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3. Members opposing the merger concept advanced a number of points which they considered to be disadvantages. In summary they believed that such a merger would:

a. violate the principle that the U. S. COMINT effort must be compartmented and treated in all respects as being outside the framework of other intelligence activities. They believe that this activity should remain under the control of USCIB as a separate body, and that the principal role of the DCI in this field is to insure that intelligence production and other "normal" intelligence operations are coordinated with the separate COMINT operation. Furthermore, it would in their view down-grade the present USCIB structure to place it in the same position vis-a-vis the DCI and the NSC as is now the case with other foreign intelligence activities;

b. tend to increase the number of individuals cleared for and having access to COMINT information, thus jeopardizing security;

c. involve agencies and offices in the production of national intelligence that have no concern therein or capability therefor;

d. result in longer agendas, require larger attendance at meetings, and therefore waste time and personnel;

e. impair the favorable status of USCIB in international relationships in the field of COMINT;

f. combine functions which are essentially dissimilar, i.e., the development of policy and procedures with respect to the operation and security of the COMINT effort in contrast with the production and dissemination of finished intelligence.

4. Members who looked with favor upon the merger concept generally favored further study to determine more specifically appropriate charter responsibilities and operational procedures, and to delimit certain safeguards prior to any final decision. They pointed out that a merger would be in harmony with a general trend toward better integration and more central direction of all government activities related to the national security, and that it would promote closer understanding and better knitting-together of activities within the Intelligence Community as a whole. With adequate safeguards, provision of which was considered to be entirely feasible and practicable, those representatives who were inclined to look with favor upon the merger

concept considered that some of the advantages which could be expected to ensue from such a merger include:

- a. probable improved stature of the Intelligence Community in the over-all governmental structure and possible improvement in the attention paid to the intelligence product by policy-determining levels;
- b. expedited consideration of matters pertaining to over-all intelligence policies, coordination, and supervision; and more effective community support for requirements -- budgetary and otherwise -- affecting the over-all Intelligence Community;
- c. improvement in the intelligence-production process, by reduction of artificial barriers caused by greater compartmentation than actually required for security;
- d. improved relationships and intelligence product resulting from "cross-fertilization" of ideas and more intimate associations and appreciations of intelligence problems.

5. It is my own conclusion that, while there is much to recommend a merger and it may eventually be desirable, it should not be directed at this time.

6. I reach my conclusion because (1) there is strong and sincerely motivated opposition on the part of many of the most important members of USCIB; (2) the two Boards are now functioning smoothly and in close coordination; (3) a consolidation of the two Boards would not in my opinion result in any early saving of time or effort. Possibly it would initially lead to a waste of time since the present supporting technical staffs and subcommittee structures of the IAC and USCIB are wholly distinct and the joint meetings would require both staffs to be available while waiting for their respective items on the agenda of the merged Board; (4) the merger would call for a prior major decision in principle with regard to the position of the Director of Central Intelligence. As Chairman of the IAC, the IAC member agencies are advisers to him, whereas in the case of USCIB he is the non-voting Chairman. A decision as to a change in the DCI's status, if it is desirable, should in my opinion be reached independently and prior to undertaking a merger.

7. I am further influenced in my conclusion by the fact that important and, I believe, very salutary developments in the coordination of the Intelligence Community's work are taking place, both through the

revision of the NSCIDs and otherwise, and a great measure of agreement in the Community is being evidenced. I should prefer to give these new measures a period of trial before a final decision on the merger is reached, including a revised draft of NSCID No. 9 covering NSCIB's work, when agreed upon. It is also to be taken into account that certain reorganization steps are understood to be contemplated within the Department of Defense which may or may not have some bearing on the intelligence structure within that Department and hence on a proposed merger.

3. Accordingly, I recommend that action on recommendation No. 3 of the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities be deferred, and that I be directed to make further recommendations on this subject when we have had an opportunity to test the revised NSCIDs, and after the extent and scope of the reorganization steps referred to above have been clearly defined.

