

**TOP SECRET**

30 October 1962

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

1. At 6:00 p.m. today in Secretary Ball's office I attended a meeting of the Executive Committee representing Mr. McCone. Present were Secretary Rusk, Mr. McGeorge Bundy, the Attorney General, Secretary Dillon, Secretary Gilpatric, Secretary McNamara, General Taylor (but for the early part of the meeting only), Secretary Nitze, Don Wilson of USIA, Harlan Cleveland, Secretary Foster, Secretary Ball, Secretary Johnson, Secretary Martin, and Ambassador Thompson. The meeting was called presumably to respond to the nine items that had been transmitted to me at 4:15 by telephone. However, upon arriving at the meeting, there was already a draft message to Ambassador Stevenson for discussion as well as a number of listed points apparently put together by Paul Nitze and Alexis Johnson.

2. Secretary Rusk opened the meeting by trying to point out what we hope to achieve in the near future. He said that we had had a Cuba before this and a Cuban problem, and that we would certainly have a Cuban problem after the present crisis was settled. Our primary objective must be to get the offensive missiles out of Cuba now, just as quickly as possible. If we succeed in this, then a number of other things can happen as we go ahead in the future. It will have an effect on the USSR, it will have an effect on Castro, and many of these things will be dividends and we must not try to tie in our dividends now with the major problem of getting the missiles out of Cuba. He pointed out that the margin of decision in the Kremlin is very, very thin and if we load too much on them now in the way of demands, we may break down their initial reaction and therefore end up with nothing. Paul Nitze pointed out that while we are doing this, we must under no circumstances tie our hands to this particular purpose and must keep maximum freedom of action for future activities. The Attorney General stressed the importance of how we phrase any talk of "invasion" and our safeguards against taking such action. He seemed to not have realized that the President had already made some very firm commitments on this. In any event, he was most anxious that we not tie our hands in this regard so that if at some future period an invasion was necessary for other reasons, we would not have an international commitment preventing us from doing so. It was generally agreed that if we

**TOP SECRET**NSC REVIEW  
COMPLETED,  
6/26/2003

~~TOP SECRET~~

- 2 -

stuck to the President's previous press statements as well as his communications with Khrushchev and did not try to expand on these or explain them, we were on pretty safe ground. I think the actual phraseology, as I recall, was "we would give assurances against an invasion of Cuba," or at least this is what Khrushchev asked Kennedy to do. The Attorney General pointed out again that we must not make that type of finalized commitment because it would then allow Cuba to move into Latin America with all forms of subversion, and that in the event we wanted to put pressure on Cuba, possibly as a result of a Soviet move in the Berlin area, we might be enjoined from doing so. Secretary Rusk pointed out that the Rio Pact would protect us and there were a number of other things that we could do to relieve us of any such commitment. It was generally agreed, however, in the entire meeting that we would not attempt to spell out or make any agreement either unilaterally, bilaterally, or on a quid pro quo basis, as to subversive activities. Certainly the Soviets and the Cubans would not live up to them and we did not want to be saddled with something that we would have a moral obligation to live up to. The Attorney General again pointed out that it would be fatal for us to have any sort of unilateral "no-invasion" statement and Mac Bundy agreed that we must stick to the President's prior statement without further elucidation.

3. Secretary Ball then took over the meeting to indicate that he had a draft of possible instructions for Ambassador Stevenson and also a Department of Defense memo. The latter I was not given a copy of, nor were there any more available, but it seemed to parallel, from what I could see, the draft of instructions. Ball was anxious to get a draft out tonight, refine it in the Department, and submit it for the approval of the Executive Committee tomorrow, 31 October. Then Ball and Gilpatric could return to New York and work on Stevenson. He felt that we needed a preamble to the instructions, of some sort of philosophical material to indicate a statement of U. S. objectives, at least during this initial period, so Stevenson would have some guidelines within which to operate. There was a general discussion of what constituted offensive weapons and it was generally agreed that we again would conform to the Presidential statements and press releases. I pointed out that it was our feeling that in the event the Soviets did remove their offensive missiles, they would concurrently or shortly thereafter also remove their SA-2 missiles since

~~TOP SECRET~~

TOP SECRET

- 3 -

these were of the latest type, contain C-band radar equipment, and taking Mr. McCone's policy or, rather, prognostications in reverse, if they removed the missiles there would be no need for the air defense system. Mr. Bundy pointed out that Mr. McCone had been a voice crying in the wilderness from either the Riviera or the Champs Elysees, and he presumed that Mr. McCone's opinion at that time had now become doctrine. I stated unequivocally that insofar as the Agency in which I operated was concerned, there was no question but what it was doctrine.

