

Notes For Mr. Helms

30 August 1965


1. The Director buzzed to talk about several items.

a. He said that on second thought he had some reservations about closing out [redacted] for fear we might alienate Dr. Land and others connected with it. He thought that we might consider the possibility of making it work. I agreed that we might alienate Dr. Land, but I expressed extreme pessimism about our ability to make it work. On balance I would favor proceeding with the phase-down in Fiscal Year 1966 and phase-out in Fiscal Year 1967. The Director said that he wanted to talk to Bud Wheelon about this. (I don't know yet what his decision will be.)

25X1

b. The Director talked with me regarding his concern about DD/I management, the possibility of reorganization, etc. I told the Director that, while I had not been briefed recently on DD/I, I thought his real problem was a personality conflict and that, whether or not they were over-staffed and whether or not we reorganized, the unsatisfactory situation would not be resolved unless the personalities involved in this struggle were called in and straightened out. While we were talking Mr. Kirkpatrick called to say that he would turn in his long-range planning report tomorrow. The Director talked with him about the DD/I management and reorganization problem and expressed the hope that Kirk might find time to go into this in depth. As far as I could tell, Kirk suggested that he would talk

25X1



c. In querying the Director today whether he wanted to see Ambassadors who would be in the building today and tomorrow, he advised me that in the future, if his time permitted, he wanted to see all visiting VIP's such as Ambassadors, military officers of flag rank, etc. If he is unable to see them personally, he will ask

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
is exempt from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

25X1

the DDCI or Executive Director to represent him. This information was passed on to the morning meeting group and specifically to the Liaison Staff of the Office of Central Reference.

* 2. I met with Matt Baird and Bob Bannerman to discuss [redacted] [redacted] They had reached a tentative agreement with Tom Karamessines that we would cancel the course scheduled for October inasmuch as we have already put on two of the two-week courses and two two-day courses this year. I asked them to review this situation and to ensure that the views of the War Plans Staff as well as DD/P are taken into consideration. Also, they should check with the Pentagon to obtain their reaction. The two-week course started several years ago as a War Plans activity and I think its original purpose may no longer be valid. In the light of the drain on the Agency for speakers, particularly DD/P and OTR, I would be inclined to cancel the October course if this can be done without any offense to the Pentagon. I would then wish to have a careful study made so we might come to a firm conclusion before the early 1966 running of [redacted] [redacted] about whether this or some other course of instruction would better suit our needs and the needs of the military.

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

3. I talked to John Bross about NSAM No. 337 and he agreed to assume responsibility for this during [redacted] absence.

25X1

4. I met with John Bross and Ray Cline to discuss the CIA-DOD survey of photo interpretation facilities, which John will undertake, and whether this same group should tackle the problem of maintaining balance between requirements, production capacity, and collection systems. Initially John was inclined to feel that he could undertake this better than COMOR. Ray felt that COMOR could do it quicker and perhaps better. John called me later in the day to say that he had talked with [redacted] who also felt that COMOR was in a better position to do this. Accordingly, we agreed that John would undertake the survey of the facilities and COMOR would be tasked with attacking the requirements, production capacity, and collection systems problem.

25X1

5. Bud Wheelon came to see me about a number of items.

a. First, he has had further talks with [redacted] General Ledford and [redacted] and now has completely reversed his position of last Friday and wants to put [redacted] in charge of Program B. I declined to approve this and asked him not to take any steps along these lines without consulting with me again. As a minimum I felt that I first would want to talk with [redacted] and Dick Helms.

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

~~SECRET~~

[redacted]

25X1

b. Bud was quite upset about [redacted] actions during his absence. He said that he had had a meeting of his staff and had explained his personal position in this current situation and had concluded that [redacted] was responsible for spreading the word that he was leaving almost immediately.

25X1

25X1

c. He also was quite upset because Paul Borel had been talking to [redacted] about replacing Art Lundahl. I told Bud that I thought it would be most unfortunate for anyone to give Art the impression that he was being cast aside and that I felt we should tread very softly for the moment.

25X1

~~SECRET~~

[redacted]

25X1

~~SECRET~~



Notes for Mr. Helms

31 August 1965

[Handwritten signature]
25X1

X

1. I approved the recommendation of the DD/I and the Director of Training to nominate



However, he is a good man and I think that he will represent the Agency well in the program, which lasts for approximately a year.

2. DD/I made a budget presentation to the Director this morning asking for a total of



It was a good presentation, although almost certainly we will have to cut back the request somewhat before presenting it to the Bureau of the Budget.

25X1

~~SECRET~~



25X1

Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001700110055-4

Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001700110055-4

4. The Director buzzed to say that he wanted someone to take the long-range plan which Mr. Kirkpatrick submitted yesterday, extract the meat from it, and prepare an oral presentation of 25 to 30 minutes which would capsule where we are now, what our requirements are, and where we are going. He wants to take this to Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara and eventually to the President and the Congress to enlist their support for our program and our budget.

5. Bud Wheelon was in to discuss several items.

X a. In connection with our thoughts about designating DD/S&T as the coordinating official for all Agency research and development, he wanted to designate [redacted] as his Special Assistant for R&D matters. (This is the third change of plans he has made for [redacted] within the last week. I wonder what the fourth will be.) I told him that this made sense to me but that he should first come forward with the proposal which Dick Helms requested about how he proposes to go about this. If this proposal should be approved, I would support [redacted] as his Special Assistant for R&D.

