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60-524/1

* OSD REVIEW COMPLETED *

26 January 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Conversation Between Assistant Secretary of Defense,
John Irwin and French Minister, Louis Joxe

1. This memorandum is for information only.

2. Attached hereto, as requested by the Office of the Director, is a summary of a conversation held in Paris between French Minister Louis Joxe and Assistant Secretary of Defense Irwin on 21 December 1959 and continued on 22 December 1959. Comments of WE Division which have been coordinated with the Africa Division, are also included as requested.



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Acting Chief
Western Europe Division

2 Attachments

cc: DDCI

Copy dropped off for Dd/P.

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
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ATTACHMENT 1


SUMMARY OF CONVERSATION

The conversation between Minister Joxe and Secretary Irwin primarily concerned U.S. and French views on NATO, and covered current problems as related to NATO including: Algeria, Africa, the basic NATO concept, the role of the French Army, independent versus integrated defense forces, Morocco, and a French, British, U.S. triumvirate within NATO. Following is a summary of the more fundamental points covered in the conversation:



NATO

Secretary Irwin stated he shared Joxe's view on the importance of Africa and hoped a common approach might be achieved. However, he thought that where France and the U.S. diverged was on the question of NATO: the U.S. felt that NATO was essential as a political-military base from which problems of defending Africa could be met. He did not mean to suggest that NATO should be expanded to include Africa, but that the U.S. policy of collective security, which applied to Africa, was firmly based on the need of a strong NATO.



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Approved For Release 2002/11/22 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001200100043-3

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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

60-524

15 January 1960

INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS

Dear Allen:

While in Paris for the NATO Conference,
I had the opportunity to hold some interesting
discussions with Minister Joxe, and wanted you
to have a copy of the record.

Sincerely,

John N. Irwin II
John N. Irwin II

Enclosure - 1
Memo of Conversation dtd
30 Dec 1959 - SECRET (9 pages)

Mr. Allen Dulles
Director, Central Intelligence
Agency
2430 E Street, N.W.
Washington 25, D. C.

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UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENTS

THIS DOCUMENT BECOMES *Unclassified*



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

30 December 1959

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Present:

United States

Assistant Secretary of Defense
John N. Irwin II
Brigadier General Frederic H.
Miller, Director, European
Region
Mr. Timothy W. Stanley,
Special Assistant

France

Minister Joux
N. Labouret

Date: 21 and 22 December 1959

Place: Paris, France (Office of Minister Joux, 58 Rue Varenne)

Secretary Irwin opened the conversation by stressing how helpful Secretary Gates and he had found the discussions last September with Minister Joux. Minister Joux indicated that he had also found the frank exchange of views valuable and then gave a short analysis of the events in Algeria which had occurred since the September discussions. He noted that the FLN had suffered losses from French military actions both in terms of personnel and supplies of arms. The rebels, therefore, felt an urgent need to replenish their forces and particularly to re-establish contact with rebel forces in both Tunisia and Morocco which had been cut off by the French border barricades. Minister Joux predicted that there would be attempts at mass breakthrough of the barricades on both the Tunisian and Moroccan frontiers, particularly the latter; he noted that in the last major battle at the barricade line in Tunisia, thousands of rebels had been involved.

Minister Joux went on to discuss the political situation in the light of President de Gaulle's 16 September announcement and his press conference of a few weeks ago. De Gaulle's basic objective was to maintain a bridge between the opposing forces through one or more of

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the following means: between the military forces themselves, by rebel delegation visiting Paris for talks, and possibly by secret negotiations. The FLN had not replied in a responsive manner since they had designated rebel leaders who were imprisoned in France for the talks and also insisted upon exploring political questions before a meeting. Minister Joxe stressed that before the French could engage in military questions it was essential that the FLN leaders give up any claim to representing a government and become merely representatives of a political organization or party. He concluded by noting that the rebels had been unsuccessful in their United Nations' efforts so that the situation was quite similar to what it was in September. The two sides were slowly coming closer together in their positions but a fundamental move by the rebels was still lacking. Minister Joxe explained that France could not accept rebel claims of being representatives because of the government's firm obligation to those in Algeria who had remained faithful to France. President de Gaulle had achieved two significant victories in the face of the political sensitivity of the French settlers in Algeria, namely, granting Algerians the right to vote and offering discussions with the opposing military leaders. In dealing with the serious problem of "exasperated patriotism", President de Gaulle was trying to redefine the goals of patriotism as applied to Algeria.