ARTHUR W. BISHOP
Director

DDC:IKT:obp 29 January 1950

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Major General Millard A. Lewis, Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence,
United States Air Force

Brigadier General Richard Collins, Deputy Director for Intelligence,
The Joint Staff

Mr. Charles H. Reichardt, Atomic Energy Commission

Mr. Ralph E. Roach, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Captain Allyn Cole, Executive Secretary, USCEB

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29 January 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director

SUBJECT : DCI Memorandum to Executive Secretary, NSC, concerning Recommendation No. 2 (IAC-USCIB Merger), Report of the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities dated 24 October 1957.

1. This memorandum recommends signature on the attached memorandum for the Executive Secretary, NSC, which contains your report with respect to subject Recommendation.
2. On the basis of comments from the agencies indicated, the following revisions have been made in the draft of your memorandum:
 - a. Paragraph 2 has been revised to remove the word "mildly" in the sixth line at the request of General Collins to indicate that the Joint Staff's attitude was "unfavorable". Additional wording has been added at the request of General Erskine to more clearly indicate his concern as to lack of detail on how the recommendation would be implemented".
 - b. On the ^{third} ~~sixth~~ line of page 2, the words "collection objectives" have been substituted for the word "targets" at the request of General Lewis.
 - c. Paragraph 3.f. has been revised at the request of ACSI (Army) to more clearly indicate the "dissimilarity" they have in mind; the same point was made by the Air Force who accepted the Army's proposed wording.
3. NSA, State, AEC and FBI stated the paper was O.K. Navy stated the paper reflected their views correctly.
4. A single copy of your report will be furnished to each member of the IAC and USCIB.

~~SECRET~~

L. K. TRUSCOTT, JR.
Deputy Director (Coordination)

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29 January 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Secretary
National Security Council

SUBJECT : Recommendation No. 2, Report of the President's
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
dated 24 October 1957

REFERENCE : Memorandum for the Director of Central Intelligence
from Executive Secretary, National Security Council
dated 23 October 1957

1. In accordance with your instructions I have consulted with the IAC and USCIB agencies with regard to the subject recommendation, in the reference memorandum, that the two committees be merged. The members of both groups were given ample time prior to final consultation on the subject to give this matter the fullest consideration and each member was consulted individually by General Truscott.

2. The three service agencies, Army, Navy and Air Force Intelligence, believe that the merger would entail grave disadvantages. Among the remaining agencies, leaving aside for the moment my own position, the attitudes ranged from favorable in the case of the Department of State and the Atomic Energy Commission, to unfavorable in the case of the representative of the Joint Staff. The representative of the Department of Defense believed that in view of the shift of responsibilities involved it was not appropriate for him to make a decision without more specific detail on how the recommendation would be implemented. The Director of NSA felt that so long as he received adequate and authoritative policy guidance, he could operate under the merger or under the present situation equally well, but indicated that he himself would not wish to participate in the consideration of National Estimates and other related work of the IAC. However, he would have a representative present on any merged committee to gain any intelligence information as to priorities and collection objectives which might be useful to him in his work, and to give his support. The representative of the FBI expressed a neutral view.

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- a. violate the principle that the U. S. COMINT effort must be compartmented and treated in all respects as being outside the framework of other intelligence activities. They believe that this activity should remain under the control of USCIB as a separate body, and that the principal role of the DCI in this field is to insure that intelligence production and other "normal" intelligence operations are coordinated with the separate COMINT operation. Furthermore, it would in their view down-grade the present USCIB structure to place it in the same position vis-a-vis the DCI and the NSC as is now the case with other foreign intelligence activities;
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8. Accordingly, I recommend that action on Recommendation No. 2 of the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities be deferred, and that I be directed to make further recommendations on this subject when we have had an opportunity to test the revised NSCIDs, and after the extent and scope of the reorganization steps referred to above have been clearly defined.

/s/

ALLEN W. DULLES
Director

DIC:LAT:obp 29 January 1958

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Brigadier General Richard Collins, Deputy Director for Intelligence, the Joint Staff
Mr. Charles H. Reichardt, Atomic Energy Commission
Mr. Ralph R. Roach, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Captain Allyn Cole, Executive Secretary, USCIB

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29 January 1958

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L. K. TRUSCOTT, JR.
Deputy Director (Coordination)

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