

*Box 1 of ER file 67-101*

STANDING GROUP AGENDA

14 May Mtg. : Memo re "Cuban Attacks on Recon Flights -- a Contingency Plan" discussed and to be revised for a future meeting.

Memo "Certain Cuban Contingencies" noted.

Memo on "Developments in Cuba... Castro's Death" postponed.

Cuban sugar & world market, Agriculture to develop paper with State/CIA consulting.

State and Defence prepare plans to meet contingency of USSR efforts to stop U-s's over Cuba by means other than force.

Other Related Papers:

1. ONE/OCI memo re Reactions to low-levels over Cuba.
2. NRO summary of sources of info on U-2 shoot-down.
3. ORR memo re Cuban sugar, etc.
4. DDP additional actions against Cuba.
5. Cuban supply/demand POL.

NSA, NRO, JCS, OSD reviews completed

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REF 4494-63

May 1963

9 May 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: DOD-State Paper: U-2 Flights - Cuba Contingency Plans

1. In addition to the attached comments of ONE, Desmond FitzGerald has the following observations in that he questions the validity of the paragraphs below:

a. Page 2, paragraph 3a: "Moreover, in any new confrontation over Cuba the United States will be facing a Khrushchev who has reflected on the lessons of the missile crisis and who will be less likely to retreat before U.S. power."

b. Page 3, paragraph d to end of page: "It is also possible that the shock effect of such vigorous response could lead to a decision by the USSR to cut her losses and gradually withdraw from Cuba."

2. The DD/R comment, which is set forth below, raises the issue of the use of the [redacted] which heretofore the Joint Chiefs have been unwilling to authorize for use over Cuba.

"In the event of the loss of a U-2 over Cuba and the intention of the U.S. Government to react immediately it is highly problematical that detailed knowledge of the exact cause of the incident or the political reasoning behind the incident will be known. Therefore, the initial problem is to continue to obtain intelligence information through reconnaissance flights. To fulfill this requirement authority must be obtained to operate U-2 aircraft equipped with [redacted] Aircraft so equipped are on standby for this mission at all times and could be moved into place to allow a mission the day following an incident."

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
[redacted]

Huntington D. Sheldon  
Acting Deputy Director (Intelligence)

Attachments

- 1. DOD-State Paper
- 2. ONE Comments

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*page 1  
para 2.c.*

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REF# 185617

6 May 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director/Intelligence

SUBJECT : ONE Comments on DOD-State Paper, "U-2 Flights, Cuba --  
Contingency Plans"

32


The Paper's Assumption

1. The paper should explicitly acknowledge that it is addressed to the present situation, in which control of the SAM system rests with the USSR, and is not applicable to a possible future situation in which the system has been turned over to the Cubans.

US Objectives

2. The paper ought to be clearer about US objectives in the stated contingency. The only objective mentioned is to use the crisis as an opportunity to bring down the Castro regime. In fact, however, the US also has the more limited objective of restoring untrammelled reconnaissance. Moreover, in proposing to suspend U-2 flights, after the first reprisal, until further Soviet intentions can be determined, the contingency plan seems designed to avoid escalation, or at least to leave the next crucial step to Soviet choice. Without trying to prejudge the US choice, we believe that the paper ought to recognize that, if the US objective is to use the crisis as a means of overthrowing Castro, this purpose would probably be better served by an immediate

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heightening of tensions such as would result from a second U-2  
shootdown.

3. The same point is relevant to the proposals for low-level overflights discussed in paragraph 6. As presented in the paper, these appear to be conceived as temporary substitutes which would help to keep the crisis at a more manageable level than high-altitude reconnaissance. In fact, we believe that low-level overflights, because they are such an ostentatious violation of sovereignty and because they would generate alarm and fear in large sections of the Cuban population, would be more difficult for the Cuban and Soviet regimes to tolerate than high-altitude reconnaissance. These regimes would not recognize low-level flights as temporary substitutes, and would be unlikely to believe US assurances to that effect. Low-level flights thus seem to us to be better suited to a heightened crisis which might lead to Castro's overthrow than to a regulated crisis aimed at restoring unopposed reconnaissance.

4. In sum, we believe that, after the first US reprisal, the objective of avoiding escalation and aiming only at a restoration of "immunity" for U-2s would best be served by the temporary substitution of high-altitude drones, both target and photographic. The objective of exploiting the crisis and aiming at Castro's downfall would best be served by continued U-2 overflights, low-level overflights, or both.

