

~~TOP SECRET~~

Memo of Executive Committee Meeting, November 1, 10:00 a.m. - all members were present.

25X1
25X1
McCone reported on intelligence summarizing the Cuban crisis memo of November 1 pointing out specifically probability that Cubans would engage reconnaissance by ground-to-air fire; that they had developed a pattern of our reconnaissance and therefore would be waiting for us [redacted] 25X1

[redacted]
[redacted] McCone called attention to the annex covering evidence of Cuban instructions for sabotage demonstrations in Latin America. McCone stated that he had passed this on to Secretary Gilpatric.

25X1
CIA evaluation of [redacted] concluded that [redacted] appeared remote. 25X1

McCone called attention to the fact there had been no reconnaissance of the eastern end of Cuba since the 23rd or 24th of October. CIA felt this was an urgent need. Later the President questioned McNamara and General Taylor on this point. They responded that reconnaissance of this area was required as a definite requirement, but required a U-2.

25X1
[redacted]

The balance of the meeting is covered by penciled notes attached.

Decision was reached to fly three low-level missions of two aircraft each over the San Julian IL-28 field and the MRBM sites and that we would accept the risk of interception by ground-to-air fire and if the plane was lost we would not respond. This is a presidential decision made after General Taylor reported JCS recommendation that if plane was shot down we would immediately initiate an all-out total blockade.

[redacted] 25X1

DCI reported on the Watch Committee stating that the Watch Committee findings coincided with the content of the CIA report where applicable.

25X1 Following the meeting McCone advised Secretary Rusk privately of certain Rusk agreed although he indicated some hesitation concerning one phase of the operation.

Secretary Ball called Rusk reviewing the ^{most} ~~memo~~ of the current situation at the UN and advising that there will be an evening meeting with Kuznetsov and Mikoyan tonight. At the DCI request Rusk suggested that at this meeting the US press for the removal of the SAM sites and a clear statement concerning the current status of their command and control and to attempt to secure a firm irrevocable commitment that these units are inoperable.

Note: At the meeting the President, Bundy, ^{Rusk} ~~Ball~~, McCone decided to attempt to gracefully suggest to Adenauer that he postpone his visit for a week or ten days past November 7.