

TOP SECRET

TS 142729 #2

22 August 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Assistant to the Director
for Planning and Coordination

SUBJECT : President's Special Committee on Disarmament Problem

1. I attended the first meeting today and made notes of the following. I presume that there will be minutes circulated.

a. The Committee has the special privilege status of a Presidential Advisory Group so that its deliberations can never be examined into by Congress.

b. One backer-upper will be permitted each member as a matter of routine. Any additional person should be cleared with the Secretary (Mr. Toner).

c. One clearance is required for attendance. Next meeting is Thursday, 25 August, 1500 in the old FOA conference room.

d. Composition of the delegation to the UN subcommittee meeting 29 August et seq:

State - 2

Defense - 2

AEC - 2

USIA - 1

Stassen Staff - 2

US-UN - 1 or 2

[redacted] For the above meeting CIA was requested to supply support. [redacted] is to be kept busy in Washington so what they wish to be assured is that the delegation will be promptly briefed on relevant intelligence. [redacted]

[redacted] I balked on this and promised to have a proposal for the Thursday meeting as to how we could best provide the required support. I have asked [redacted] to examine this problem and to give you a recommendation by Thursday morning. Inasmuch as the delegation will not be cleared for special intelligence, I think we can send briefing materials as necessary via [redacted]

TOP SECRET

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CIA
not
involved

f. The discussion then turned to substance with the talking paper being the Secretary's letter of 15 August (see attached papers). JCS have prepared a definition of "blueprint" and this will be circulated in the next day or so for discussion at the Thursday meeting. The definition relies heavily on the technical term "order of battle" and special research was directed to see what the meaning of this was to Russians, French, etc. The AEC representative raised some question as to whether AE installations would be included because they were "non-military".

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

...considerable discussion of the proposal to have a joint technical panel conduct experimental verification and surveillance of designated military installations (see Tab G). Mr. Bowie was quite dubious about the effect of this as possibly looking too pushy from the Soviet point of view at the outset. I suggested that the proposal might well be cut down to one in which each country would designate a single area where all three military services had installations for this exercise (e.g. the US might designate the Island of Oahu and the Soviets Vladivostok). Bowie agreed that this might be considerably more acceptable and the Governor was receptive to it as a retreat position.

i. The JCS wants to "withdraw" our 1952 proposal as to numerical limits maintaining that they no longer are rational. Bowie countered by saying the Secretary's letter was very carefully drafted so as to indicate only a change in order of attack on the problem giving first place to inspection and verifications and by no means implying either reaffirmation or withdrawal of any previous position.

j. The task forces appointed pursuant to NSC Action 1419 (see White House memorandum of 5 July, revised 4 August, attached) are to be completed by 15 October. DOD is then to have 30 days opportunity to review the reports so that the NSC can consider the problem approximately 1 December.

k. In closing Governor Stassen expressed the hope that departmental papers in rough draft form would be freely circulated among the committee rather than held up for full departmental clearance.

2. The underlying packet of materials includes the intelligence support I have so far furnished to the Stassen organization. The large folder is our one remaining copy of one of these items so please guard it with care.

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3. Finally, [redacted] can fill you in on the relevant lack of progress made to date by the IAC subcommittee. I personally feel that it should go out of business and allow adequate existing machinery, departmental and inter-agency, to handle the job of intelligence support to Stassen, your committee, and all the various specialized task forces.

ROBERT ANDRY, JR.
Deputy Director/Intelligence

Attachments

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