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Soviet Pre-Attack Propaganda

5. The paper should give some attention to Soviet contingency plans for attacking a U-2. In our view, the USSR would enter upon this venture expecting a prompt and vigorous US response, and would be intending to provoke a severe but controlled crisis designed to force an end to overflights by political means, probably at the UN.

6. If this is so, then the US ought to be prepared for a major preparatory campaign against the U-2. There is a good chance that the USSR, in setting the stage for an attack, would try to agitate the general issue of overflights as an impermissible transgression of sovereignty. In the course of this campaign, they might reveal a great deal of information about U-2 overflights  25X1  
In this way, they would try to capture the support of countries which had been overflown in the past and the votes of the generality of nonaligned nations.

7. As a second stage in this campaign, the USSR could begin to hint that it was preparing to take military action against overflights of Cuba. This would be intended to bring the issue of peace into play as a supplement to the issue of sovereignty. In the course of these hints, the Soviets might add an ominous note by reminders that, in any US attack upon SAM sites, Soviet lives would be lost, making a Soviet counter-action all but inevitable. This would have

the incidental effect of confounding any US contingency planning to represent an attack on a U-2 as an act of Cuban policy.

8. This course of action has the advantage, from the Soviet viewpoint, of offering some chance of forcing an end to overflights by political means, without shooting. If it failed to accomplish this result, it would then serve as political preparation for manipulating the crisis initiated by an attack upon a U-2.

9. We cannot predict that the contingency under study would in fact occur in this context. It seems likely enough, however, to require advance consideration. In particular, the US ought to concern itself with the problem of meeting a prior political campaign against the U-2 which included revelations of overflights of non-Bloc countries.

Other Comments

10. The next-to-last sentence of paragraph 3a is very confusing. There are many lessons in the Cuban crisis for Khrushchev. One of them, of course, is not to make attacks such as are considered here. Another is that, once the US has proven itself ready to use armed force against Soviet units, it would be prudent for the USSR to close out the crisis rather than expand it.

11. The discussion of US options (final paragraph of 3d, page 4) cites several ways to make US reactions "more palatable to the USSR."

One of these -- placing public responsibility on Castro rather than the USSR -- might give the appearance of fearing a confrontation with the Soviets and thereby perhaps encourage greater boldness in Moscow's next response. The second -- renewal of the US "offer" to work out ground inspection -- might assist our efforts to gain allied and neutral support, but would certainly not be palatable to the USSR; this is the very issue on which the Soviets badly burned themselves with Castro before and which formed the basis for Communist China's most telling charges against Soviet policy.

- 5 -

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

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In reply refer to I-35505/63

24 April 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: DOD-State Paper, "U-2 Flights, Cuba -- Contingency Plans"

Attached is a revision of the DOD-State paper incorporating all those changes recommended by JCSM 325-63 which were acceptable to me and the Secretary of State. You will note that subparagraph 3.d. has been reworded in such a way as to meet the concern of the JCS that there be no precommitment against an invasion of Cuba.

It is anticipated that the paper, in its present form, will be used for discussions with the President at an early date.

/s/ ROBERT S. McNAMARA

Attachment  
As stated above

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APR 21 1963

This document contains 11 pages.  
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#2 - Sec. A

**TOP SECRET SENSITIVE**DOD-STATE PAPER

## U-2 FLIGHTS, CUBA - CONTINGENCY PLANS (C)

1. Problem. The possibility exists that Soviet/Cuban forces may shoot down, or attempt to shoot down, a U-2 reconnaissance aircraft over Cuba. The purpose of this report is to develop a series of actions to be considered by the United States in advance of and after the event.

2. Facts Bearing on the Problem

a. U-2 flights are currently conducted over Cuba at the rate of approximately two sorties per day.

b. Alternative methods of carrying on surveillance are available but the quantity of data that could be obtained by these alternative methods is smaller than that obtainable with the U-2; thus, the available alternatives would not meet presently stated requirements. A prolonged hiatus in high altitude surveillance would be intolerable in view of the continuing Soviet option of reintroduction of IREMs and MREMs.

c. While not a certainty, present intelligence resources give a considerable degree of confidence that Washington should have reliable information on the destruction of a U-2 by a SAM shortly after the attack. There is also a probability that correspondingly reliable information would be available with respect to an unsuccessful firing of a SAM on a U-2. A possibility exists that a U-2 could be attacked by MIG aircraft using air-to-air rockets and special attack techniques. In this case also, information would probably be available promptly. However, there remains a possibility that a U-2 could disappear under circumstances in which we had no positive information on the cause of its loss.

