remarked jokingly that CHOU En Lai might want to include the USSR itself in his sphere of influence.

5. In general, there was considerable nervousness and fear of the future evident. For instance, in the discussion of the dependability of military units, the liberation by Volkspolizei units of prisoners in the Cottbus prison during the 17 June 1953 uprising was mentioned as a particularly alarming sign. Nervousness over the fact that the expression of dissatisfaction among the population could lead to explosions of demonstrations accounted for the excessively severe measures decided on against such expression.

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