4. Mr. McNamara seemed absolutely convinced that the Soviets will move out the missiles and that some of the indicators in today's photography pointed toward this already being in effect. I did not make an issue of it except to indicate that we did not feel as complacent about this as he did. At about this time it became apparent that the feeling was for some direct, bilateral, highly-secret negotiations with the Soviets. Secretary Rusk reported that the initial U Thant and Castro conversations had gone very badly, that Castro was adamant and would not give an inch, that Castro would allow no inspections on Cuba or over Cuba. Alexis Johnson pointed out that Gromyko had told Kohler that bilateral bargaining arrangements between the U. S. and the Soviets were the best way to handle this proposition and certainly we should not get <sup>too</sup> heavily involved with the UN and Castro. Apparently Stevenson had lunch with Kuznetsov today or yesterday and he, Kuznetsov, seemed greatly disturbed at what appeared to be Cuban reaction.

5. They went through the cable very, very hastily, pointing out areas which needed correction and it was quite apparent that a complete redraft of the instructions to Stevenson was in order. It was the consensus of the entire Committee that we must now move very rapidly and very secretly to bilateral discussions with Kuznetsov. Furthermore, that the President has a press conference scheduled for Thursday (which might possibly be delayed to Friday) in which he must be in a position to report current situation as regards Cuba and the Soviet missiles and we could not delay much longer in taking actions directly with the Soviets.

6. Secretary Rusk then read a memo prepared by Ed Martin in two and a half pages which ended up with the conclusion that we should not attempt to get or to give any assurances of non-subversion; in other words, the Soviets and the Cubans would not live up to them and we did not want to be bound by any such moral commitments, but we must avoid this at all costs. It was also agreed that we must not do or say anything that would

TOP SECRET

**TOP SECRET**


- 4 -

in any way tie our Cuban action or attempt to relate it to possibilities in Berlin. It was further agreed that we would not even discuss any change in status of Guantanamo.

*Rickey* 7. Finally, it was agreed that in response to a query from General Rickey as to what the photography showed today, we would report back that it had been inconclusive and that as a result thereof we must certainly start flying again on Thursday. There is still considerable doubt as to when U Thant will return and what bearing this might have on our reconnaissance standdown.

8. The meeting ended with the State and Defense people going back to redraft instructions to Stevenson in the light of the discussion and for Cleveland to send a message to Rickey along the lines previously indicated. The new draft will be considered at the Executive Committee meeting tomorrow morning at 10:00.

9. As an aside, Mr. Bundy indicated that he did not feel we had made full use of



25X1

Furthermore, he felt that we should initiate a concentrated intelligence operation on those ships of the Soviet Bloc which have hatches capable of taking the missiles out of Cuba.

10. If the foregoing seems a little bit confused, it is primarily because the discussion was somewhat confused. I attach as documents which were passed out at the meeting, the following:

a. A Top Secret attachment listing an approved list of outstanding issues prepared for the meeting tonight.

b. A draft letter of instructions to the United Nations, Ambassador Stevenson. This will be drastically revised.

11. In conclusion, I felt somewhat encouraged at the general attitude of firmness and resolve displayed on the part of the people there that we

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

- 5 -

could not make commitments which would prejudice U. S. interests, either short or long-range and, further, that we must be ready for more definitive action in the event our current activities bring no fruit.



MSC

25X1

**TOP SECRET**

TOP SECRET Attachment

NSC EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

The attached is the approved list of outstanding issues prepared for the use of the NSC Executive Committee at its meeting 6:00 p.m., October 30, 1962, in the State Department.

TOP SECRET Attachment

**TOP SECRET**

SENSITIVE HANDLING

TO:

FOR YOUR RETENTION

SENSITIVE HANDLING

**TOP SECRET**

TOP SECRET  
CUBA FLIDA

18

I. Theory of operation.

- A. What is to be removed? (Maximum objective breaking military tie with Moscow and removal of strictly offensive weapons.)
- B. How to determine what has been removed.
  1. To convince U.S.C.
  2. To convince U.S. public and others.
  3. Precedents.

II. Short term verification requirements.

A. Shipping.

1. Inbound.
  - a. UN port surveillance.
  - b. UN sea surveillance
  - c. US standby position and conditions for change.
2. Outbound.
  - a. Extent UN verification.
  - b. US standby capability.