Drawing a distinction between the problems faced by Spain and Portugal and other countries in ending colonial rule -- which was never easy -- Minister Joxe stressed that Algeria was a different and more complex problem. France had allowed other former colonies to assume control of their own destiny without any problems whatsoever, but if France pulled out of Algeria it would leave a situation of possible massacres for which France could not escape responsibility. He concluded that since the last conversation with Secretary Irwin some elements of the Algerian situation remained the same while others had changed -- the principle of granting independence within the French community being a primary new factor.

Secretary Irwin replied that in his opinion the French appeared now to have less problems in black Africa than the British, and that he had been impressed during his recent trip to Africa that there seemed less tension between the natives and Europeans in French Equatorial and West Africa than in British East Africa. He noted that President de Gaulle's September announcement had cut the ground out from under the rebel's position.

Minister Joxe then spoke of the prospect of 30 or 40 years of conflict of one sort or another in Africa and the great responsibility for defense of that continent left by the withdrawal of European powers. The new nations needed technical assistance, foreign policy guidance, and, above all, external defense. In the past,

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Africa had constituted a manpower reserve for Europe in that African troops had helped in the two world wars, and as a base of operations, for the allies liberated Europe in part from North Africa. Now all this had changed and Africa contained all the elements of 'neo-Marxism': a leader, a party, regimented youth organizations, a directed economy, etc. He stressed that we must help Africa to evolve and to resist Communism and that Algeria is the gate to Africa. Minister Joxe quoted Lenin's dictum to the effect that North America would be conquered via South America and Europe via Africa.

Secretary Irwin asked how the French viewed the problem of stopping arms races between African nations, e.g., between Guinea and Liberia or Ethiopia and Senegal. Minister Joxe responded that the new nations never thought of defense problems and were aware of no enemies, so that they must be 'led by hand'. Mr. Irwin stated that it was highly desirable to avoid arms shipments to Central and Western Africa except possibly for minimum internal police protection. Minister Joxe indicated that if these countries built an army even for internal security, the general who commanded it would soon rule. He stressed also that if even some emerging states could retain a sense of responsibility and loyalty to the culture they had inherited, this would be a significant accomplishment and would assist the Free World in such political bodies as the UN.

Secretary Irwin agreed and pointed out the assistance the countries of Latin America had rendered to the Free World. He pointed to the problems the U.S. faced in Latin America, such as Cuba and Panama, and indicated that he shared the Minister's view on the political and military importance of Africa and hoped that a common approach might be achieved. However, Mr. Irwin thought that where the United States and France diverged was on the question of NATO; the U.S. felt that a strong NATO was essential as a political-military base from which the problems of defending Africa could be met.

Minister Joxe replied that NATO did not include Africa (except possibly the North) in its terms of reference and that it would be difficult to convince members such as Norway and Denmark of the importance of concerning ourselves with Africa. Secretary Irwin indicated that he had not meant to suggest that NATO, as an organization, should be expanded to include Africa, but merely that the U.S. policy of collective security, which applied to Africa as elsewhere in the world, was firmly based upon the need of a strong NATO.

Minister Joxe said he could agree along these lines, but went on to state that although French-U.S. friendship and Western cohesion were important to France, there were a number of specific problems:

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(1) the Mediterranean fleet (which was one aspect of the French responsibilities in Africa); (2) air defense and (3) nuclear stockpiles. On air defense, Minister Joxe indicated that what was needed was a radar net across all of Europe and a unified air defense command. Secretary Irwin agreed that in speaking of "integration" all that was meant was a unified command, in which all the assigned forces would be under the command of SACEUR. Minister Joxe responded that if that was all that was involved, the problem should be subject to reasonably easy solution.

