


<p>EXECUTIVE MEMORANDA</p> <p>From: #79</p> <p>Thru: #120</p>

NSC REVIEW COMPLETED, 06/26/2003

EXECUTIVE MEMO #79 - #120
01 JAN 1963 - 26 MARCH 1963



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ER

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

WE

March 23, 1963

TOP SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

NSC REVIEW
COMPLETED,
06/26/2003

For your convenience, I am recording the decisions reached at your meeting with the President on NATO Nuclear Forces on March 22. The President has reviewed this record.

1. The State Department should draft letters from the President to Adenauer and Fanfani as soon as possible, indicating the terms on which we are willing to make a firm commitment to the MLF, and stating that, on these terms, we were in fact eager to go ahead and we invite their acceptance. The central points are:

- a. The force must be surface borne
- b. The control system must be such as to retain the U.S. veto

It appears preferable to propose now the kind of control arrangements which the Europeans would prefer, rather than to insist on the principle of unanimity if that means that we have to provide for a re-examination of control arrangements at a definite time in the future.

The possibility that a future expansion or modernization of the Force could involve submarines rather than surface ships can be raised.

2. The letters should invite a positive response and offer immediate technical discussions on any technical problem that arises.

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3. Some thought must be given to the method of conveying these messages to their addressees in view of the Italian election situation and Chancellor Adenauer's absence in Cadenabbia. An answer from the Italians may not be necessary.

4. There is to be no Congressional consultation on these matters before a response is received from the Germans. If a response is not forthcoming promptly, and Congressional pressure mounts, the two Departments will consult further with the President on the nature of the presentation to be made to the interested Congressional committees.

5. The two Departments should prepare recommendations for action in the event that a negative or a noncommittal response is received from the Germans. In particular, the question of what further can be done on Paragraph 6 forces and whether a new political control mechanism can usefully be associated with them should be examined. So should any other alternatives which appear fruitful. The question of whether an indefinite or ambiguous response should be taken as a signal to halt U. S. efforts on the MLF should also be examined.


Carl Kaysen

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(CLASSIFICATION)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

EXECUTIVE MEMORANDUM

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

EXECUTIVE MEMORANDUM No. 96

DATE 26 March 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR:

- DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)
- DEPUTY DIRECTOR (INTELLIGENCE)
- DEPUTY DIRECTOR (RESEARCH)
- ~~DEPUTY DIRECTOR (OPERATIONS)~~
- ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
- ~~XXXXXXXX~~
- ~~DIRECTOR GENERAL~~
- ~~GENERAL MANAGER~~
- ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
FOR NATIONAL ESTIMATES

✓ DCI _____

DDCI 3/26/63

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-Ed. Messer

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

This memorandum contains information for the addressees. Addressees may give this memorandum additional circulation within their components as required. All copies should be destroyed not filed, upon completion of circulation. A master file will be kept in the Executive Director's Office and will be available upon request.

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(CLASSIFICATION)

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