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
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# DAILY LOG

Office of the Deputy Director

Date 7/22/63

25X1



2. Memo to DCI from Chas. E. Johnson containing statement of the ACDA position on development of high-yield nuclear weapons, prepared in response to NSAM 245. To [redacted] and AD/SI for info. (ER 5637)

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5. OSI memorandum to DCI on the effectiveness of very high-yield weapons in connection with the AEC and DOD study of this problem directed by NSAM 245 (TS 117937)

6. ONE memo states that military junta in Ecuador has declared its intention to effect reforms before restoring power to an elected government. The junta now enjoys broad political support. However, preservation of the status quo is an invitation to Castro/Communist revolutionary activity. (DD/I 3740)

7. ONE memo indicates that the Castro government has begun to introduce tight control and discipline over Cuban workers. This policy is likely to lower worker morale and if rigidly applied will almost certainly cause widespread discontent. (DD/I 3710)

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8. ONE memorandum indicating Yugoslav concern over economic relations with the West makes economic exchanges with eastern Europe desirable. Tito believes that Khrushchev's leadership is making significant changes in Soviet attitudes. Tito remains determined, however, to preserve Yugoslavia's independence. (DD/I 3711)

25X1 9. OCI memorandum describes Rumanian opposition to certain Soviet-backed policies which limit Rumania's industrial development. The Soviets may eventually feel it necessary to bring pressures other than military even at the risk of damage to its relations with other Satellites. [REDACTED]

25X1 10. OCI memorandum analyzes Argentine elections as an overwhelming vote for the center and the rejection of extremist elements. ([REDACTED])

11. OCI memorandum to Community allows that whether or not a complete Sino-Soviet break occurs, relations between the USSR and Communist China are seriously ruptured for the foreseeable future. Chances of a genuine Soviet approach to the US at China's expense are not great, but they justify US planning for meeting new hazards and opportunities of such a contingency. (OCI #1585)

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