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16 December 1962

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

MEMORANDUM: Current Situation in the Congo

The Adoula Government:

1. Adoula's political position has been precarious since 28 November when opposition deputies in parliament nearly succeeded in a motion of censure against him. The opposition, with 50 votes, fell 16 votes short of the required two-thirds for overthrow, but the vote for Adoula (47) was less than a majority. The vote clearly indicated that Adoula was critically weak, and that he would be unable to get his program through parliament--including the budget and the new constitution upon which the UN plan depends--without drastic concessions.

2. The opposition is now trying to augment its supporters still further, and is seeking another vehicle to bring Adoula down. On 7 December it successfully passed a motion of censure against Adoula's minister of justice, and other similar moves are probably in the offing. The opposition has now introduced a motion to "suspend" the UN reconciliation plan, a motion which it could probably pass. A second attempt at a motion of censure is probably only a question of time.

3. The opposition is a disparate group of radicals, moderates, and conservatives ranging from Gizengists on the left to the Katangan deputies on the right. Their only common objective is to overthrow Adoula. Their motives are equally diverse: dissatisfaction with Adoula's failure to solve the Katanga problem; personal disgruntlements with Adoula; desire to obtain ministerial posts for themselves. It is almost certain that a successor government to Adoula would be more anti-West and anti-UN, and would seek closer ties with the radical African states and the Soviet Bloc.

4. The opposition attack has thrown the government into confusion. Adoula and his supporters are undecided


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and uncertain as to what to do. Adoula himself, though showing more fight than two weeks ago when he repeatedly talked of resigning, is badly fatigued



5. Soviet bloc representatives in Leopoldville have been encouraging and financially assisting the opposition in its attacks on Adoula. At the same time the Soviets are dangling vague offers of financial support and military equipment before Adoula's supporters. No specific offers have yet been made to Adoula himself, but the Soviets and Yugoslavs have spread rumors and reports in the Congo army and in the government that sufficient military would be available to enable them to end Tshombé's secession should they choose to accept it. The Congolese, [redacted] have reiterated their requests for US military equipment. Adoula himself has repeatedly said he would not accept a Soviet offer; he says he would resign and leave the decision to parliament and the army, although he is sure they would accept. It seems unlikely that the Soviets would actually make a specific offer to Adoula, whom they regard as pro-Western, without seeking considerable concessions. Essentially, the Soviets appear to be awaiting Adoula's downfall, in order to deal with a more radical successor.

6. There has been no progress on implementation of the UN plan since 16 October, when Adoula--convinced that the UN was favoring Katanga--repudiated a cease-fire and a preliminary financial agreement his negotiators had worked out with Tshombé in Elisabethville. Katanga's military forces remain separate and Leopoldville and Elisabethville are in wide disagreement over the new UN-drafted federal constitution. Adoula and UN officials appear convinced that without new military and economic pressure on Tshombé, further efforts to negotiate a settlement are useless.

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7. Adoula has been attempting to exert military pressure on Tshombé in North Katanga, but the Katangan forces still have the initiative in the area, though outnumbered at least five to one. Katangan aircraft by bombing and strafing have been able almost completely to demoralize and scatter Leopoldville's (ANC) troops. Mobutu in his appeals to the US for aircraft has expressed great concern that the army will mutiny or be completely lost if no way is found to counter the Katangan air attacks.

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sizeable elements of two ANC battalions have deserted. The UN is now in process of moving UN forces to the Kongolo area to try to support the ANC.

Tshombé's Position:

8. Tshombé continues to voice his support of the UN plan for Katanga's reintegration, but has made no moves jeopardizing his military, political, or economic independence from Leopoldville. He has continued to build up his ground and air forces. He is advising and contributing financially to the anti-Adoula opposition in parliament. He has described Adoula as incapable of uniting the Congo, and indicated that he himself would not be averse to becoming premier. Tshombé also appears to be playing for time--awaiting Adoula's downfall, and the withdrawal of the UN.

9. On 13 December, Tshombé accepted a Belgian proposal that Union Miniere (UMHK) henceforth pay all of its foreign exchange earnings--some \$200 million--to the UN-controlled Monetary Council in Leopoldville, and that a division be made of these funds between the UMHK, the Katangan government, and Leopoldville. The final details of the plan as presented to Tshombé remain to be worked out, and reports on the actual division of funds are conflicting. The Belgian plan, as we understand it, would involve a return of about \$80 million to UMHK to run its facilities, \$84 million to Tshombé, and about \$36 million to Leopoldville. Tshombé in his acceptance letter asked that UMHK receive enough for its need without specifying a figure, and that Leopoldville and Elisabethville split the remainder as long as he received a minimum of \$60 million. This would be a 50-50 split with Leopoldville, but there are indications Tshombé may have been only referring to a 50-50 split of foreign exchange, and not to the \$40 million he receives in export tax payments from UMHK. Ambassador Gullion concluded from his analysis

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of the Belgian plan, that Leopoldville would in fact receive considerably less than \$36 million and that Adoula might reject the plan.

10. Having made the gesture, Tshombé is again beginning to fuzz the issue. He has asked for UN, UK, and US guarantees for the plan and attached political conditions. A late report states Tshombé has refused to proceed prior to receipt of Western guarantees.

The UN

11. Since early December the UN military command in the Congo has been building up its ground and air forces in Katanga in an effort to induce Tshombé to move forward on the UN plan. UN Congo chief Robert Gardiner in a tough letter to Tshombé on 10 December informed him that the UN regarded him as primarily responsible for the failure of the plan to date and that accordingly it intended to move on to more drastic measures. Gardiner said that UN forces would insist on complete freedom of movement, hinted the UN might round up Tshombé's mercenaries, and called on Tshombé to halt his bombings in North Katanga, to lift his blockade of some \$2 million worth of UN supplies at Sakania and Dilolo, and to remove all Katangan roadblocks in the Elisabethville area. In New York, UN officials, despite Tshombé's acceptance of the payment plan, appear to be moving ahead in their appeals for a Western embargo on Katangan copper and cobalt. Tshombé has threatened to destroy "every bridge, every road, every plant" in Katanga if economic sanctions are applied.


12. UN officials have publicly and privately stated that they will not mount offensive military action against Tshombé, and their tactics do appear to be primarily aimed at exerting psychological pressure on him. They have, however, indicated that there were certain undefined "administrative" and "non-military" measures they could take under present UN mandates, although they admit these might result in new hostilities. The two measures UN officials have most frequently discussed are a military move to secure control of the principal mining towns of Jadotville, Kolwezi, and Kipushi, and a military move to secure control of Katanga's rail exit points at Dilolo, near the Angolan border, and Sakania, on the Northern Rhodesian border.

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13. U Thant has given Brussels assurances the UN will avoid any UN actions which might jeopardize the success of the UMHK payments scheme. If Tshombé is not forthcoming, however, the UN will probably then press for Western economic sanctions. UN officials have few illusions that an embargo would in fact obtain Western support and some UN officials appear convinced that more drastic measures should be attempted before the UN forces are depleted by troop withdrawals or crippled by lack of UN funds. About 6000 (half of the UN combat forces) are scheduled to depart by February without replacement. This includes the Indian brigade. The only replacements now expected are the 1800 Indonesian troops.

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