

NOTES FOR DDCI

14 September 1964

1. Chretien advises, in answer to your query, that we will be "good guys" in the Buz Sawyer strip. The artist was referred to us by the Navy, and came to see Paul recently. I have asked Paul to look over his notes of this meeting and fix up a memo for you. ✓

2. Over the weekend Peer DeSilva reported in a cable to the DCI that Ambassador Taylor had told him that the DCI was somewhat concerned with the matter of intelligence coordination in Saigon, and that the DCI seems dissatisfied with the Station's handling of this function. Peer asked the DCI for details. The DCI responded: "Taylor completely misunderstood. I am in no way dissatisfied with your handling of the intelligence function, nor am I dissatisfied with the intelligence functions of MACV. What concerns me is lack of detailed current intelligence on VC locations, activities, and operations which make possible recurrent and discouraging ambushes. I am at a loss to understand how VC forces can assemble in battalion size or greater in geographic areas or in the vicinity of communities which are presumably held by government elements without some advance knowledge of the presence of VC being communicated to the authorities. I am at a loss to understand how a battalion size attack could occur 4 miles from the Saigon airport without a civilian informant communicating a warning. In sum, where are the Vietnamese Paul Reveres? ✓

"Obtaining info of this type seems to me to be the responsibility of the Vietnamese civilian and military and I raised the question as to whether they are properly organized, trained, and motivated, and whether the friendly population is in support. I do not believe that CAS or MACV can do this, but we must see that it is done and done efficiently by the Vietnamese. ✓

"Again, I repeat the views I expressed to Taylor do not reflect a "dissatisfaction with your handling of this function", but rather a concern as to why we are having surprises of VC presence in comparatively large units. ✓

3. During the first chaotic hours of the weekend coup in Saigon when it appeared so important to develop quick and close contacts with those in charge, the DCI gave DeSilva latitude to recall [redacted] Peer did not think this was necessary and was able to work things out okay. ✓ 25X1

[redacted] ✓

5. The USS Wright, the National Emergency Command Post Afloat, and the one to which you and other wheels are to fly on 24 September in connection

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with [redacted] was found on 12 September to be flooding badly. Until repairs are completed, there is no rudder control and the ship can be moved only with the aid of tugs. In its current condition, the NMCC says the Wright can be used as a Command Post only if anchored or tied to a pier!! ✓

6. There have been some snafus -- I am not familiar with all of the details -- in regard to the DCI's trip. [redacted]

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[redacted]

7. There is some puzzlement in the White House as to what to do about the panel of wise men selected by LBJ to advise him on foreign policy matters. There is some thought that the thing to do first is to get all of them briefed on the state of the world. If so, this could give us a busy time. ✓

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[redacted]

9. I have looked into the matter of the U-2 charts which you had wanted disseminated to the members of the NRO ExCom. Copies were sent to McMillan, Vance, and Fubini on 9 September, the day before the meeting. McMillan's got to him rather quickly, but delivery to the other two was made through the DIA Control Registry which apparently did not move quickly. We are checking with the Control Registry to see what went wrong. In any case, your previous dissemination directive had been adhered to. ✓

10. You asked me not long ago to insure that DDS&T, OSI, and Security were clued in on the DCI's notes for his European briefing. DDS&T and OSI had helped in the preparation. In advising of their position on the matter, Security made one good recommendation; namely, that the introductory remarks include a statement emphasizing the high degree of security protection the U.S. gives to satellite reconnaissance and the results of same. Such a statement is being drafted for inclusion. ✓

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