3. Political Considerations

a. Balancing Objectives - The optimum objective with regard to this contingency is to deter the attack on the U-2 by giving private

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and public assurances that the US reaction to such an attack would be prompt, firm, and effective. The fundamental political judgment to be made in connection with the attack itself involves balancing the opportunity to make progress toward our long-term objective vis-a-vis Cuba (the overthrow of Castro's regime and elimination of Communism from Cuba) with our objectives vis-a-vis the US-USSR confrontation. The political and power realities, including the USSR's capability to react in Berlin or elsewhere, argue against arbitrary and unilateral action, without provocation, to eliminate Castro. The exploitation of contingencies is the only politically feasible means for taking steps, in the immediate future, to apply US military power directly to reduce Castro's power and influence. Yet obviously, no single contingency can be said to offer the last chance to move against Castro. Moreover, in any new major confrontation over Cuba the United States will be facing a Khrushchev who has reflected on the lessons of the missile crisis and who will be less likely to retreat before US power. Thus, the United States must consider the USSR's capability to react to a second Cuban crisis by actions in Berlin or elsewhere.

b. The context of the attack - It is judged that the USSR would be likely to deliver an official warning prior to an attack on a U-2. In the event that an attack is conducted, therefore, without advance warning, allowance should be made for the possibility that there was a failure of USSR command and control procedures by providing for a minimum response, initially, while attempting to ascertain Soviet intent by all means available. For the same reason, in a case where USSR responsibility is in doubt, the US might desire to take an initial public position that holds Castro rather than Khrushchev responsible.

c. Advance notification and consultation - Secretary Rusk has recently informed the North Atlantic Council of US concern that there may be an attack on a U-2 over Cuba. Consultation with our Allies after a Soviet warning or a Soviet attack probably would become known to the

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USSR. The longer the period of direct or indirect warning thus given to Khrushchev, the more opportunity he is given to make threats of retaliation from which he would find it difficult to withdraw, thus increasing the dangers of escalation, causing confusion among our Allies, and inhibiting their decision to support the United States. On the other hand prior knowledge acquired by the USSR could provide the deterrent effect suggested above. Moreover, once a specific indication of intent to attack is received, or an attack occurs, the retention of political support of our allies argues for as much notice as possible of our intentions.

d. Options - The plans which follow provide for a spectrum of response against the presupposed contingencies. The decision as to the specific degree of force to be applied within this spectrum is a matter for determination at the time of the attack on the U-2 and is dependent on evaluation of latest intelligence and the existing political dynamics. The removal of a facility of the same type (SAM, MIG airfield, AA battery) as the weapon which attacks the U-2 has the virtue of a limited, eye-for-an-eye retribution before the world. Retaliation against a single SAM site regardless of the type of the offending weapon retains the political advantage of a limited response and has the additional feature of orienting action against the weapons system we are most interested in removing.

Both of the foregoing options can be made relatively surgical in nature in order to provide minimum offense to the USSR. The elimination of all facilities of any one weapons system (SAM, MIGs, AA batteries) or all air defense systems would provide progressively larger steps toward the elimination of the Castro regime but might be considered of such proportion by Khrushchev as to make counter Soviet retaliation mandatory. It is also possible that the shock effect of such vigorous response could lead to a decision by the USSR to cut her losses and gradually withdraw from Cuba. US retaliation by elimination of one facility and subsequent

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large-scale surveillance at low levels deprives the US of required high altitude coverage and cannot safely be continued indefinitely.

Any of the foregoing options could be combined with a decision to reinstitute a partial or total quarantine. Total quarantine, if maintained, could serve to bring Castro down. At the very least, it would provide a negotiable application of force from which to bargain in the Security Council in exchange for Soviet concessions.

The foregoing options might be made more palatable to the USSR by (a) taking the public position that Castro had been the perpetrator of the attack; (b) renewing the US offer to work out on the ground inspection of Cuba and the Caribbean (coupled with a general settlement such as withdrawal of Soviet troops) to eliminate the need for future aerial surveillance; (c) making it clear that the foregoing reprisals were not intended as a prelude to an invasion. This would leave open the decision to invade if required in the event of escalation by Cuba or by the USSR in Cuba or elsewhere.