B. Activities in Cuba.

1. UN verification.
  - a. Specified identified sites.
  - b. General inspection.
  - c. Techniques - air - ground.
  - d. Timing - air - ground.
2. US verification.
  - a. ~~Inspection~~ Sites vs. general inspection; i. ., requirement for US aerial reconnaissance.

III.

TOP SECRET

**TOP SECRET**

-2-

III. Long term verification requirements.

- A. Duration of UN arrangements.
- B. Inauguration of OAS or nuclear free zone arrangements (Brazilian resolution).
- C. US standby requirement.

IV. Political Arrangements.

- A. Extent of U.S. guarantees.
  - 1. Not to invade.
  - 2. Regarding subversion - insurrection in Cuba.
  - 3. In multilateral framework.
- B. Reciprocal obligations of Cuba:
  - 1. Regarding Latin America.
  - 2. Regarding Guantanamo.
  - 3. International obligations.
- C. Multilateral arrangements.
  - 1. OAS.
  - 2. UN.
- D. Handling of refugees.

**TOP SECRET**

SECRET

DRAFT:

10/30/62

ACTION: USUN, NEW YORK

SUBJECT: UN Inspection Procedures.

You are requested to convey to Thant following suggestions regarding UN inspection procedures during and after dismantling and withdrawal period which have been developed here in light views expressed by Kuznetsov to SYG (UrTel 1535).

From our viewpoint, ideally inspection would begin immediately upon return of Thant and cover (1) incoming cargoes; (2) outgoing cargoes; (3) dismantling process at missile bases; (4) verification after withdrawal process allegedly completed in order assure there has been full compliance with agreement. Suggested inspection programs for dealing with each of these phases follows:

(1) Incoming Cargoes. As indicated Deptel 1136, we prepared accept ICRC inspection incoming cargoes on ships from bloc ports. According our projection \_\_\_ ships now in transit or scheduled depart bloc ports shortly to arrive in Cuba during next three to four weeks \_\_\_ number Red Cross inspectors required to do job will depend on whether inspection at sea or onshore. Most efficient use manpower would be port inspection permitting close, seriatim inspection vessels without transit time required shuttling between vessels at sea. Accordingly, hope port inspection agreeable to Cubans. We strongly prefer port inspection to inspection high seas. If inspection done at ports, we estimate \_\_\_ personnel needed. If done on high seas, estimate \_\_\_ would be required.

/We believe

SECRET

SECRET

- 2 -

We believe inspection of incoming cargoes should continue until entire verification process completed, thus giving us assurance all offensive weapons and related facilities withdrawn ~~or~~ dismantled!

2. Outgoing Cargoes. If ICRC port inspection acceptable, same team could check outbound shipments from Cuba. To be meaningful, such inspection would be against prior inventory of weapons being shipped (in general categories not raising too many security problems for the Soviets) to be supplied by Soviets to ICRC. Such inventory obviously dependent on Soviet willingness and good faith. We recognize their agreement unlikely, but believe suggestions worth discussing. (If Soviets declare less equipment in proscribed category than we know they have this good grounds for suspicion about their compliance and if they declare more materiel in Cuba than we currently know about, we gain further advantage <sup>re factual</sup> ~~xxxxxxxxxx~~ situation.)

Our estimate is that team of \_\_\_\_\_ ICRC personnel would be required for checking outgoing cargoes, in addition to those inspecting incoming cargo ships. This phase of work could be completed in two or three weeks if enough Soviet bloc shipping is available.

3. Aerial Reconnaissance. As indicated in DEPTTEL 1136, we believe <sup>systematic</sup> ~~some~~ continuing aerial reconnaissance essential, particularly if no on-site inspection of missile sites can be arranged until dismantling completed. Our strong preference is for UN to do job. Canadians have volunteered pilots to UN. You have already indicated to SYG and Rikhye our

SECRET

SECRET

- 3 -

and Rikhye our willingness to make available four RF-101's.

We could make available C-130's and within two-week/<sup>period</sup>train  
aircrews from one of the following: Mexico, Argentina, Chile  
or Columbia. Canada and Indonesia already have competent crews  
which would take only brief period to check them out.

Another highly attractive possibility would be for Mexico or  
Argentina to volunteer squadron of T-11's and crews which Defense  
Department believes would be fully capable to do kind of surveillance  
job we want. Moreover, it is quite feasible to secure suitable  
cameras from other nations. Processing unit with U.S. equipment  
could be readily provided to operate in Havana or at whatever place  
U.N. would wish to use as base of operations.