Mr. Irwin stated that he was unsure whether there were only specific problems and disagreements (e.g., the U.S. actions in the United Nations on Algeria, which he knew had displeased France, or the nuclear stockpile matter which concerned the U.S.), or whether there was a basic difference in the U.S. and French philosophy with respect to collective security.

He mentioned President de Gaulle's speech at the staff college as an example, to which Minister Joxe replied that this speech had in part covered academic matters and that he thought President de Gaulle had been explaining his concept of the evolution of NATO. That is, when he said that the period of integration was finished, President de Gaulle was indicating the need for an evolution from the philosophy of a deterrent to a recognition that the Soviet threat was world-wide and involved a war of subversion, so that military means were not the only answer. In short, President de Gaulle was attempting to redefine NATO functions to face the global threat.

For example, there had never been an opportunity to have a broad discussion on the political-military problems of Africa in the light of the many recent changes, i.e., Suez, and the several newly independent states. Secretary Irwin replied that the Defense Department agreed that the problem was more than military; that the Soviet threat involved general war and limited war, political and economic pressures and subversion. However, the U.S. relied upon a strong NATO to deter the Soviets both from general war and also from limited war in Europe and elsewhere, so that both a strategic deterrent and a strong shield force were needed. He failed to see how one could connect the military weakening of NATO (by such means as withholding air defense unification and a nuclear stockpile) with our ability to defend against other Soviet threats. On the contrary, the U.S. felt that we should make NATO strong to enable us better to deal with the other threats.

Minister Joxe replied that the connection was that as long as there was no agreement to consult regularly on non-NATO matters, France must reserve her forces to deal with her other responsibilities.

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such as Algeria. He added that "the way we put our questions indicated the way to get out of the problems they raise." NATO should be kept as a nucleus, as a basis for strength, but leaving open the opportunity to discuss with other members problems of common concern outside of NATO. Mr. Irwin pointed out that the U.S. also retains the ability to act outside of NATO, and that we expect the same of Britain and France; but that without the mutual strength of NATO we would not have the same capability. Also, as modern weapons such as missiles decrease the effectiveness of manned aircraft, disagreements within NATO on such problems as air defense weakens the Alliance both militarily and politically through the internal dissension created. This weakening also reduces our ability to deal effectively with the Soviet threat in other areas than NATO.

The discussion was adjourned at this point and continued the following day.

Minister Joxe opened the discussion by asking where we had left off yesterday. Secretary Irwin replied that we were discussing the question of whether there was any difference in basic philosophy on collective security between the United States and France. Minister Joxe responded that integration was not the best answer to collective security in all circumstances. There are two aspects to this question, first, technical: i.e., will the measures proposed work in practice, and, second, political. On the latter, Minister Joxe stressed General de Gaulle's desire to achieve maximum political coordination among members of the alliance. In this connection, he referred to the U.S. vote on the Algerian question in the United Nations and the resentment which it had caused in France. Minister Joxe indicated that there was considerable uneasiness in the French Government about U.S. policy in North Africa, with particular reference to arms for Morocco and Tunisia.

Minister Joxe indicated that U.S. policies were fundamentally oriented on NATO, while French policies could be so oriented, but only if assured that other subjects would also be covered, for French policy revolved around two poles -- Europe and Africa.

Minister Joxe stated that the technical aspects of various problems derived from the political because the missions of the French forces required mobility. However, this has been the case for several years, as for example in Algeria. This is why France feels it must maintain a separate striking force which could be used inside NATO but which is also available for use outside it. Minister Joxe indicated confidentially that in his opinion, France was faced with a crisis in the Army. The Army has been organized and

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trained to fight guerilla warfare and against subversion. The political power of the Army, which is considerable, derived from the civil authority which it has had to exercise. Minister Joux went on to say that if we want the Army to change its present psychological condition and to become a modern Army, it was necessary to face certain morale problems. That is, the Army must not be submerged in any international organization such as NATO in which it would lose its identity, but rather it must find national missions within a general framework of NATO. He added that they have made progress in changing the military orientation on holding specific pieces of ground, which stemmed from experiences in Indochina and Algeria. But despite this progress, considerable further reorientation was necessary.