4. Military Considerations

a. Prompt, but deliberate, retaliatory measures should be taken following the shooting down of a U-2 and, in certain circumstances, in event of an unsuccessful attack against a U-2. After certain precautionary measures are taken, including the evacuation of noncombatants from Guantanamo and the initiation of reinforcement of that base, it is feasible to make a retaliatory attack on a Cuban military facility or facilities at first light on the morning of the day following the shooting down of a U-2, weather permitting.

b. US response to an attack by SAM site, MIG, or AA battery should be against one or more Cuban military facilities. Where retaliation is to be taken against a single facility, it should normally be a SAM site selected to meet the following criteria: It should be as close as feasible to the location of the incident but should be selected for accessibility of attack and for isolation from populated areas to minimize noncombatant casualties.

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5. Range of Circumstances. In the event of the shooting down, or the attempted shooting down of a U-2 over Cuba, a wide variety of circumstances may attend the incident:

a. With public advance warning by the USSR either through press media or through official governmental communications and/or other indicators of imminent Soviet/Cuban action:

(1) Pre-attack

(a) Public threat only

(b) Covert indicators or official governmental communications.

(2) Unsuccessful attack

(a) Demonstrable and persuasive evidence

(b) Doubtful evidence

(3) Successful attack

b. Without public advance warning and other indicators of imminent Soviet/Cuban action:

(1) Unsuccessful attack

(2) Successful attack

6. Courses of Action to be Considered

a. With public advance warning by the USSR and/or other indicators of imminent Soviet/Cuban action:

(1) Pre-attack

(a) Public threat only - If the warning is limited to public threat, unaccompanied by confirming intelligence indicators of imminent Soviet/Cuban action, the United States should inform Khrushchev that the flights will continue.

(b) Covert indicators and/or official governmental communications - If advance warning is obtained through covert means and/or official governmental communications, with or without public warning:

U-2 flights should be suspended while military preparations

**TOP SECRET**

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188307

#2 Ser A

**TOP SECRET****SENSITIVE**

are initiated by establishment of appropriate conditions of readiness in all US commands and readiness is improved for evacuation of noncombatants from and reinforcement of Guantanamo. The fact of increased readiness would almost immediately become public. U-2 flights should be suspended. Enemy intentions may be verified by flying target drones, for a limited time. If these drones are not fired upon, U-2 flights will be resumed. If the target drones are fired upon, consideration will be given to taking out all or selected SAM sites, or substituting photographic drones and low-level reconnaissance for U-2 flights. U-2 flights will be resumed where there is reasonable prospect that they will not be fired upon. Adequate surveillance of Cuba requires that any hiatus in U-2 flights be limited in time.

(2) Unsuccessful attack

(a) Demonstrable and persuasive evidence - In the event that public advance warning or other data provides demonstrable and persuasive evidence that an attack has been made, the United States should:

1. At the time of the decision to take reprisal action, declare appropriate conditions of readiness in all US commands (if not already in effect), and initiate evacuation of dependents from and reinforcement of Guantanamo.
2. Initiate military preparations for an attack early the next day.
3. Alternatives: Conduct the attack on one, several or all SAM sites. Before resuming U-2 flights, check enemy intentions by flying target drones. If these drones are not fired upon, U-2 flights will be resumed. If the target

**TOP SECRET****SENSITIVE**

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drones are fired upon, consideration will be given to taking out all or selected SAM sites, or substituting photographic drones and low-level reconnaissance for U-2 flights. U-2 flights will be resumed when there is reasonable prospect that they will not be fired upon. Adequate surveillance of Cuba requires that any hiatus in U-2 flights be limited in time.

(b) Doubtful evidence - In spite of public advance warning, an unsuccessful attack may occur in circumstances which make it impossible to provide demonstrable and persuasive evidence that an attack has in fact been made. In such a case, the United States should assess the situation in the light of circumstances existing at the time and apply flexible, selective measures ranging from no response to those measures specified in subparagraphs (2) (a), 1, 2, and 3, above.

(3) Successful attack

(a) At the time of the decision to execute reprisal attacks, the United States should declare an appropriate condition of readiness in all US commands (if not already in effect), and initiate evacuation of dependents from and reinforcement of Guantanamo.

