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5 June 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Science and Technology)

1. The attached papers were handed to me by R. Jack Smith who does not happen to be involved in this business. Please note that Mr. Crimmins is not OXCART cleared and that many of the people working on this contingency plan are also not OXCART cleared. Please also note that Secretary Vance or Secretary Johnson apparently "blew" CIA involvement in the A-11 -- however, everybody and his brother already knows this so it is no great crime.

2. Please prepare some sort of appropriate reply to paragraph 3 of the [redacted] memorandum, preferably for my signature. If you prefer, give me a talking paper that I can take directly to Alexis Johnson to tell him what we are doing and to ensure that we maintain OXCART security to the maximum extent. For your information, I have no taste whatsoever for any use of OXCART over Cuba and intend to tell Johnson exactly that.

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*/s/ MSC*

Marshall S. Carter  
Lieutenant General, USA  
Deputy Director

Attachment:

Memo for Acting DD/I from [redacted] Subject:  
U-2 Flight, Cuba--Contingency Plans, dated 5 June 1964  
(TS #174766-64, Cy 1) w/atts

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5 June 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Deputy Director (Intelligence)

SUBJECT : U-2 Flight, Cuba--Contingency Plans

1. This morning I met with Mr. John H. Crimmins, Director, Office of Cuban Coordinator, in his office at State to discuss a question relating to the current contingency plans in re the possibility of a shootdown of a U-2 over Cuba. This was in accord with your instructions following a telephone call to you yesterday from Crimmins.

2. Basically Mr. Crimmins' point is that word from CIA is necessary on the possibility of using the "A-11" as an alternative for the U-2 over Cuba. He sees this as necessary to supplement certain technical studies now being done in Defense as a technical base for a revision of the current contingency plans paper.

a. The current contingency plan, a DOD-State paper "U-2 Flights Cuba--Contingency Plans" (in the coordination of which CIA did have a voice), is the one which was distributed on 1 May (in anticipation of a then-scheduled White House meeting for 2 May), although this paper is scheduled for revision, particularly as to certain technical questions in the consideration of possible alternatives to the current U-2 flights.

b. On 4 May a meeting was held in Deputy Secretary of Defense's Vance's office (Mr. Clise attended for CIA) at which a paper drafted by State (Crimmins) was considered. Agreement was not reached, and following this meeting and the NSC meeting of 5 May it was quickly decided that State needed a better technical base for the rewriting called for. DOD undertook to do certain technical studies.

c. The DOD technical studies are still not finished, although DOD recently sent State preliminary drafts of what is being done (and I understand that DOD at the time asked that no decisions be reached on the basis of these preliminary studies, pointing out that work had not been completed). Crimmins' principal

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comments on these preliminary drafts:



(2) The drafts do not cover the "A-11" possibility.

d. Crimmins says that U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs, on 1 or 2 June asked Vance re the "A-11," and Vance replied that this was CIA's business. Johnson then subsequently asked Crimmins to get in touch with CIA and have the "A-11" question answered.

3. Crimmins now asks that CIA provide an early input into the planned revision of the contingency plans paper in the form of a statement on the "A-11" as to the feasibility of using it as an alternative for the U-2 in coverage of Cuba. He suggested that this input be provided in the form of a letter to U. Alexis Johnson (presumably from the DCI or DDCI). Specifically the statement would answer the questions (a) Is the "A-11" a practical vehicle for such use? (b) If it is not, can it be made so? (c) If it can be made so, what is the timing factor?

4. Crimmins evidently expects the DOD studies to be completed shortly and says that when these and the CIA input are available, he will be able to have a revised paper available for coordination quite promptly. He mentioned the possibility of the middle of next week for a meeting.

5. Without offering a reply to the specific questions asked, I assured Crimmins that the matter raised by him and U. Alexis Johnson would be considered promptly.

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Executive Staff

Attachments:

1. Copy of current 1 May 1964 contingency plan.
2. Copy of State-drafted paper considered at 4 May meeting in Vance's office.

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