25X1

25X1

X b. Bud also asked my advice, in the light of his departure within a year, on whether he should take a trip around the world. He said that he had postponed such a trip earlier in the year because of his involvement in the NRO matter. I said that unless there was some terribly important reason for his taking this trip which he did not give me, it seemed to me that his time could better be spent here in Washington. I pointed out that I thought it was inevitable that DD/S&T personnel were going to be restless until they knew who his successor would be and that he might well spend his time here keeping the lid on this can of worms. In this connection, I also said that the sooner his replacement or an Assistant Deputy who could become his replacement was selected, the better. I believe that he agreed with me on both counts.

c. Bud also talked with me about the possibility of Hank Knoche replacing Jack Blake, and again he seemed to be on one of his kicks where he felt that Hank was the only man in the Agency qualified to do this job. This also led to a discussion about the infusion of Agency blood into DD/S&T. Specifically, he would like to have somebody like Peer de Silva or Jim Critchfield running the Office of Special Activities or heading Program B.

~~SECRET~~ [redacted]

Notes for Mr. Helms

2 September 1965

[redacted]

25X1

(they apparently forgot about Daylight Saving Time). In addition, the message was two and a half hours in transmission due to poor communications. It was not properly handled by either the Clandestine Services or the Office of Current Intelligence Watch Office after it did arrive, and as a result the Director went through quite a tirade. He needed the information for a 9 a.m. meeting at the White House. Des FitzGerald, Jack Smith, Jim Critchfield, and I have had discussions about this, and I think that there will be much closer cooperation and coordination between the DD/I and DD/P on these matters as a result of this incident.

25X1

[redacted]

25X1

3. I had quite a philosophical discussion with [redacted] and Walt Elder about the Operations Center. I think that Jack now understands that the Director looks upon the Senior Intelligence Duty Officer as he would a watch officer on the bridge of the ship; in other words, during off-duty hours he feels that he should be able to call the SIDO and through him get anything he needs. Furthermore, he thinks that the SIDO should exercise more initiative in calling other people in the Agency to get things done or to report to them what has been done. I also urged Jack to have the SIDO call Walt Elder or someone in the Director's office when the Director is personally involved. They were badly negligent on this score last night

25X1

~~SECRET~~ [redacted]


GROUP 1
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET




in connection with the Director's appointment at the White House this morning.

SECRET



Notes for Mr. Helms

3 September 1965




X 2. Ray Cline telephoned and was somewhat exercised about something that [redacted] had told him, apparently based on a conversation with Walt Elder. Bill told Ray that it was his understanding that as Chairman of COMOR he was to be on the Director's T/O and report to the Director. I told Ray that I didn't know anything about this and that I saw no reason, just because he was the Chairman of a USIB committee, that he had to be on the Director's T/O. This is not consistent with current practice with regard to other USIB committees.

3. I talked to Don Smith of the Bureau of the Budget on three different subjects.

a. Concerning NPIC, the draft letter which Mr. Schultze was about to sign with regard to the joint CIA-DOD examination of photo interpretation facilities will exclude departmental facilities. I told Don that in my judgment this would not produce very much if the Department of Defense could decide for itself what was departmental and what was national. I therefore felt that it would be better if CIA and DOD together looked at all the facilities and made this judgment rather than leave to the individual services the decision of what they would call departmental or national. He agreed and said that he would make this point to Charlie Schultze when he saw him at 1600 hours today.

b. He then wanted to talk about his personal plans. He wants





c. We philosophized about the President's planning, programming, and budgeting scheme; in particular, how we should set up this program in the Agency; and more specifically, what should be the relationship between a planning staff and BPAM. Although  was not completely clear on this subject, I gathered that he felt it might not be a mistake to make them a part of the same organization. If they are not, then there must be some way to tie them very closely together. He suggested that I might like to talk with Henry Rowen about this, which I plan to do.

25X1

25X1





25X1
25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001700110055-4

Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001700110055-4

~~SECRET~~




Notes for Mr. Helms

8 September 1965

1. I talked with Des FitzGerald today about his processing of 303 Committee papers. Three or four were submitted today, which required signature immediately in order to meet the deadline. No time whatever, not even fifteen minutes, was left to review and consider the papers before release. Des said that he is in the same boat and that all of these papers have wings on them. However, after further discussion we agreed that in the future they will be submitted at least twenty-four hours before they have to be released unless there is a good reason for late submission. (I am still not satisfied with the way these are handled and at the moment I get no feedback whatever as to what happened at the 303 Committee meeting.)

25X1



I told him that I thought this was a risk which he and the Agency should take. I also said that I would prefer to check this with Dick Helms but that, if he had to act before I could do this, I would accept responsibility provided Ray Cline concurred, which Bill assured me is the case.

3. Howard Osborn advised me that Mr. Montague of the Post Office Department had requested a counter-audio briefing for Postmaster General Gronouski, who will soon become our Ambassador to Poland. I approved, and the briefing has been given.

~~SECRET~~



25X1

Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001700110055-4

Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001700110055-4