


27 February 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: Coordinator for Academic Relations, NFAC
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Soviet Nationalities

1. I found our dinner meeting on the Soviet minorities issue very stimulating and helpful. You certainly organized it well and Jeremy certainly kicked it off in a stimulating manner. I was particularly impressed by Professor Bialer of Columbia and hope we can find ways to engage him in our activities here as a panelist consultant, etc.

2. By coincidence, a few days after this meeting I received the attached paper suggesting a need for translating and interpreting journals and newspapers published in the Muslim areas of the Soviet Union. Professor Bennigsen raised this very question during the dinner conversation. He made a special point, however, of saying that you had to get local journals rather than those at the republic level if you were really going to get the view of the controversy and differing opinions. Someone mentioned also that we just couldn't get these journals because you could not subscribe to them and the U.S. Embassy's efforts to send people around to pick them up have been diminished. The attached paper alleges that you can subscribe but the difference here may well be that the level of publication that this proposal suggests may be obtaining great journals at the republic level which will not have the content that we're looking for. I'd appreciate your views on this. I think the attached paper has an interesting idea but I would like to play a role in acquiring, translating and disseminating this kind of intelligence.

3. I also wonder a little about the hypothesis of the paper that the Soviets are using their Muslim population to be a spearhead for penetration and subversion of their inept Muslim neighbors. I almost got the impression from our dinner conversation that the Soviets might be wary of annexing more Muslim populations, considering the problems they're having of absorbing those which they currently have.



STANSFIELD TURNER

Attachment

Approved For Release 2005/03/01 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003300290006-3

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by NFAC, per DCI

IMPROVING INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
IN THE MIDDLE EAST, INNER ASIA, AND CHINA (U)

1. Recent setbacks experienced by the United States in Afghanistan and Iran provide an insight to possible similar events in all countries along the Soviet southern and eastern frontiers, and in Arab nations of the Middle East. The effectiveness of Soviet political penetration and subversion in Iran and Afghanistan rests on the utilization of natural forces of (a) desires to regain or annex adjacent territory populated by the same ethnic groups, (b) Pan-Islamism, (c) Pan-Turkism, and (d) Pan-Mongolism in the Far East. These forces are generated by Soviet Muslim national minorities along the entire Soviet southern and eastern frontiers.
2. Figure 1 schematically illustrates ethnic, cultural, religious, and linguistic bridges used by Soviet foreign policy to penetrate and subvert the existing governments in Arab nations, Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, Chinese Inner Mongolia, and the PRC's Sinkiang-Uighur Autonomous Region.
3. The Soviet Muslim national minorities reside in the administratively defined national republics and autonomous republics and regions. The Soviet Muslim population is projected to reach in the year 2000 between 25 and 33% of the total Soviet population. At that time one out of three Soviet citizens will be a Muslim. The Soviet Muslims enjoy a great degree of *de facto* national and cultural independence and the native languages (Azerbaijani, Bashkir, Crimean Tatar, Kazakh, Kirghiz, Tajik, Tatar, Turkmen, Turkish, Uighur, Uzbek, Persian, Pushtu, Mongolian, Tibetan, and Chinese) are used in government, educational, and business organizations. A large number of books, magazines, journals, and newspapers are published in the minority languages. These publications represent the *best open source for understanding Soviet policy, strategy, and tactics toward independent Muslim nations.* The topics of Soviet foreign policy toward these countries, and the role of Muslim minorities in the "eventual liberation" of related ethnic groups across the border are prominently featured in the minority press; much more than the central Russian language press ever publishes.
4. For example, over a period of years, the Uighur newspaper *Kommunizm Tughi* (*Banner of Communism*) carried an extensive discussion of "liberating Uighur minorities in China." It described the existence (on the Soviet territory) of the *Uighur National Liberation Front in Exile*, headed by a famous Uighur poet Ziya Samed. This Uighur liberation group has a pramilitary wing (*The Movement to Free Chinese Turkestan*) with 50,000 men under arms. This force is commanded by the former Chinese Peoples Liberation Army General Zunun Taypov in Alma Ata.




FIGURE 1
CULTURAL, RELIGIOUS, LINGUISTIC, AND POLITICAL BRIDGES
FOR SOVIET PENETRATION OF MUSLIM COUNTRIES AND CHINA

The Uighur "liberation movement" is headed by a "troika" that includes Taypov, Samedi, and Uchun, all of them former Chinese nationals who defected to Soviet Union from PRC. The program of the movement is based on the dismemberment of China by national minority population distribution patterns. ^{1/} The target of the movement is the Chinese Turkestan (or the Sinkiang-Uighur Autonomous Region in the Peoples Republic of China).

5. Similar information from the Soviet Azerbaijani and Turkmen press on the activities to "liberate" the people of the Iranian Azerbaijan, undoubtedly would have augmented and provided the context for the intelligence obtained by other sources. Better insights would have been available to anticipate recent events in Iran. However, it appears that *not one newspaper published in Soviet Muslim languages is currently being systematically monitored by U.S. intelligence.*

6. There is an opportunity to improve intelligence support to U.S. foreign policy decisionmakers by taking advantage of availability of publications on Soviet foreign policy, strategy, and objectives toward Arab nations of the Middle East, Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, and certain major administrative divisions of the Peoples Republic of China. Since these areas are immediate targets of Soviet penetration and subversion, systematic monitoring and analyzing of open-source literature published in Soviet minority languages could provide some extremely valuable inputs to U.S. policymaking.

7. An assessment of available and new approaches to performing this literature intelligence task shows that:

- o The existing and planned activities in this area are mostly academic in nature and do not yield immediately useful intelligence products.
- o A comprehensive effort on monitoring and analyzing Soviet Muslim minority press is feasible, desirable, and would include:

-*Collection:* The best source is by direct subscription to 122 magazines, journals, and newspapers currently available

-*Production:* Optimal steady-state professional staff of language-capable analysts should be supported by technical personnel in ADP, editing, and graphic arts, and a typist/secretary. Key professionals would include:

^{1/} *Kommunizm Tughi (Banner of Communism)*, Alma Ata, 19 March 1974, and other issues of this paper.

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Linguistic capabilities of the professionals (all of whom have been identified and could be available) would include:

(1) Azerbaijani, (2) Bashkir, (3) Crimean Tatar, (4) Kazakh, (5) Kirghiz, (6) Tatar, (7) Turkmen, (8) Turkish, (9) Uighur, (10) Uzbek, (11) Persian Dialects: Iranian, Pushtu, Tajik, (12) Mongolian, (13) Chinese, (14) Russian, (15) Arabic, and (16) Tibetan.

-Products: The products of this LITINT effort would include an easily accessed data bank, partial translations (excerpts, extracts, quotations, and *ad hoc* translations of complete articles), regular analytical summaries of trends, "white papers" responding to specific intelligence requirements, and topical coverage of political, economic, and military events. The emphasis will be placed on Soviet intents vis-a-vis independent Muslim countries.

-Dissemination: Dissemination of products should be handled through a sponsoring activity to users engaged in Soviet, Chinese, Middle East, Central Asia, Far East, and Southeast Asia mainstream all-source intelligence production divisions and groups in CIA, DIA, DoS/INR, and Service Intelligence Organizations.

8. Such an effort is probably best organized and operated outside of Government and the Intelligence Community to facilitate implementation, and to attract qualified personnel who might prefer to avoid direct involvement in an intelligence activity.