

9 January 1961

*James L. Card*

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL**

**SUBJECT: Recommendations of the Joint Study Group on Foreign Intelligence Activities of the United States Government, dated 15 December 1960**

The Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and the Director of Central Intelligence, constituting the principals of the ad hoc study group on foreign intelligence activities of the United States Government, have submitted their views on the recommendations made by this Study Group. The full-text of the views of the principals, with the exception of the Director of Central Intelligence, whose views are included herein, are appended. The principals recommend that the following actions be taken on the recommendations of the Study Group.

I. On the following 28 recommendations all of the principals are in agreement and recommend that there be immediate implementation of the recommendations: 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 19, 20, 25, 26, 27, 28, 32, 33, 36, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42 and 43.

In addition, there is substantial agreement among the principals on the following seven recommendations with the exceptions noted.

Recommendations 21, 22 and 23 would establish a central requirements facility, use CIA's Office of Central Reference as a reference facility, and establish a program for integration of collection requirements manuals into a compatible series of coordinated guides. The Secretary of Defense while concurring with the intent of these recommendations desires further study on the method of their implementation.

Recommendation 24 would give affirmative responsibility to the chief of mission or principal officer in each overseas

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area for coordination of all overt and clandestine intelligence requirements concerning that area. The Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs would modify this by adding "except in situations with respect to which the Secretary of State and the Director of Central Intelligence may agree do not warrant such allocation of responsibility."

Recommendation 31 would establish a management group under the United States Intelligence Board. The Director of Central Intelligence suggests using the coordination staff recommended in number 29 for this purpose rather than creating an additional committee.

Recommendation 34 would require that intelligence guidance and instructions to components of unified commands be transmitted through the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Director of Central Intelligence accepts this with the understanding that it does not include the National Security Agency communications to service cryptologic agencies in the field.

Recommendation 37 would permit CIA stations abroad to continue day-to-day coordination of clandestine activities but would relieve them of the authority to veto another agency's proposed operation. The Director of Central Intelligence does not believe this action is necessary, since CIA field stations do not now have authority to veto operations but where differences of opinions exist, can refer such operations to Washington for final decision. There is no objection to reaffirming present practice.

II. On two recommendations there is some disagreement between the principals but it is recommended that a decision be reached at this time.

Recommendation 16 suggests that there be a National Security Council Intelligence Directive to provide authority and assign responsibility for the establishment of a National Photographic Intelligence Center. The Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence are in agreement that there should be such a center, jointly manned by the interested agencies, but differ as to whether the Central Intelligence Agency or the Department of Defense should be assigned the responsibility for the administration of this center. An NSCID is attached on which the United States Intelligence

Board is in agreement on all points except this one. It is recommended that consideration be given to the views expressed herein and that a decision be reached and action taken at this time.

Recommendation 29 concerns the coordination responsibilities of the Director of Central Intelligence. The discussion in the Joint Study Group report preceding this recommendation analyzes the advisability of separating the position of the Director of Central Intelligence from that of the head of the Central Intelligence Agency. The Study Group came to the conclusion that there should not be a separation, but the Secretary of Defense's representative dissented from this view and the Secretary of Defense concurs with this dissent. If the Study Group majority proposal that no organizational change is necessary at this time is approved no action need be taken to seek any statutory change in the functions and relations of the position of the Director of Central Intelligence. It is recommended that the President note this difference in view and direct that the organization of the Central Intelligence Agency be continued as at present, in line with the recommendations of the Joint Study Group.

III. With respect to the following six recommendations it is believed that action should be deferred for the reasons indicated:

Recommendations 1, 2 and 35 would require a re-organization of intelligence within the Department of Defense and field commands, with particular reference to the role of the Joint Staff and unified commands in relation to the military intelligence services, while Recommendation 30 would reduce the membership of the United States Intelligence Board to four members, the Director of Central Intelligence (Chairman) and representatives of the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff following such a reorganization. The Secretary of Defense approves the principles embodied in these recommendations, but requests further study with a view to determining the best method of implementation with the minimum disruption of operations and activities, indicating the belief that the implementation should be evolutionary. The Director of Central Intelligence believes that the organization of the military intelligence services is primarily a matter for the Department of Defense. He would specifically object at this time to recommendation 1. b. (2.) which would require the Joint Chiefs of Staff to

coordinate the intelligence views within the Department of Defense, notably for estimates. The Director of Central Intelligence is opposed to any reduction of military intelligence representation on the United States Intelligence Board unless there is the aforementioned reorganization within the Department of Defense. The Director of the Bureau of the Budget states that he would have a single military intelligence service and that the sooner this could be achieved the better. His views are further explained in the text of his comments which are attached.

With regard to recommendation 5, the Secretary of State would place the Central Intelligence Agency in direct charge of all clandestine collection operations abroad and believes that the military services should retain capability for wartime employment by placing their clandestine personnel in CIA bases under CIA direction concentrating on targets set by military commanders. The Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence endorse the views of the Joint Study Group.

Recommendation 18 concerns focusing community attention on counterintelligence and security of overseas personnel and installations and assigning responsibility for periodic reports on this subject to the United States Intelligence Board. The Secretary of State wishes to give this matter further study.

Allen W. Dulles  
Director

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cc: DCI  
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