

**CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATION REPORT**

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

25X1

SECRET - U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY

COUNTRY	Yugoslavia	REPORT	[REDACTED]
SUBJECT	Policies of Edvard Kardelj	DATE DISTR.	24 Nov. 1954 25X1
DATE OF INFO.	[REDACTED]	NO. OF PAGES	2 25X1
PLACE ACQUIRED	[REDACTED]	REFERENCE NO.	RD
		REFERENCES	[REDACTED]

This is UNEVALUATED

THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.
THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
(FOR KEY SEE REVERSE)

25X1

1. In 1948, at the beginning of the conflict with the Cominform, Edvard Kardelj was opposed to the break with Moscow. In addition to support from Slovenian Communist leaders, Kardelj had additional support from his friends in the Croatian government, Stanko Opacic-Canica and Dusan Brkic. However, Kardelj was influenced by Tito, Djilas and Rankovic into accepting the official stand of the Central Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party and his Croatian friends followed him. Later, however, they were arrested and are still in prison.
2. Milovan Djilas lost his Party and Government positions because of the policy conflict between Tito and Kardelj. Tito was using Djilas as Party apologist for the policy of relaxing the strict application of Communist principles, and both Tito and Rankovic had advance knowledge of Djilas writings and approved them. However, Kardelj, opposed to this policy of relaxation, succeeded in organizing a majority in the Central Committee of the Federation of Communists of Yugoslavia against Djilas and then forced Tito to strip Djilas of his functions.
3. The following ranking persons in the State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs are followers of Kardelj: Ales Bebler, Stave Pavlic, Stanislav Kopcok, Bogdan Crnobrnja, Josip Djerdja and Joze Brilej. Koca Popovic and Vladimir Velebit are opponents of Kardelj.
4. General Peko Dapcevic would have many reasons to join Kardelj's group in the Party in any conflict with Tito's supporters. As a Montenegrin he has pro-Russian leanings, his brother was imprisoned as a Cominformist, and his marriage was severely criticized by Tito's friends.
5. If there is Party conflict in the near future, the Kardelj group will win. But if Tito can succeed in postponing a showdown, he will have time to eliminate the Kardelj sympathizers in government, the Army and UDB.

SECRET - U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY

STATE	EV	X	ARMY	X	NAVY	X	AIR	X	IAI										
-------	----	---	------	---	------	---	-----	---	-----	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--


(NOTE: Washington distribution indicated by "X"; Field distribution by "#".)

SECRET - U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY



- 2 -

6. Kardelj's foreign policy envisages a Balkan Federation consisting of Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania, all under Russian protection. The realization of this federation would mean the settlement of outstanding Balkan problems, including the unification of Vardar, Pirin and Aegean Macedonia and a definitive solution of the Epirus problem. For this reason, the Yugoslavs are trying to recruit the Albanian refugees and the Yugoslavs of Albanian origin, persons who can be educated and prepared for their future position in Albania under such a Balkan Federation.



25X1

SECRET - U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY