

UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS
WASHINGTON

September 25, 1962

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE JOHN A. McCONE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SUBJECT: Program to Influence World Opinion with
Respect to a Communist Chinese Nuclear
Detonation.

Attached is a copy of a paper entitled "Program to Influence World Opinion with Respect to a Chicom Nuclear Detonation".

Also attached is a copy of a memorandum from Secretary Rusk approving the program as U.S. policy and assigning responsibility to me for affecting the coordination envisaged therein. The Interdepartmental Political-Psychological Working Group will assume primary responsibility for carrying out this function. The group is prepared to assist your agency in fulfilling those elements of this program which are your primary responsibility.

Mr. William Jorden, who heads the Psychological Group in my office, is available to answer any questions you may have or to otherwise assist you and your agency in this program.

G... C. McGhee

George C. McGhee

Attachments:

As stated.

SECRET

This document consists of 1 pages.
Number 18 of 22 copies. Series B

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: M - Mr. McChes

PROGRAM TO INFLUENCE WORLD OPINION
WITH RESPECT TO A CHINESE COMMUNIST NUCLEAR DETONATION

1. Foreign policy considerations make it necessary that there be followed within the Government a coordinated program with respect to a Chinese Communist nuclear detonation.
2. I have accordingly approved the attached "Program to Influence World Opinion with Respect to a Chinese Nuclear Detonation". All agencies and officials of the Government who are or may become concerned with overt and covert aspects of this program are requested to observe and assist in implementing this program.
3. Responsibility for effecting the coordination envisaged in this program is assigned to your office. In discharging this responsibility, you should undertake consultations with the appropriate Agencies of the Government, utilizing for this purpose the Inter-departmental Psychological-Political Working Group.

15/9/20/62
Eagan Rusk

Attachment:

As stated.

SECRET

M - WJJordan: fjm

SUBJECT: Program to Influence World Opinion with Respect to a
Chicom Nuclear Detonation

PROBLEM: To develop a U.S. program aimed at enlightening and influencing world opinion, particularly Asian, in anticipation of a Chicom Nuclear detonation.

CURRENT ESTIMATE:

Intelligence estimates (July 1962) place a probable initial Chicom nuclear detonation in the period 1963-64. A delivery capability is not expected for at least two years thereafter, with only a modest stockpile of weapons available in the latter half of the 1960's.

ASSUMPTIONS: The Chinese Communists will continue to pursue an internal policy designed to give them, in the shortest possible period of time, the domestic resources required for great power status on the world scene, including nuclear capability.

Despite continuing efforts to prevent an open break in the Bloc, the Sino-Soviet dispute will not be resolved in the foreseeable future.

The

SECRET

The Soviet Union will not contribute to Chicom nuclear capability.

The Soviet Union will not assume a public position in opposition to the Chicom nuclear program.

DISCUSSION: While reaction to a Chicom nuclear detonation will be world-wide, the primary impact will be felt in countries in the Asian community.

The impact of the initial detonation will vary depending upon the state of political and economic developments in Communist China, in the other Asian countries, and in the East-West conflict.

Continuance or worsening of Chicom difficulties in agriculture and industrial production will continue to make highly desirable a breakthrough in the nuclear field for the regime's prestige abroad and for internal effect.

On the whole, Asian views on nuclear affairs are characterized by vast ignorance and strong emotionalism. As to knowledge, Australia, New Zealand, India and Japan are exceptions to this generality because of their educational systems and programs for the peaceful uses of atomic energy.

Strong

SECRET

Strong and vocal popular movements, particularly in Japan and India, oppose the deployment of nuclear weapons and support "Ban the Bomb" movements.

For the most part, public as well as governmental attitudes in Asia toward nuclear weapons are surcharged with strong negative overtones.

From the point of view of an Asian already apprehensive about a powerful and aggressive Communist China, the achievement by an Asian country of a nuclear weapons capability will have dramatic repercussions. Perhaps even more than the effect of Soviet space successes, evidence of a Chicom atomic capability, however small, is bound to have an impact upon Asian estimates of Communist China's scientific and technological prowess.

The further a country is removed from the borders of Communist China, the less chance there seems to be of panic or precipitate policy shifts.

The imponderables of estimating Asian reactions to a Chicom nuclear test are extreme. Broadly speaking there may be three categories of reaction:

(1)

~~SECRET~~

(1) an acute concern accompanied by a drive to seek an accommodation with Peiping.

(2) an opposite reaction of stiffening resistance to Communist China including a willingness to seek additional U.S. security assistance.

(3) a short-lived period of acute concern followed by a return to the status quo ante.

After the initial nuclear detonation, or perhaps even before, the Chicoms will launch an intensive, large scale propaganda campaign to exploit the event. They probably will seek to convey the impression that they are on the verge of becoming members of the nuclear club; that they are the first Afro-Asian country to achieve nuclear status; and that consequently they will soon be in a position to dominate Asia militarily.

On a relative basis, there can be little doubt but that over the long run a Chicom nuclear program could have a degrading effect on the U.S. political and military positions in Asia. The U.S. will accordingly be faced with policy problems concerning the

security

SECRET

security of U.S. overseas bases, the deployment of forces, and contingency plans for military operations.

Since 1957, stories have circulated in various media, principally Japanese, Indian, and American, to the effect that a Chicom nuclear detonation was imminent. Such stories are likely to continue, especially in Asian journalistic media.

