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NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
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8 February 1966

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
TO: Distribution

SUBJECT: National ELINT Plan (NEP)

Forwarded herewith are requested copies of the National ELINT Plan (NEP). The draft NEP dated 30 August 1963 and inclosures may be destroyed. No record of destruction is required by the National Security Agency.

MARSHALL S. CARTER
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army
Director

OFFICIAL:



Colonel / USA/
Chief of Administrative Services

NSA review(s)
completed.

DIA review(s)
completed.

Incl:
a/s

JCS review complete

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Material Attached

This correspondence
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NUMBER



NATIONAL ELINT PLAN

PUBLISHED AND DISTRIBUTED BY THE DIRECTOR,
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY, UNDER PROMULGATION
AUTHORITY OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE AS
EXECUTIVE AGENT OF THE U. S. GOVERNMENT FOR
THE CONDUCT OF ELINT ACTIVITIES.

8 FEBRUARY 1966

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Washington

8 Feb 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
THE SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
THE DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
THE DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY

SUBJECT: Implementation of the National ELINT Plan (NEP)

The Secretary of Defense and the Director, Central Intelligence have approved the National ELINT Plan (NEP) for implementation within the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency. The National Security Agency has been directed to publish and distribute the Plan in accordance with your distribution requirements.

The Director, National Security Agency has been given the responsibility for coordinating the over-all implementation of the plan and an ELINT Advisory Group, with membership from the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency has been established to assist him in this endeavor.

/s/ Cyrus Vance
DEPUTY

cc: Director
Central Intelligence

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. Secretary of Defense memoranda, dated 30 October 1961, requested that the Director, National Security Agency (DIRNSA), prepare a National ELINT Plan (NEP), and requested the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and the Unified and Specified Commands to assist the Director, National Security Agency, in the preparation of the plan. Accordingly, the Director, National Security Agency, arranged for, and convened under his aegis, a Joint Steering Group with membership from the Joint Staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to prepare the plan with Military Department and Unified and Specified Command participation as required. This resultant plan is based upon existing National ELINT policy and jurisdictions and does not envisage any change in pertinent National directives.

B. This plan is the result of a review and analysis of all facets of the total U.S. ELINT effort as well as those ECM resources which may be used for intelligence purposes under appropriate conditions. It sets forth the agreed steps for modifying or abolishing existing operational procedures or establishing new ones.

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C. Those operations and procedures not considered in need of modification or increased emphasis are omitted from the plan since their inclusion would not serve to improve the overall ELINT effort and would tend to make the report so voluminous as to obscure those points which are deserving of specific attention. Details for carrying out agreed objectives or recommendations of the plan are not generally specified beyond indicating where the responsibility will repose.

D. It is expected that a considerable effort will be necessary to execute the plan and to reorient the present ELINT organization and activities in accordance with the provision of the plan. The utilization of an advisory group by DIRNSA, as recommended by the plan will materially aid the staffing, execution, and updating of this plan.

II. GENERAL

A. Purpose. The purpose of this plan is to provide a basis and an initial system for the effective management of the total U.S. ELINT effort. The plan addresses itself primarily to establishing basic responsibilities and objectives and providing operational, management, and coordination mechanisms in the fields of: ELINT requirements; collection; processing; reporting; evaluation; research;

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development, test and evaluation (RDT&E); training; technical standards; and planning and programming. The steps necessary for meeting these responsibilities and objectives are set forth below in paragraph III, POLICIES AND PROCEDURES GOVERNING THE CONDUCT OF U.S. ELINT ACTIVITIES.

B. Scope. As previously indicated, groundwork for the plan has included a comprehensive review and analysis of the present U.S. ELINT effort. Within its scope were such items as: an inventory of all U.S. ELINT resources -- ground, sea, and overhead platforms, both present and proposed (including RDT&E);

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the responsibilities and

interrelationships of all major U.S. ELINT participants; the areas and methods of collection and processing operations; the present status of production and reporting; and a preliminary assessment of the effectiveness of the ELINT program to date.

