

December 3, 1962

MEMORANDUM OF MEETING OF EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE NSC ON MONDAY, DECEMBER 3, 1962, AT 10:00 AM. ALL PRESENT PLUS STEVENSON AND GOVERNOR HARRIMAN AND SEVERAL MEMBERS OF HIS MISSION.

NSC REVIEW
COMPLETED,
10/31/03

Harriman reviewed in some detail the report of his mission as covered in the written report of 34 pages, undated (issued Dec. 3). He made a firm recommendation that we support the initial phase of the Indian requirements which were covered in the London meeting, and that careful study be given to phase two which involves the re-equipping of three divisions and setting up three additional divisions so the Indians would have a total of 16 divisions, 15 regular plus one armored division.

Harriman reviewed the Pakistan-Indian problem in detail, indicating some hope, though quite remote, of a settlement.

With reference to the Soviet position and a question from the President, Harriman advised that apparently the MIG deal was off though Nehru had stated it had merely been postponed. Nehru seemed intent on maintaining a relationship with the Soviets. There were no indications that the Soviets have intervened to stop the Chinese Communists; on the other hand Mr. Harriman reached the conclusion that the ChiComs had only limited objectives which they had accomplished and that they did not at this time intend to attempt conquest of the Assam Plain. It is quite possible their objectives might be extended in the future but only after further preparation on their part.

With respect to the London agreement, it appears there is no firm understanding of how the costs of the initial phase are to be divided, but the agreement calls for each side to supply the equipment which it is best equipped to supply. The British have agreed on 10 million pounds and may add another 5 million pounds. The Canadians and Australians have indicated modest help. McNamara protested the arrangement, stating that it might require between

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~~TOP SECRET~~

120 and 150 million dollars from the United States. The President expressed the belief that we should split on a 50-50 basis with the Commonwealth. A subcommittee was appointed to work out details.

The meeting then turned briefly to Cuba. Stevenson explained there were three areas of disagreement with the Soviets: (1) The manner of expressing the right to verify events in Cuba. (2) The language of preserving peace, and (3) The manner in which the invasion commitment was expressed -- that is, whether we stated we had no intention of invading, or alternatively, made a firm undertaking that we would not invade. It was pretty well agreed at the meeting that we could not agree with the Soviets and therefore two separate and different papers would be filed with the Secretary General, one by the Soviets and one by ourselves.

Later in the day I met with the President privately and pointed out to him my concern over the Soviet conduct in Cuba. Specifically I referred to three items reported in the Check List, as covered in the attached memorandum of December 3. The President asked for more details and these were transmitted to him in the afternoon in the form of the two documents attached (Department of State cable #2026, dated November 29, 1962, and FBIS #70, dated November 29, 1962).

John A. McCone
Director

JAM:at

~~TOP~~ Secret

December 3, 1962

Three indicators from Cuba that worry me are:

1. Detection of the presence of new and more sophisticated communications equipment as part of the Air Defense System. This would suggest that we soon would face the prospect of operational SAM sites manned by Soviets.

2. Che Guevara's statement to the London Daily Worker that peace has been assured and that Cuba will pursue the arms struggle already ~~is~~ taking place in a number of Latin American countries such as Venezuela, Guatemala, Paraguay and Colombia. This would indicate no intention to halt Castro sub version in Latin America.

3. Mikoyan's public statement in Moscow that he had achieved Soviet objective of maintaining a Communist regime in the Western hemisphere.

These three statements would prompt extreme caution on the part of the United States in any agreement which might give Castro and the Communists a sanctuary.

John A. McCone
Director

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all present - Acheson + Harman
and several members of the
mission

Harman report - Substantially reviewed
the written report - Indicated
need for fast support of Phase I
and careful study of Phase II -
Referred Pak - India problem of
Kashmir indicating some hope
of settlement - Pres asked of
Gov position on IC - communication
to Nehru - H - advised MIG
deal is off though Nehru says it
is postponed - No indication that
Sov. had intended to stop the Coe
Believed Chicom had limited
objectives and need the capture
of Soedak - Prav.

Agreement - Sander Agreement OK

R - Put up 10 ~~MM~~ f and may add
another 5 ~~MM~~ f -

②

Canadian and Australian indicate
a modest help

U.S. requirement may add up
to 120 to 150 MM but not need
all

Pres believes we should
split even - 50/50 communitism/US.

Sub committee

Barba - McClay / Keresztes discussion
Area of disagreement

- 1) manner of expressing reply to
awfully
- 2) language of presenting
Phase
- 3) Involvement - intention vs
undertaking -