

TERMS OF REFERENCE, WARNING SYSTEMS SURVEY COMMITTEE
(Approved by the IAC, 14 May 1957)

A. NAME:

Warning Systems Survey Committee

B. MISSION:

To determine how fully and promptly present and potential intelligence collection methods, sources and transmission channels can provide information which may be essential for advance warning of Sino-Soviet Bloc hostile action.

C. JUSTIFICATION:

1. The requirements in DCID 1/2, Para. E-1: "Develop and operate on a current and continuing basis the Watch Committee Intelligence Plan for systematizing, energizing, and coordinating through appropriate channels the world-wide collection by US agencies of information and intelligence pertinent to the Watch Committee mission."
2. The recommendation in IAC-D 57/14, 7 September 1955, the Post Mortem on NIE 11-6-55, that the Watch Committee contribute evaluations of its operational capabilities whenever estimates of probable intelligence warning are under consideration.

D. FUNCTIONS:

1. The Committee will carry out, under the direction of the IAC and based on information furnished by each IAC agency, a systematic survey of present and potential US intelligence systems which may be capable of providing information on which advance warning of Sino-Soviet Bloc hostile action may be based.
2. The Committee will prepare and forward to IAC agencies lists of questions based on the criteria as set forth in Section E as appropriate. These questions will be directed toward determining the capabilities of the agencies to provide warning information bearing on appropriate indicators of Sino-Soviet Bloc hostile action. A comprehensive general list of such indicators has been developed by the NIC and will be submitted to the agencies for review and to the IAC for approval in the course of the survey.
3. Each IAC agency will utilize the questions, criteria, and the general list of indicators in determining its capabilities to provide essential advance warning information. Provision will be made for discussion between members of the Committee and appropriate members of IAC agencies regarding any additional points which may be suggested by agency replies to the Committee's lists of questions.

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4. The Committee, during the course of the survey, will not concern itself with details of operations, identities of sources or sensitive operational techniques of source systems utilized by IAC agencies.

5. The IAC will request USCIB to direct that a similar survey of warning capabilities be conducted by USCIB agencies and referred by USCIB to the IAC. The general guidance for this survey shall be provided by the Chairman of the WSSC and provision made by USCIB for the cooperation of USCIB agencies with the Warning Systems Survey Committee.

6. The Committee will prepare a final report based on replies from and discussions with IAC agencies which will comprise an analysis of the capability of the US intelligence community to provide adequate warning information on a timely basis. Recommendations will be made for improving the warning capability where appropriate. The final report will be forwarded to the IAC and to the Watch Committee of the IAC. The Committee will submit quarterly progress reports to the IAC during the course of the survey.

7. The Committee will consider itself dismissed when the IAC has taken action on its final report.

E. CRITERIA:

1. The survey will cover certain general criteria as to the capabilities and vulnerabilities of various types of sources both at present and under anticipated emergency conditions during periods of high international tension and prior to the outbreak of hostilities. It is recognized that the criteria applied will vary among the types of sources under review. Criteria to be employed will include:

- a. Current ability to cover targets of warning significance.
- b. Assessment of present trend in this ability.
- c. Potential for expansion of coverage under alert conditions.
- d. Potential for developmental breakthrough in coverage capacity.
- e. Known use limitations, present and potential.
- f. Possible or expectable threats to use or effectiveness under emergency or prehostilities conditions.
- g. Vulnerability to enemy deception, manipulation or doubling back.

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- h. Availability of alternative sources or methods which could provide similar coverage in event of loss.
- i. Performance record under past alert or emergency conditions as to dependability, timeliness, productivity, etc.
- j. Reporting-time factors under normal and under alert conditions - in first-echelon field reporting and in processing channels back to Washington analysis organizations.
- k. Vulnerability of reporting channels to saturation with high volumes under alert conditions.
- l. Availability of alternative standby, auxiliary or duplicate transmission channels in emergencies.
- m. Flexibility of control from Washington or from major field organizations for rapid reassignments from target to target under emergency conditions.

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