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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Wartime Clandestine Intelligence Collection Requirements

1. This memorandum suggests action on the part of the Director of Central Intelligence. The requested action is contained in paragraph 7.

2. Background: On 20 July 1957, in approving the revised Command Relationships Agreement, CIA noted in a memorandum to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that it hoped to receive, in due course, military requirements for wartime clandestine intelligence collection support.

3. Requirements for wartime clandestine intelligence collection have now been received from the JCS. In responding to these requirements, we have been requested to advise the JCS of our capabilities to meet these requirements and to furnish comments concerning the manner of presentation of future requirements.

4. There is a great variance among the theaters in the usefulness of their requirements to this Agency. EUCOM requirements are specific and in a format which we had informally recommended, but are generally quite unrealistic in terms of access. CINCPAC requirements are so general and broad that we would be hard put to give any definite answers concerning our capabilities to meet them. Representatives of the Joint Staff have indicated informally that they agree that it is not feasible for the Agency to attempt to give an indication of its capabilities or to accept any of these requirements in their present form.

5. We have discussed with representatives of the Joint Staff the desirability of full consultations in the field between the Commands and the Senior War Planners. In March of this year, the JCS forwarded to their theater commanders the Wartime Clandestine Intelligence Collection Appendix to the Intelligence Annex to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. Included therein were procedures for handling wartime clandestine intelligence collection requirements, which we believe should be followed. These are:

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
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a. Disclosure to our representatives of the total requirements, including those which the Commands believe they have a capability to satisfy.

b. Acceptance by the Senior War Planners (as authorized by Headquarters) of those requirements for which the Agency has present or programmed capabilities.

c. Forwarding, by the Commands to the JCS, those requirements for which the Community has no capabilities, for further consideration and possible submission to the Agency for its further consideration.

Our Senior War Planners have been instructed to cooperate with representatives of the theater commanders in the coordination procedures outlined above.



7. Recommendation: We recommend your signature on the attached memorandum to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. (All Clandestine Services Staffs and Divisions concerned, as well as SPA/DDS, DD/C (), and the DD/I, concur in this recommendation.)



RICHARD M. BISSELL, JR. *br*
Deputy Director
(Plans) *(S)*

Attachment:
Memo to JCS

cc: DDCI

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Wartime Clandestine Intelligence Collection Requirements

REFERENCE: [redacted] dated 5 March 1959

1. The requirements for wartime clandestine intelligence collection activities forwarded by the reference memorandum have been given careful consideration by this Agency.

2. After a thorough review of these requirements within the CIA and discussions with elements of the Joint Staff concerned, the CIA believes that there are four general areas for improvement in our joint planning for wartime clandestine intelligence collection, as follows:

a. Specificity. Requirements should be stated in specific enough terms to guide the CIA in determination of the extent of its capabilities to meet them; or to make specific operational plans to create capabilities where none presently exist.

b. Realism. Requirements should be realistic in terms of target accessibility, and in terms of the likelihood that the Intelligence Community may be able to generate capabilities to meet them.

c. Priorities. Military requirements for support in the fields of unconventional warfare, psychological operations and intelligence have been received by the CIA. Due to the limited number of CIA assets in critical areas, it may be necessary for Military Commanders to indicate which of several requirements should take precedence.

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d. **Coordination.** Further consultation between the Military Commands and the CIA Senior War Planners on the total list of requirements may reveal that more than one element of the Intelligence Community has the capability of satisfying a specific requirement.

3. I believe that improvements in the above areas will be made when the Military Commands, in coordination with the CIA Senior War Planners, review, redraft and resubmit their requirements in accordance with the guidance provided in the Wartime Clandestine Intelligence Collection Appendix to the Intelligence Annex to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, 1 July 1959-30 June 1960. I understand that the current requirements were drafted prior to the receipt of this Appendix. For this reason, we have limited our comments to the usefulness of these requirements, as presently expressed; and are not at this time commenting on our capabilities to meet them. Specific comments on the requirements from each Command are attached hereto. I have noted that, through local coordination in Panama, CINCARIB has been able to determine that he has no requirements beyond those which he and the CIA have a present capability to meet. The CIA representatives in the field have been directed to furnish assistance to representatives of the theater commander in the framing of future requirements.



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
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SIGNED

C. P. CABELL
General, USAF
Deputy Director


6 attachments:
Comments on requirements
from each Command

cc: DCI



(30 July 1959)

Concur:



Deputy Director
(Plans)

for

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ALLEN W. DULLES
Director

6 attachments:
Comments on requirements
from each Command

cc: DDCI



(30 July 1959)

CONCUR:

/S/ C. Tracy Barnes
For

Deputy Director
(Plans)

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