

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001300080059-8

SECRET

DATE : 13 FEB 63

ROUTING

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| 1 | 4 |
| 2 | 5 |
| 3 | 6 |

TO : DIRECTOR

FEB 13 1453Z 63

FROM : [REDACTED]

ACTION: D/DCI

ROUTINE

INFO : DCI, DDP, ADDP, WE 4, [REDACTED] 5, DD/1, AD/C1 2, AD/NE, S/C 2

IN 67048

25X1 [REDACTED]

25X1 1. I AM GROWING INCREASINGLY CONCERNED OVER SOVIET INTENTIONS IN CUBA. [REDACTED] THAT SILOS UNDER CONSTRUCTION IS NOT REPEAT NOT SATISFACTORILY ANSWERED BY NEGATIVE SURFACE INDICATIONS OR THE ABSENCE OF SPOILS AS QUANTITIES OF EARTH INVOLVED COULD BE TRUCKED AWAY AND HIDDEN FROM VIEW AND OTHER SIGNS OF WORKINGS COULD BE EASILY CAMOUFLAGED. THEREFORE FEEL WE CANNOT REPEAT CANNOT DISMISS THIS POSSIBILITY ON BASIS OF PHOTO INTERPRETATION AND ANALYSIS.

25X1 2. SEVERAL RECENT EVENTS CONTRIBUTE TO MY GROWING CONCERN OVER THE POSSIBILITY OF REINTRODUCTION OF AN OFFENSIVE WEAPON CAPABILITY IN CUBA AND I WISH THE ENTIRE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY TO INTENSIFY EFFORTS TO SATISFACTORILY ANSWER THIS QUESTION. IN ADDITION TO [REDACTED] THE RECEIPT OF TWO SHIPLOADS OF UNEXPLAINED MILITARY CARGO AND THE PRECIPITOUS DISCHARGING OF THE CARGOS BY MILITARY PERSONNEL, TOGETHER WITH NEWS OF A POSSIBLE THIRD CARGO, IS TO ME AN OMINOUS SIGN. IN ADDITION KHRUSHCHEV'S FALSE AND ABSOLUTELY MISLEADING STATEMENT THAT HIS "TECHNICIANS WERE IN CUBA TO TRAIN CUBANS" IS INCONSISTENT WITH FACTS, AS WERE HIS AND DOBRYNIN'S STATEMENTS PRIOR TO OCTOBER CRISIS.

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PAGE 2

IN 67048

3. FURTHERMORE, DISARMAMENT PROPOSALS OF YESTERDAY AT GENEVA WERE SO OBVIOUSLY UNACCEPTABLE TO THE WEST AS THEY HAVE BEEN ON NUMEROUS OCCASIONS DURING THE PAST TEN YEARS THAT I BELIEVE THEY WERE STATED AS A JUSTIFICATION FOR A SOVIET OFFENSIVE WEAPONS BASE IN CUBA THAN FOR ANY OTHER PURPOSE. CERTAINLY THEY WERE NOT ADVANCED FOR THE PURPOSE OF SERIOUS NEGOTIATION.

4. IN VIEW OF ALL OF THE ABOVE, I AM INCLINED TO THE VIEW THAT IT IS HIGHLY DANGEROUS FOR THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY OR SPOKESMEN FOR THE GOVERNMENT TO TAKE A CATEGORIC POSITION CONCERNING THE POSSIBLE EXISTENCE OR FUTURE CLANDESTINE DEVELOPMENT OF AN OFFENSIVE THREAT AND AM INCLINED TO PLACE GREATER EMPHASIS ON MY STATEMENT THAT THIS CAN ONLY BE PROVEN BY PENETRATING AND CONTINUING ON SITE INSPECTION.

5. I WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR DISCUSSING THIS SUBJECT IN EXECUTIVE SESSION WITH MEMBERS OF USIB TODAY, DISTRIBUTING COPY OF THIS COMMUNICATION TO EACH MEMBER, TO SEC DEF, SEC STATE, AND BUNDY, AND INSTRUCTING DD/I AND ONE TO EVALUATE THESE MATTERS CAREFULLY PRIOR TO MY RETURN.

END OF MESSAGE

S E C R E T

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