A Chicom detonation will have an effect on questions concerning:

- (1) Chicom representation in the U.N.
- (2) recognition policies of various countries toward Communist China
- (3) test ban and disarmament negotiations.

The extent of this effect will depend on pertinent conditions at the time of detonation.

U.S. OBJECTIVES: Primary U.S. objectives involved in this subject fall into two separate categories:

- (1) those intended to create through a positive approach the image of U.S. and Free World strength in all fields - militarily, politically, ideologically, economically, etc.

- (2) those intended to counter an image of Chinese Communist power which might induce awe or unreasoned fear: to alert Asia without causing alarm.

Specific objectives which might be included under the first general category:

(1) to emphasize the diversity, flexibility and strength of the U.S. deterrent-weapons and delivery systems.

(2) to enlighten target audiences with the basic principles, complexities and problems of a nuclear program

(3) to reassure all free peoples that we remain dedicated to their defense if they so desire while actively seeking ways which will safeguard peace in their areas.

(4) to appear firm in countering a nuclear threat to the Free World and flexible in exploring ways to reduce the likelihood of nuclear war.

(5) to ensure our subsequent flexibility in nuclear weapons policy with respect to the structure and composition both of U.S. forces in the area and of allied and neutral nations.

(6) to make clear U.S. opposition to the proliferation of independent nuclear weapons capabilities.

(7)

SECRET

(7) to demonstrate now the threat of Chicom nuclear power can be met by appropriate local efforts backed up by U.S. power.

(8) to state and restate U.S. sincere desire for effective world-wide disarmament and nuclear test bans which would include and be binding on Communist China.

Specific objectives which might be included under the second general category:

(1) to avoid exaggerated fears among Asians by placing developments in a proper perspective with regard to the status of Chicom nuclear developments in relationship to U.S. nuclear capabilities.

(2) to prevent a loss of confidence among U.S. Asian allies in the value of their relationship to the U.S. and to prevent among Asian neutrals a movement to positions more favorable to Communist China than those now existing.

(3) to underline the pointlessness of a primitive independent, national, nuclear capability - the cost involved, the sacrifices which must be made.

(4)

SECRET

(4) to make clear the gap between a nuclear explosion and an effective nuclear capability.

(5) to exploit disruptive elements of Sino-Soviet rift which will cast doubt on Chicom ability to sustain a complex technological program to ICBM capability.

(6) to contrast the nuclear achievement with China's grave internal weaknesses.

RECOMMENDED PROCEDURES:

I. Pre-Detonation Period:

A. Immediate Action:

1. Preparation of a U.S. Government statement for issuance following a Chicom nuclear test.
2. Preparation of a circular instruction to all U.S. diplomatic missions, selected consular establishments and major overseas military commands which would include the following components:
 - a - the current intelligence estimate concerning initial Chicom nuclear detonation
 - b.- the public posture and rationale which U.S. officials abroad should adopt if

questioned

SECRET

questioned concerning this subject at
this time.

c. - a summary of the interdepartmental
program contemplated to further the
image of U.S. and Free World strength
and to counter a possible image of
Chinese power which might cause awe or
unreasoned fear.

3. Preparation of country or area papers es-
tablishing public and official reaction to a
Chinese nuclear detonation.

RESPONSIBILITY: For preparation, clearances, and
coordination - Department of State.

4. Educative Program:

The preparation of texts of detailed orien-
tation programs covering aspects of nuclear
development to be given to senior government
officials and military officers of countries
requesting such a program.

RESPONSIBILITY: For preparation and clearances -
Department of Defense.
For coordination - Department of State.

TARGET

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

TARGET DATE: November 1, 1962.

C. Overt Program:

The formulation of a broad information campaign (overt) explaining U.S.-Free World military strength, especially nuclear. This campaign would (1) draw upon authoritative statements, articles, speeches, primarily U.S., but including foreign as appropriate; (2) encourage nuclear briefings to Asian scientists, journalists, and intellectuals during visits to the U.S.; (3) disseminate simplified versions of the "nuclear facts of life" as furnished by DOD and/or AEC; (4) emphasize ways to prevent war - disarmament and test ban initiative and a stable, peaceable military posture based on our retaliatory capability; (5) include information buildup of Japanese and Indian non-military atomic activities.


**RESPONSIBILITY: For preparation and clearances -
United States Information Agency
For coordination - Department of State.**

TARGET

~~SECRET~~

TARGET NAME - ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ 1962

STAT



TARGET DATE: September 15, 1962.

II. POST-DETONATION ACTION:

- A. Issuance of U.S. Government statement following Chicom test.
- B. Coordinated program through all media available building up picture of U.S. strength and downgrading significance of Chicom detonation and Chicom ability to compete in advanced weapons race. In this connection the following contingency papers should be prepared:

SECRET

- a. **General Amplification of U.S. Government statement for use by U.S. officials abroad and in U.S. (including UN).**
- b. **Position to take with non-aligned countries.**
- c. **Position to take in countries allied with the U.S.**
- d. **Position to take with USSR and its satellites**
- e. **Position to adopt toward Communist China**

**RESPONSIBILITY: For preparation and clearances -
Official and Educative Program -
State-DOD**

Overt Program - USIA

[Redacted Box]

STAT

For coordination: - State

**TARGET DATE: As soon as possible - not later than
December 1, 1962.**

SECRET

August 31, 1962