You should therefore reaffirm all this to SYG, strongly urging  
him to develop a UN reconnaissance capability that would enable us  
to withhold our own flights. We recognize that (unlike US) UN will  
only wish to overfly Cuba after explicit clearance by Cuban authori-  
ties. US would of course need access to photos resulting from UN  
reconnaissance. It goes without saying that US aerial surveillance  
will continue throughout entire dismantling and withdrawal operation  
as long as there is no adequate substitute to satisfy us that agree-  
ment is in fact being carried out.

4. Verificiation of Compliance with Agreement on Assumption  
No On-Site Inspection Permitted.

Judging from Kuznetsov's remarks yesterday (URTEL 1535), Soviets  
will not agree to UN verification until dismantling of missile

sites

SECRET

SECRET

- 3(a) -

sites has taken place. If this assumption correct, it becomes doubly important that UN perform verification function in manner which will satisfy us that Communists have in fact abided by commitment dismantle missile sites and withdraw offensive weapons. Verification problem breaks down into following aspects: (a) terms of reference UN team; (b) number of observers; and (c) composition.

(a) Terms of Reference: UN/Cuba

Preferably UN would be invited inspect actual dismantling of missile sites. At minimum, UN should inspect on spot those sites after dismantling which identified by US as missile bases as well as any Cuban airport which could accommodate bombers and any other area where we have reason believe there may have been concealment of such weapons.

Such teams

SECRET

SECRET

-4-

Such teams should have unrestricted confidential communication facilities with their headquarters units, and free access to areas required for the performance of their duties. US will furnish to UN comprehensive list of locations to be covered under foregoing. Items under ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ current agreement contained in Deptel 1126.

(b) Number of Inspectors

The number of inspectors required to do job satisfactorily will depend on length of time permitted to accomplish task and on the extent of mobility. US would prefer to see such verification accomplished quickly. Assuming for political reasons Communists would prefer keep number UN inspectors relatively small, suggest UN consider possibility utilizing number of helicopters or small planes (which US prepared ~~not~~ available) to permit rapid transit inspection teams maximum number sites in minimum time. It appears to us that team of 50-60 men with adequate air transport could accomplish verification job within a week or so. Moreover, we would want UN aerial observation as described in section 3 this paper to participate in verification process.

(c) Composition

While we assume that probably only citizens of neutral countries will be acceptable to Communists for verification personnel on the ground, it is important from our standpoint that "neutral countries" defined ~~be~~ ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ for this purpose of genuinely reliable members who have demonstrated impartiality during crisis. For example, we would prefer to exclude UAR and Ghana citizens in light of "unneutral" statements made by their Dels in SC meeting and would be willing to see some LA's included such as Brazil and Mexico (recognizing Cuba unlikely agree

to latter's

SECRET

SECRET

- 5 -

to latter's inclusion). From neutrals, we would prefer nations from Sweden, Switzerland, Nigeria, India and Ireland. When it comes to air reconnaissance, it is probably not so important to have neutral personnel; Canadians and Argentinians, for example, might prove acceptable.

5. Security Council Action.

(a) We greatly prefer that any of foregoing inspection arrangements be carried out as executive operation under SYG. As indicated Deptel 1136, we hope ICRC will operate as executive agent of SYG. We understand ICRC operated in similar capacity at UN request in checking compliance with Geneva agreement in US POW camps in Korea. Also, ICRC has acted as executive agent for High Commissioner for Refugees in Congo.

(b) UN/Cuba should be sanctioned by SC and operate under SYG. It would be established at time Soviets report to SC that they have completed dismantling and withdrawal.

(c) We believe financing all verification measures should come under \$2,000,000 provision in regular UN budget for small-scale peace and security operations. If total cost likely to exceed one million dollars, financing problem will need to be reviewed in the ~~light~~ light of the then U.S. position on financing UN peace-and-security operations.

6. Longer-Range Inspection Problem.

Best approach to ensuring against recurrence of problem posed by Soviets in stationing nuclear weapons in Western Hemisphere lies, we believe, in moving forward along lines of Brazilian Resolution on

SECRET

SECRET

- 6 -

Latin-American nuclear-free zone. Such a zone established as self-denying ordinance agreed among Latin American countries including Cuba, could use UN SYG as executive agent to conduct periodic inspections to assure all members of zone that all other members were living up to agreement.

SECRET