(b) Initiate military preparations for reprisal action early the next day.

(c) Alternatives:

1. Alternative I - Conduct an attack on all SAM sites.
2. Alternative II - Destroy one SAM site; thereafter, until safety of U-2s can be assured, or for a limited time, fly only low-level reconnaissance and photo drones.

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

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b. Without public advance warning and other indicators of imminent Soviet action.

(1) Unsuccessful Attack

(a) In light of assessment made at the time, make military preparations by establishment of appropriate conditions of readiness in all US commands and by evacuation of dependents from and preparations for reinforcement of Guantanamo.

(b) U-2 flights should be suspended while these preparations are being made.

(c) After preparations are made, publicly announce that an unsuccessful attack was made.

(d) Execute reprisal attack against one SAM site; then either resume U-2 flights, or test enemy intentions with target drones. If these drones are not fired upon, U-2 flights will be resumed. If the target drones are fired upon, consideration will be given to taking out all or selected SAM sites, or substituting photographic drones and low-level reconnaissance for U-2 flights for a limited time. U-2 flights will be resumed when there is reasonable prospect that they will not be fired upon. Adequate surveillance of Cuba requires that any hiatus in U-2 flights be limited in time.

(2) Successful Attack

(a) At the time of the decision to attack a site, declare an appropriate condition of readiness in all US commands, initiate evacuation of dependents from and reinforcement of Guantanamo.

(b) Initiate military preparations for and conduct reprisal attack early the next morning on one or more of the SAM sites, depending on the circumstances.

(c) Execute reprisal attack against one, several, or all SAM sites. Before resuming U-2 flights, check enemy intentions

**TOP SECRET****SENSITIVE**

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by flying target drones. If these drones are not fired upon, U-2 flights will be resumed. If the target drones are fired upon, consideration will be given to taking out all or selected SAM sites, or substituting photographic drones and low-level reconnaissance for U-2 flights for a limited time. U-2 flights will be resumed when there is reasonable prospect that they will not be fired upon. Adequate surveillance of Cuba requires that any hiatus in U-2 flights will be limited in time.

e. Concomitant Political Initiatives. In each of the foregoing cases, the United States should consider concomitant political initiatives as follows (parenthetical portions that follow are applicable only to those cases in which a retaliatory attack on a site is to be made):

- (1) Inform North Atlantic Council (immediately prior to attack).
- (2) Transmit Presidential messages to Macmillan, Adenauer, de Gaulle, Fanfani.
- (3) Inform Organ of Consultation of Organization of the American States of the situation and US intentions.
- (4) Transmit instructions to USUN to inform Secretary General, United Nations at time of attack or clear warning and call for immediate Security Council meeting.
- (5) Transmit message from President to Khrushchev - giving it simultaneously to Soviet Ambassador in Washington (deliver at time of attack).
- (6) Issue public statement by the President, including message to the Cuban people (at the time of the attack).
- (7) If the Soviets wholly or partially blockade Berlin in response to US retaliation, immediately convene Quadripartite Group to consider implementation of "Preferred Sequence" courses of action with respect to Berlin.

d. Subsequent Military Action. If strike aircraft used in the

TOP SECRET

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retaliatory strike against a single site are shot down, additional retaliation action would be taken against appropriate Cuban targets.

e. U-2 is missing with confirmation lacking as to cause. No action should be initiated until there is confirmation that the disappearance is the result of a Soviet/Cuban attack; then the United States should proceed in accordance with subparagraph 6 a (3) or 6 a (2), as appropriate.

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<p>TS# 188307</p> <p>Memo for the Chairman, JCS, from Robert S. McNamara, Sec/Defense. Subj: DOD-State Paper, "U-2 Flights, Cuba Contingency Plans"</p> <p>Attachment is a revision of the DOD-State paper incorporating all those changes recommended by JCSM 325-63 which were acceptable to me and the Sec/State</p> <p>cy #2 Series "A" DDCI from Ex Dir 10 May 1963</p>		
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27 April 1963

O/NE-O/CI MEMORANDUM FOR THE ACTING DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: Reactions to Low-Level Overflights of Cuba

1. In this memorandum we consider Soviet and Cuban reactions to a program of three low-level overflights of Cuba, undertaken within a single day some time in the near future. We do not consider reactions to a more extensive program.

