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29 August 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Conversation with General Bozo McKee

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1. I had dinner at the Chevy Chase Country Club with General and Mrs. Cabell on Thursday, 27 August. Present as guests were General and Mrs. Dunford, General and Mrs. Ira Eaker, a  (previously with OSS and employed by the Agency up until last spring), and General and Mrs. McKee.

2. In a private conversation overheard by no one, General McKee made the following two points:

a. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, and particularly the Air Force staff, were in agreement with Mr. McCone's dissent on the 16 March McNamara report on South Vietnam. General McKee said that the copies of the McNamara report which were provided to the Joint Chiefs had not contained Mr. McCone's dissent and indicated that this dissent had been clipped off (using his fingers as scissors). He stated that it was by pure inadvertence that they had obtained a copy of Mr. McCone's views and the whole implication of his statement was that chicanery was involved. (In checking this out I have been informed by the staff that after the DCI had made the point of his dissent at the NSC meeting, he did not consider it mandatory that the dissent remain a part of the report.)

*Not suitable
Committee*

b. General McKee said that he and the Air Staff had been greatly refreshed by the DCI's candor and complete frankness when he had lunch with them several weeks ago. In this connection, McKee told me that Dr. Fubini and Dr. McMillan have repeatedly stated to the Air Staff that the CIA

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was intent on taking over the entire satellite reconnaissance business and all other forms of overhead reconnaissance. They had stated this was a very sinister campaign of the CIA and that the Air Staff should do everything to combat it. I told General McKee this was absolutely false and that what we were trying to do was maintain within the Washington community the capability of getting intelligence inputs into the mechanics of intelligence collection. I told him that repeatedly the NRO, through the offices of McMillan and Fubini, had taken actions intimately affecting the intelligence community without checking these out with Mr. McCone or anyone else in the intelligence community and that this was an intolerable situation. I told General McKee that I thought that the manner in which the NRO was being operated was close to a national scandal and that the manner in which the NRO and Dr. McMillan had failed to utilize the assets of General Schriever and his command, as well as the assets of the Air Staff and other Air components, was a total disgrace. I told him that the Air Forces had tremendous competence which could be applied to overhead reconnaissance and that the CIA had rather unique assets not available to other elements of the Government as well as a high competence in both satellite and aircraft operations. I told him that I felt that the NRO was wrong in concept and wrong in operations and that it should be a very small management group allocating tasks between the CIA and the Air Forces and that these two latter agencies should be constantly in bed together across the board at all levels to ensure that the intelligence needs of the nation are fully met without bureaucratic finagling. General McKee agreed wholeheartedly and said he thought he might just be in a position to do something about this -- at least he would continue to plant seeds wherever he could to counteract the Fubini/McMillan charges against the CIA as well as to get better utilization of both Air Force and CIA assets.



Marshall S. Carter
Lieutenant General, USA
Acting Director

MSC:blp

Original - DCI

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