Mr. Irwin replied that he had been surprised to hear of our abstention in the United Nations' vote on Algeria. He had assumed that we would not abstain. He understood that our abstention had been based upon the wording of the resolution, but as he was not familiar with the technicalities of the procedures and the language, he could only say he had been surprised when he learned in Europe of the results of the vote. Minister Joux commented that he had dined on the Sunday before last with some friends from the United States (Merchant and Bohlen) and it was just at this time that he had learned of our abstention in the United Nations' vote and of General Twining's statement to the Military Committee.

Minister Joux indicated that the youth of France were doing military service in Algeria, with a period of conscription of 28 months. Their mission was not to win a war but to restore peace and to allow the Algerians to reach a position where they could determine their own destiny. He mentioned that his own son was currently in Algeria, and although he hoped that he had a good orientation on the problems there, it was not easy to explain to most of the men serving in North Africa, especially when the French position was so misunderstood in the United Nations.

Mr. Stanley then commented that this sense of frustration was understood by the American people, who had been in a somewhat similar situation in Korea. Minister Joux pointed out that there were several differences in that the United States was fighting with the United Nations in Korea, whereas in Algeria, France was alone and it was this sense of isolation that made the problem particularly grave.

Secretary Irwin indicated that he understood well the points which Minister Joux had made, but that he still failed to understand with respect to NATO. We regarded the Soviet threat as primary and

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considered that the United States would be a primary target for any Soviet attack. He added that the U.S. was concerned about the Soviet world-wide threat, which was military, political, economic, and subversive, and which involved Africa, the Middle East, the Far East, and Latin America, as well as Europe. He felt that no country could meet this vast threat alone, and that without NATO, the French would be worse off in Algeria, and that the U.S. would equally be unable to meet all of the challenges which it faced. For example, we would probably not have been able to take the effective action we did in Lebanon or in Quemoy unless we had had a strong NATO defense in Europe. Secretary Irwin felt that it was only with a strong NATO that France could solve the problems outside of NATO, such as Algeria, to which it very properly was devoting attention. In summary, his view was that we ought to be able to do both, that is, that the two were complimentary rather than divergent.

Minister Joxe stressed that the principle of NATO was 'unity of force', and that we could apply the same argument of strength through union to other problems, such as the defense of Africa. He pointed out that each member of NATO used the organization differently; Greece contributed very little in military strength but was able through NATO to improve its international position and to receive assistance from the other members. Britain had withdrawn the bulk of its ground and air forces from the integrated European forces. He then took up the specific example of Morocco. Minister Joxe stated that U.S. policy toward the newly independent countries was generally to keep them from falling into the grasp of Communism. However, Morocco, which was a 'curious mixture of anarchy and feudalism', was particularly subject to Communist penetration, especially that of the Chinese Communists. The United States and France both had bases in Morocco and the United States was, in effect, giving up its bases. When we left, the Moroccan situation could well deteriorate rapidly. Economic and technical assistance and a general policy of good will was not enough. Minister Joxe stressed that there was inadequate coordination, not as between colonial powers, but in a strategic sense in the interests of the common defense.

Secretary Irwin noted that there had been Ambassadorial discussions in Washington on North Africa, and Minister Joxe replied that it was very important that these continue. Secretary Irwin agreed and indicated that he hoped they would continue.

At this point Mr. Irwin said he desired to return to a more specific point on the integration, or unification, of air defense. Mr. Stanley noted that he had heard a high-ranking American officer who was very familiar with the problem caution against use of the word 'integration' -- which had unfortunate connotations in French, and urge that 'unification' be used, since this is what was really

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meant. Minister Joux indicated that he understood what we meant by the term, and that there was no problem there.

Secretary Irwin stressed that trying to defend the NATO alliance without the certainty that French forces will continue to participate, and without the practical ability to react quickly in a emergency situation, raised doubts about the effectiveness of the defense. He indicated that he could understand if the French actions were designed to make us realize the seriousness with which they regarded certain other problems, but if that were not the case, he did not comprehend the logic of the French position on these NATO issues, unless there was a basic difference in philosophy. He thought that France, for example, could say we "accept a unified air defense but we think you should do differently in your policies in North Africa;" but did not see why should they be directly connected, unless it was to make us see and understand the French point of view. Secretary Irwin added that if there was no difference in basic philosophy, it certainly should be possible to work out the specific problems over a period of time. But what concerned him was that if there was basic differences, they would not be solved even if agreement was reached on the specific problem areas.