Direct Reactions

2. Soviet forces on the island probably have standing orders not to fire on any US planes. Cuban forces, which control the light AAA, may not have such orders, and in any event there is always a chance that some Cuban military unit, surprised by a low-level flight, would fire on it and perhaps be lucky enough to hit it. We note that the cause of the loss of an aircraft over Cuba might not be ascertainable.

3. We have not discerned any particular Soviet or Cuban reactions to the low-level overflights of 9 February. Since the Soviets are chary of drawing attention to their unwillingness

to fire on US reconnaissance aircraft, we doubt that they would make a major propaganda response to the overflights considered here. They might, however, lodge a private complaint to the US arguing the dangers of this course, warning of consequences if the action is repeated. It is not excluded, however, that they would undertake a major political and propaganda exploitation, arguing that the provocative action by the US threatened to revive a dangerous crisis over Cuba whereas they themselves had been pursuing a policy of restraint.

Effects on Soviet/Cuban Policy

4. The chief effects of the overflights on the Soviets and Cubans would be to pose again the question of US intentions. In our view, both parties are presently agreed on tactics of easing tensions in the Caribbean in order to stabilize Cuba's position and prepare for a period of new advances in the future. They are trying in various ways to reduce US pressures, and they will probably continue on this tactical line for some time unless they come to believe that the US is determined to bring about a showdown through a more militant policy. If they should reach this judgment, they might switch tactics in order to stage a showdown, probably by moving for political action against the US in the UN.

5. The Soviets and Cubans would see these overflights as a form of US pressure. The limited action considered here,

however, would probably not lead them to conclude that they must reappraise their current tactics. They would probably continue to believe that US policy is pulled in two directions, wishing to liquidate the Castro regime but unwilling to take the risks of military intervention <sup>to</sup> achieve this objective. Thus, considering this action alone, the Soviets and Cubans would probably continue to believe that their best course was to offer a minimum of provocation, unless they considered that the flights presaged a more extensive, continuing program.

6. It is possible, however, that the overflights would occur at a time when they seemed to the USSR and Cuba to reinforce other indications of a US shift to strong pressures and greater risks. This might be the case, for example, if the overflights occurred contemporaneously with a large-scale renewal of exile raids. If Khrushchev interpreted any of Governor Harriman's remarks to him as presaging more active US moves against Cuba, the overflights would contribute some confirmation to this impression. It is also possible, that, if the action <sup>TOOK PLACE</sup> ~~occurred~~ during Castro's presence in Moscow the Soviets would tend to attach exaggerated significance to it. Barring some such special combination of circumstances, however, the Soviets would probably not conclude that there had been a decisive change in US policy.

Effects on General Soviet Policy

7. All US measures against Cuba make it difficult, to a greater or lesser degree, for the USSR to pursue a line of seeking agreements with the US on other problems. At the present time, however, Soviet interest in negotiated agreements with the US appears to be very low. We conclude from Khrushchev's recent statements that no change in the USSR's position on nuclear testing can be expected during the current period. In southeast Asia, the USSR may wish to avoid a sharpening of the Laos crisis, but whether or not this is so, we believe that the Soviets, with North Vietnam already tending toward China in the Sino-Soviet dispute, do not feel free to advise or press Hanoi to moderate its tactics. In our judgment, therefore, the proposed action would not materially affect the prospects for other US-USSR agreements.

8. To the Cubans themselves, any low-level flights constitute an humiliating affront, and the strong impulse to try and bring them down is tempered only at the higher levels of the regime by fear of drastic US retaliation and, probably, some uncertainty about Soviet willingness to protect the Cuban therefrom. On the whole, even aside from Soviet influence,

such rational counsels as exist in Castro's regime, would probably work to avoid the risks of shooting down US aircraft, but pressures on the regime to counter these actions will mount and in turn will lead to pressures on the Soviets from the regime.

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14 May 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH : Deputy Director (Intelligence) (C)

SUBJECT : Comments on Cuban Sugar Sales in the  
World Market and Possible U. S. Actions

REFERENCE : Memorandum to the Acting Secretary of State  
from Mr. Edward Martin (ARA), Subject: Sugar,  
Dated 3 May 1963


1. This memorandum is in response to your request of today for comments on the referenced memorandum, and your additional questions on Cuban sugar sales.