C. References. The principal directives and other documents relevant to this plan are listed below:


1. National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 1, Subject: Basic Duties and Responsibilities, dated 4 March 1964. (SECRET)

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2. National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 6, Subject: Communications Intelligence and Electronics Intelligence, dated 15 September 1958. (TOP SECRET)

3. Department of Defense Directive S-3115.2, Subject: Electronics Intelligence (ELINT), dated 19 March 1959. ^{25X1}



7. Department of Defense Memorandum for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Subject: ELINT Activities Conducted by the Commanders of Unified and Specified Commands, dated 1 July 1960. (SECRET)

8. Department of Defense Directive 5105.21, Subject: Defense Intelligence Agency, dated 1 August 1961. (UNCLASSIFIED)

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9. Secretary of Defense Memorandum for the Director, National Security Agency, Subject: ELINT Study, dated 30 October 1961. (SECRET)

10. Secretary of Defense Memorandum to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Subject: National Security Agency Study of Electronics Intelligence, dated 30 October 1961. (SECRET)

11. Secretary of Defense Memorandum to Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; Director, Defense Intelligence Agency; Director, National Security Agency, Subject: Implementation of the National ELINT Plan, dated 22 September 1964.

12. Director, CIA Memorandum to Deputy Secretary of Defense, dated 30 October 1964.

13. Secretary of Defense Memorandum to Director, Central Intelligence, dated 13 November 1964.

D. Definitions. All definitions used are standard or slightly modified versions thereof; the definitions and the sources from which they were derived, are set forth in Appendix A (to be issued at a later date). Only selected, major definitions are shown here:

1. ELINT - The technical and intelligence information product of ELINT activities. ELINT activities are defined as the

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collection (observation and recording), and the technical processing for subsequent intelligence purposes, of information derived from foreign non-communications, electromagnetic radiations emanating from other than atomic detonation or radioactive sources. (SOURCE: NSCID No. 6, 15 September 1958).

2. ELINT Direct Support - The provision of ELINT information to a military command or other designated user by a subordinate unit, or by a cryptologic element or component thereof, the operational control of which has been delegated. The facilities and resources of elements or components so designated are employed in the satisfaction of direct support intelligence requirements. CONFIDENTIAL (SOURCE: NSA Regulation 20-6, 4 September 1961).

3. ELINT Technical Control - The authoritative prescription of those uniform techniques and standards by which ELINT information is collected, processed, and reported in satisfaction of technical as well as intelligence requirements without interference to operational control. Technical control includes the authority to conduct technical review of ELINT plans, and programs to insure technical adequacy. CONFIDENTIAL (SOURCE: JCS).

4. ELINT Technical Guidance - The act of providing technical ELINT information or other assistance of an advisory

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nature. CONFIDENTIAL (SOURCE: NSA).

5. ELINT Technical Support - The provision of technical information, specialized equipment, engineering assistance and analytic service required to facilitate the collection, processing, analysis and reporting of ELINT. Technical guidance is a function of technical support. CONFIDENTIAL (SOURCE: JESG Report, 1 October 1961).

6. Levy - to impose a requirement, through competent authority, on a specific activity or collector for fulfillment. UNCLASSIFIED (SOURCE: DIA).

7. Tasking - The assignment of a specific task, duty, or mission to an organization or element by a commander or other competent authority exercising operational control. UNCLASSIFIED (SOURCE: NSA).

8. Validation - The process by which a requirement is checked against similar requirements, and the extent to which these requirements have been satisfied. As a result of this review a requirement priority is established, and the need for the information is authoritatively corroborated. CONFIDENTIAL (SOURCE: DIA).

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III. POLICIES AND PROCEDURES GOVERNING THE CONDUCT OF U.S. ELINT ACTIVITIES

A. RESPONSIBILITIES AND MANAGEMENT

1. No national-level directives will be replaced or modified; however, there is a need for revision of the supporting ELINT directives of the various agencies and departments engaged in ELINT activities to bring them up-to-date and into conformity with this plan.

2. The provisions of the various national level directives will be carried out explicitly and any differences in interpretation of these directives which cannot be resolved at a lower level will be referred to the SIGINT Committee of USIB.