Minister Joux stated that Secretary Irwin was, in effect, asking if the French rejected integration everywhere. Secretary Irwin replied that although this was involved in air defense and to some extent in the question of nuclear stockpiles and the French fleet, it was not the main problem. In connection with the French fleet, we fully recognized the French need to maintain the line of communications with Algeria, but that the force involved was earmarked to NATO in the event of general war, rather than assigned in peacetime. In a general war situation -- in which NATO must be able to count upon the fleet in its combat operations planning -- the Algerian requirements would not really be applicable. Minister Joux indicated his agreement with this statement. Secretary Irwin then went on to indicate that our Sixth Fleet was earmarked for war use in NATO, but was used by the U.S. in Lebanon on a non-NATO matter, and also that we had moved a battle group from Germany to Lebanon. In other words, the United States felt that we can retain national responsibilities while supporting NATO. Minister Joux responded that Secretary Irwin was approaching the problem in exactly the right manner, that is, through specific examples; and that the French would like to have a discussion of specific cases in which forces would be available for NATO and non-NATO uses.

Secretary Irwin pointed out that we clearly needed a unified command in war, and that because of the speed of developments brought about by modern technology, this meant that it was needed also in peacetime.

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Minister Joxe replied that NATO had begun as a classical military alliance, but had faced a technological revolution and perhaps would face other such revolutions in the future. The question now was how to meet the problem of subversion, and there was a difference of opinion about the nature of the threat. France felt that the threat was not so much of the Soviets against the continent of Europe, but rather one of subversion and outflanking.

Minister Joxe went on to agree that the integration of radar for air defense in France and Germany was essential and that he understood very well Mr. Irwin's concern. He believed that a comprehensive exchange of views ("confrontation") was absolutely necessary. In connection with this "confrontation", Minister Joxe stressed that this was not a question of "blackmail" by their side, but rather a real need for an exchange of views on world-wide strategy.

Minister Joxe referred to the Adenauer-de Gaulle discussions to indicate that there was no intention on the part of France to abandon NATO, and that NATO was vital to maintaining the freedom of Western Europe. However, there were changes that should be made in view of the nature of the threat, as for example, in Africa -- to which NATO was not adapted. Minister Joxe indicated that France was in effect fighting a two-front war. He emphasized again that there was no intention on the part of France to weaken NATO. Problems existed, however, and we must recognize them and work out solutions.

Secretary Irwin indicated that he did not intend to imply that France desired to weaken NATO, for he had full confidence that this was not the case; but that he was concerned over the fact that intentionally or not, NATO had been weakened, for example as a result of the 9-squadron problem; and that through military weakening, a political weakening could follow which might undermine the confidence of the member nations in NATO.

Minister Joxe expressed the view that solutions were within reach on air defense and the Mediterranean fleet but that the stock-pile question would take a little longer.

Secretary Irwin stressed that the discussions that had been held were of assistance in making clear the differences of opinion. Minister Joxe agreed that an understanding was vital since things could not remain much longer in a condition of flux. Mr. Irwin added that in our discussions with France and Britain we considered that we were consulting with our allies and would continue to do so, but without creating a "triumvirate" within NATO. Minister Joxe agreed that he did not wish to see any institutional form of consultation, but did wish a broader scale of discussions.

The discussion was terminated at this point so that Secretary Irwin could leave for the airport. Both considered that the exchange of views had been helpful to both sides.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
 OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	INITIALS	DATE
1	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	26 JAN 1960
	Chief, WE		
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	ACTION	DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
	APPROVAL	DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION
	COMMENT	FILE	RETURN
	CONCURRENCE	INFORMATION	SIGNATURE

Remarks:

[Redacted]

DCI would like to have a brief summary of this and any comment you think might be appropriate for him to make to Jack Irwin when he sees him at the OCB Wednesday noon.

W. J. ...

STAT

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FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
[Redacted] Asst to the Director	1/25/60