

SECRET

63-1287

13 February 1963

Mr. Roger Hilsman
The Director of Intelligence and Research
Department of State
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Hilsman:

Mr. McCone, who is currently abroad in Europe, has sent me the attached message and asked that it be given to you, the other members of the United States Intelligence Board, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, and Mr. Bundy.

Within CIA the Deputy Director (Intelligence) and the Office of National Estimates are at work evaluating the matters raised by Mr. McCone and we will keep you advised.

Faithfully yours,

SIGNED

Marshall S. Carter
Lieutenant General, USA
Acting Director

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Attachment

- H. Knoche:MSC:bjp
- Orig - Adse w/attachment
- (Same letter w/attachment went to each IB member, SecDef, SecState, and Mr. Bundy.)
- ✓ - DDCI w/cy attachment
- 1 - Executive Director w/cy attachment
- 1 copy each letter to w/1 copy attachment
- 1 copy each letter to ER w/1 cy attachment (Att. filed w/Bundy ltr.)
- 1 - Mr. Knoche, O/DCI w/cy attachment

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Executive Registry
63-1287/1

From McCone to Carter (13 February 1963)

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1. I am growing increasingly concerned over Soviet intentions in Cuba. [redacted] deep verticle wells, three to four meters in diameter in Pinar del Rio is not satisfactorily answered by negative surface indications or the absence of spoils as quantities of earth involved could be trucked away and hidden from view and other signs of workings could be easily camouflaged. I therefore feel we cannot dismiss this possibility on the basis of negative photographic interpretation and analysis.

2. Several recent events contribute to my growing concern over the possibility of reintroduction of an offensive capability in Cuba and I wish the entire Intelligence Community to intensify efforts to satisfactorily answer this question. In addition [redacted] the receipt of two shiploads of unexplained military cargo and the precipitous discharging of the cargos by military personnel, together with news of a possible third cargo, is to me an ominous sign. In addition Khrushchev's false and absolutely misleading statement that his technicians were in Cuba to train Cubans is inconsistent with the facts as were his and Dobrynin's statements prior to the October crisis.

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3. Furthermore, the disarmament proposals meeting by the Soviets in Geneva yesterday were so obviously unacceptable to the West (as they have been on numerous occasions during the past ten years) that I believe they were stated as a justification for a Soviet offensive weapons base in Cuba than for any other purpose. Certainly they were not advanced for the purpose of serious negotiation.

4. In view of all of the above, I am inclined to the view that it is highly dangerous for the Intelligence Community or spokesmen for the Government to take a categoric position concerning the possible existence or future clandestine development of an offensive threat and am inclined to place greater emphasis on my statement that this can only be proven by penetrating and continuing on-site inspection.

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