3. Appropriate action will be taken by DIRNSA to insure strong technical guidance and support of the U.S. ELINT effort.

4. An NEP implementation or coordinating group, comprised of senior representatives of NSA, DIA,¹ and CIA with broad experience in the field of ELINT will be established under DIRNSA to advise and assist him in carrying out the National ELINT Plan. DIRNSA will provide the chairman and administrative support for this group which will be convened as required.

¹DIA will arrange for appropriate Military Department representation, as required.

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B. REQUIREMENTS

1. The Military Departments

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will forward all ELINT requirements to DIA for registration, validation, and assignment of intelligence priorities prior to their forwarding to NSA by DIA for collection action. In an emergency situation commanders^{25X1} may undertake collection action against tactical requirements prior to DIA registration and validation. However, notification will be forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff as soon as possible. CIA ELINT requirements, other than requirements which call for sensitive flights/operations, which cannot be satisfied by CIA resources will be forwarded with CIA-assigned intelligence priorities to DIA for registration. To preclude unnecessary duplication, DIA and NSA will be informed of requirements for sensitive flights not forwarded to DIA for registration.

2. DIA will also receive for information and registration purposes information copies of all ELINT requirements levied by CIA on their integral non-sensitive resources.

3. As a prerequisite to the levying of ELINT requirements or tasks, all validated ELINT requirements will be passed to NSA for technical assessment; CIA and DIA will participate

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as desired in the NSA assessment of the capabilities and potential of all collectors to satisfy the validated requirements. Requirements for collection will then be levied upon the optimum collection capability, forwarded through regular command channels.¹

4. JCS has developed a Plan for Airborne ELINT which provides for a systematic review of airborne ELINT reconnaissance schedules by JCS, DIA and NSA. This Plan also provides the guidance for bringing the airborne ELINT and associated processing resources into consonance with the NEP; (Reference SM-620-65, 2 July 1965)

¹ a. Requirements will be levied:

(1) By DIA to the [redacted] Military Departments, [redacted] by Military Departments. CIA will be supplied copies of requirements levied on [redacted]

(2) By NSA on Second Parties and, in the form of tasking, on the SCAs.

b. In situations wherein timeliness is a critical factor, requirements may be levied directly on collectors of other agencies provided prior coordination is effected and copies are provided to the operational control authority and to DIA for registry.

c. The representatives of the executive agent will be the single channel through which requirements or tasking will be levied in those cases where two or more U.S. sponsors would otherwise levy requirements upon the same single national authority [redacted]

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5. DIRNSA will determine the technical adequacy of resources. When improved collection and processing facilities are needed to accomplish the requirements objectives, DIRNSA will identify the deficiencies to all appropriate organizations. RDT&E efforts initiated by other agencies to improve ELINT collection and processing capabilities will be coordinated with NSA prior to their initiation.

6. DIA, in coordination with CIA and NSA, will develop a standard format and procedure for periodic reporting of progress on meeting requirements. These status reports will be prepared by the Agency levying the requirement and furnished to activities undertaking collection against specific requirements.

C. COLLECTION

1. NSA will be responsible for providing technical guidance and technical support for all U.S. ELINT collection operations. This technical guidance and support will be provided through command channels unless otherwise agreed upon.

2. NSA, in coordination with DIA, will develop a system which will provide for the continued technical evaluation of the total U.S. ELINT collection posture vis-a-vis all USIB

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and operational intelligence requirements. This technical evaluation together with consumer evaluation must be adequate to provide the planning base from which all ELINT programs can be developed, evaluated and funded, and to permit existing collection programs to be redirected on a current basis where necessary. This evaluation must be prepared with the participation and support of the commands, the SCAs, CIA and the Military Departments; it will include an assessment of the inadequacies and redundancies of current and programmed collection efforts and provide recommendations for appropriate action.

3. NSA, DIA, and CIA will develop and maintain an ELINT collection capability register of all collection resources under their cognizance and control. DIA and CIA will provide registers to NSA where they will be incorporated with the NSA-maintained SCA register for purposes of the overall technical assessment program. The DIA register of command collection capabilities will include those passive ECM resources which are judged by the as capable of contributing to the overall ELINT collection program on a second priority basis. NSA will provide copies of the master register to DIA and CIA on a quarterly basis.

