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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Memorandum




THE CRISIS
USSR/CUBA

Information as of 0600

30 October 1962

PREPARED FOR THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL.



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30 October 1962

I. THE SITUATION IN CUBA

1 Photographic coverage of 29 October on Sagua La Grande sites 1 and 2 and the Remedios site was poor in quality and does not permit any judgments regarding the nature of activity there. Yesterday's coverage of the San Cristobal and Guanajay sites is not available for interpretation as of 0700 EST.

Castro continues his effort to insinuate his own conditions into the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement.

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
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Cuban exile organizations are despondent.

Castro insists that the US must meet his conditions before he will be satisfied with the US assurance that it will not invade Cuba.

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
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[redacted] the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement has plunged most of the Cuban exile community into despair. According to one UPI dispatch, some of the more aggressive anti-Castro groups such as Alpha-66 and the Revolutionary Student Directorate have pledged that they will renew their armed fight against Castro. [redacted]

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SOVIET DIPLOMATIC MOVES

9 | The USSR is maneuvering to bring its agreement on withdrawal of offensive missiles from Cuba into line with its general disarmament stand. Soviet propoganda continues to work on portrayal of the agreement as a successful Soviet peace initiative, but in Peiping political circles, according to one Western press report, it is described as a "Soviet Munich."

10 | *We note* *to the effect*
The USSR is also trying to tie the US' hands by suggesting in its propoganda that President Kennedy's commitment not to invade Cuba includes putting a stop to anti-Castro activities by "counterrevolutionaries."

11 | Moscow's refusal to allow UN inspection of the actual dismantling of the missiles appears to be at least in part an attempt to avoid setting a precedent which could be cited in general disarmament negotiations. Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov told U Thant in his first discussion with him on 29 October that a UN team can be sent to verify the dismantling after the USSR informs the Security Council that the process has been completed.

12 | This fits with the standard Soviet position on inspection--that there will be no inspection of armaments, but only of disarmament, and then only to verify that the disarmament has been completed.

13 | Kuznetsov said the missiles were already being dismantled in preparation for shipment. He did not say specifically how long the process would take, but U Thant received the impression it would not be more than "a week or two."


14 | Kuznetsov also made it clear that the Soviet government would not permit UN teams to inspect incoming Soviet ships to verify that they were not carrying offensive arms. He noted that Moscow would accept such inspection by Red Cross representatives from neutral countries if they boarded the Soviet freighters from other Soviet or neutral ships. Kuznetsov offered no objections to a suggestion that inspection be carried out in Cuban ports, if the Cuban government agreed.

15 The central theme of Moscow's propaganda commentary for the last 24 hours has been to portray Khrushchev's 28 October letter to the President as a new peace initiative by the Soviet leader. Specific indications as to which areas of international dispute may become the subject of new Soviet initiatives for negotiations are lacking, however,

16 The USSR is still attempting to broaden the President's commitment not to invade Cuba. Talk of the alleged anti-Castro activities of Cuban "counterrevolutionaries" continues to appear in bloc broadcasts, with a Soviet commentator asking whether President Kennedy, in permitting the "shady maneuverings" of these counterrevolutionaries to continue, is living up to his guarantee that Cuba will not be invaded.

17 Reaction from Peiping continues to be at variance with the propaganda from Moscow and Eastern Europe. Peiping yesterday carried an extensive TASS item on Khrushchev's 27 October offer to swap missiles in Cuba for US missiles in Turkey, but has played down the final agreement. An NCNA review of the October 30 Peiping press says that "top prominence" is given to Castro's "important" statement of Sunday upholding Cuba's independence and sovereignty. A Western news agency in Peiping reports that news of Khrushchev's October 28 letter was received with "surprise and disapproval," and that the highest political circles in Peiping are talking of a "Soviet Munich."

SOVIET MILITARY STATUS



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Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

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