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4. Passive ECM resources will continue to provide maximum responsiveness to ELINT requirements as a second priority mission. It is generally understood that ELINT can be a first priority mission if so desired, and ELINT collection and reporting responsibilities devolve upon all units possessing passive ECM capability when operating in potential electronic contact with the devices of unfriendly or hostile nations. The ELINT tasks assigned shall be consistent with the primary mission.

D. PROCESSING

1. A cohesive processing program designed to derive maximum analytic results, employing the finest skills available to the United States will be developed. As pertains to Department of Defense resources the following responsibilities apply.

a. NSA will:

(1) Participate in and exercise technical control over all command ELINT processing without interference with normal command and operational control.

(2) Standardize technical reporting and formats to permit exchange of technical data throughout the system.

(3) Make available to the services advanced analytic training for service ELINT analysts.

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(4) Make recommendation to the commander concerned when changes are needed in the processing effort which involve personnel and/or resources.

(5) Orient the processing program toward the fulfillment of actual technical and intelligence requirements.

b. The commanders of the [redacted]

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[redacted] will:

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(1) Make full use of the technical competence of NSA analysts whenever possible.

(2) In conjunction with NSA review ELINT processing activities within the respective commands, eliminate processing efforts of marginal value and consolidate activities where possible.

2. The ELINT processing capabilities of [redacted]

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[redacted] will be constituted in accordance with the following

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criteria:

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b. Technical control will be exercised by NSA in order to effect maximum technical compatibility with collection systems and procedures as well as to coordinate [] processing^{25X1} with ELINT processing activities in the Continental United States.

c. This effort will provide:

- (1) Timely ELINT to all [] consumers^{25X1}
- (2) Quality control of intercept for feedback to collection activities.
- (3) Quick analysis of new and unusual signals for [] use, if feasible, prior to forwarding to CONUS.
- (4) Information to enable NSA field activities to provide technical guidance as part of collection tasking.

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(5) An opportunity to more fully utilize COMINT products.

d. The elements of the [] ELINT processing ^{25X1} effort will be collocated to the maximum extent feasible, consistent with technical and economic factors. The present Electronic Intelligence Centers will be the nuclei of the facility. Actions have been taken to accomplish the foregoing and include the following:

(1) Establishment of close technical collaboration and, where practicable, the exchange of technically qualified personnel between the NSA Signal Analysis Laboratories (SALs) and []

(2) The study and resolution of problems, by NSA and JCS/DIA (with participation by CIA as appropriate), connected with the establishment of a signal processing center in each []

4. To insure a non-duplicative division of processing functions and more timely reporting, the following system will apply:

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a. All exploitable ELINT data, ¹ regardless of collector affiliation, will be identified at the preliminary processing activity (or, if not possible with current resources, by the intermediate processor) and sent as directly as possible to [redacted] for exploitation.

This will include [redacted] [redacted] 25X1

[redacted] 25X1

b. Technical ELINT material, to include unidentified modulations and developmental signals, will be isolated and sent as directly as possible to the appropriate [redacted] ELINT center 25X1 as necessary for provision of technical support and guidance to ELINT collectors and processors, or to NSA for appropriate signals analysis. Materials from special project and telemetry collection will be sent directly to NSA or its designee in accordance with existing regulations.

The preliminary processing capability in the actual collection area will be strengthened as necessary to permit more timely identification of exploitable and technical ELINT and to provide for an on-site technical operation. To provide resources

¹That information reported from collection activities which can readily be reduced to an operational intelligence product with no additional technical analysis.

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for this purpose and to make possible a more rapid data flow as outlined above, NSA and the SCAs will initiate plans to phase out NSA/SCA ELINT processing activities except those integral to collection activities, technical direction and support, those engaged in SIGINT fusion, and those required for direct support of forces in forward areas.

6. Upon achieving an efficient operation in a

25X1 ELINT processing facility, NSA, with DIA and CIA participating as appropriate, will continue their studies in an effort to:

a. Further reduce ELINT processing and 25X1 analysis facilities without degradation of quality or responsiveness to consumers.

25X1 b. Assure that all resources and analysis/processing operations not essential to forward area needs are returned to CONUS.

7. DIA, CIA, and NSA will periodically and jointly review all governmental and contractor efforts in the production or interpretation of telemetry analogs from 25X1

25X1 in order to eliminate duplication and assure adequate response to intelligence needs.

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E. PRODUCTS AND REPORTING

1. DIA will direct the publications of a Master Electronic Order of Battle (EOB) making maximum utilization of existing resources. The JCS Plan for Airborne ELINT, further specifies production responsibilities of DoD resources. Supplementary processing and production will be limited to that required for operational purposes.

2. DIA, in coordination with NSA and CIA, will develop a comprehensive ELINT product reporting system to include items such as a registry of reports and recipients, standardized report serialization, etc.

F. TRAINING

1. NSA will ascertain the community requirements for specialized ELINT training, particularly as related to advanced analysis techniques and certain special collection projects and will provide for such training.

2. NSA will coordinate all ELINT training activity and establish ELINT training standards.

3. NSA, in coordination with Departments, Commands, and CIA, will develop procedures to improve the utilization of trained and experienced personnel. This will include procedures whereby organizations presently exchanging or rotating personnel

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will be able to utilize more effectively the talents available.

G. RDT&E

1. NSA, under the direction of DDR&E and in collaboration with all participating departments and agencies, will establish procedures for the effective planning, coordination, evaluation, and execution of the total U.S. RDT&E effort for ELINT. These procedures will insure:

a. That intelligence requirements are specified for the long-term (as well as short-term) and in such a manner as to permit translation into appropriate ELINT operational techniques and equipment capability requirements.

b. The development of an R&D program responsive to both short-term and long-term requirements, and which provides for evaluating the effectiveness of approved programs.

c. That, wherever effective and economical, new techniques and systems will be simulated by machine programs and operated in a simulated (future) environment as an aid to establishing and testing the R&D capability requirements.

d. That the overall RDT&E effort in support of ELINT includes a proper balance of general research as well as

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research aimed at development for operational programs, directed at short-range and long-range goals.

e. That RDT&E goals and subsequent tasks are established on a basis consistent with national objectives and priorities and with an appropriate time frame and that they are assigned to the organization best suited to the task.

f. An effective exchange of information concerning all RDT&E programs in support of ELINT.

g. That development of processing equipment is compatible and properly phased in time with associated collection equipment.

H. EVALUATION

1. The SIGINT Committee will propose an evaluation program for consideration by USIB which will facilitate appropriate action by the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence on the Consolidated Cryptologic Program, Consolidated Intelligence Program, and certain CIA ELINT projects. Such an evaluation will include a periodic review of ELINT requirements, product analysis keyed to specific ELINT activities (both collection and processing) and cost effectiveness.

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I. [] ELINT ACTIVITIES

1. Procedures involved in carrying out the provisions

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[]
[] These directives should not

only be considered regulatory in nature but should serve as guidelines in achieving U.S. objectives. To these ends the executive agent []

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[] responsible for the conduct of ELINT arrangements will:

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a. Insure that any release of ELINT is in accordance with the provisions of [] and the National Disclosure Policy. This will include general technical guidance such as ELTEX cards, ELT reports, Reference Information, etc.

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b. Insure that [] develop procedures to assure the provision of adequate and timely technical guidance and support and that these procedures are in accordance with existing directives and NSA technical responsibility.

c. Insure that [] and [] activities, insofar as possible, are also responsive to U.S. military requirements.

2. It is incumbent on DCI to assure that the exploitation in the intelligence field of []

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Additionally, each

[Redacted]

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[Redacted] activities will:

a. Define for NSA the needs for technical support and guidance.

b. Furnish to the representative of the executive agent lists of all ELINT information and equipment released to

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[Redacted]

c. Develop procedures to provide adequate and timely technical guidance and support to [Redacted] ELINT operations in accordance with existing directives and NSA technical responsibility.

3. CIA will submit for USIB approval a procedure which will enable USIB to review all current security policies and procedures governing the release or exchange of ELINT

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted] in order to assure their adequacy.

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4. As a part of the U.S. SIGINT evaluation system being developed by USIB, the SIGINT Committee will develop a compatible system by which all 25X1 ELINT will be evaluated, reviewed, and related to all other ELINT available. On this basis, the inadequacies or redundancies of programs will be 25X6 assessed and recommendation made for corrective action.

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