2. Mr. Martin concluded, in response to the Standing Group's suggestion that, "we figure out some way to diminish the Cuban income from the sale of sugar," that there is no feasible way to do so. Unless the U.S. is willing to curtail its consumption of sugar by cutting back on imports Mr. Martin may be right. However, we do not concur fully with the statement that the Soviets are not holding sugar off the market. We estimate that Soviet sugar stocks are now 1 to 2 million tons above normal, due to past deliveries from Cuba. The Soviets, if they wished, could sell this sugar on world markets. We also believe that, if the U. S. were to make public the information that the Soviets hold large sugar surpluses, this publicity might have a depressing effect on prices on the world's sugar exchanges.

3. With reference to your specific questions on Cuban sugar sales, we have prepared the following notes:

a. A large portion of Cuban sugar that will be exported to the Free World was contracted for in late 1962 at prices substantially below current levels. If Cuba honors these contracts, and does not attempt to resell at present prices, she will receive between \$120 and \$150 million. Sales to the Bloc should range between \$200 to \$230 million. Bloc sales are at 4 cents per pound, which price the Cubans are still required by the Communist Bloc to maintain. Thus, in

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spite of the present high world price, Cuba's total exports of sugar in 1963 will probably net between \$320 and \$380 million in contrast to an estimated \$430 million during 1962. However, if the USSR should permit greater Cuban sales to the Free World, the Cuban position could be substantially improved. If the Soviets were to permit Cuba to sell on the Free World market a million tons of its commitments to the USSR, then at present prices, a total value of \$220 million would be realized. This amount of convertible exchange would be of great benefit to the Cubans. However, we have no evidence that the Communist Bloc would be willing to accept less than the 2.5 million tons which Cuba apparently will have available to sell to the Bloc from the 1962/63 crop. If the Soviets were to sell a million tons of their surplus sugar on the Free World market at present prices, the \$220 million realized would be about equal to the amount of convertible currency which they have been receiving annually by sales of gold.

b. The current "world" sugar price\* of about 10 cents per pound is more than 3 times the level of a year ago and the highest in 40 years. Most of this increase has taken place within the last 6 months.

[Redacted]

of Agriculture are in general agreement that the current rise in the world price of sugar is attributable primarily to a tight supply situation rather than to Soviet manipulation of the market.

c. World sugar consumption is expected to exceed total production by about 3 million tons in 1962/63, the first year in which consumption has exceeded production since 1956/57. World sugar consumption has been increasing about 4 percent per year -- two to three million tons annually. On the other hand world sugar production of about 51 million metric tons in both 1961/62 and 1962/63 was about 4 million tons below the peak level achieved in 1960/61. Carry-over stocks of sugar in 47 countries at the beginning of the 1962/63 season were about 19 percent -- almost 2 million tons -- below those of a year earlier.

[Redacted]

OTTO E. GUYRE  
Assistant Director  
Research and Reports

\* All sugar prices in this memorandum refer to raw canesugar. The "world" price is for bagged sugar FOB Greater Caribbean ports.

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

*Mr. McCone*

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May 11, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR

Members of the Standing Group

Attached are two papers for discussion at the Standing Group meeting, Tuesday, May 14, 1963, at 5:00 P.M. in the Situation Room.

*Bromley Smith*

Bromley Smith

A third paper is being sent direct to you from Sherman Kent of CIA.

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE STANDING GROUP

Subject: Cuban Attacks on Reconnaissance Flights--A Contingency Plan

1. The Problem.

To capitalize on an attack on a US aircraft engaged in reconnaissance of Cuba by taking reprisals designed to place pressure on, or to effect the removal of, the Castro regime.

2. Facts Bearing on the Problem.

a. U-2 flights are currently conducted over Cuba at the rate of approximately two sorties per day. These flights have come to be accepted as a US right emanating from Cuban refusal to fulfill the Soviet commitment of October 28, 1962, for on-the-ground safeguards against the presence and reintroduction of offensive weapons.

b. Alternative methods of carrying on surveillance are available, but the quantity of data that could be obtained by these alternative methods is smaller than that obtainable with the U-2 and would not meet the stated requirements. A prolonged hiatus in high altitude surveillance would be intolerable in view of the continuing Soviet option of reintroduction of MRBMs. This need has also become public knowledge as a result of the widespread news coverage and the Secretary of Defense's briefing of the public; hence, there would be substantial political support for the US insistence on maintaining an acknowledged vital right.

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c. Present intelligence resources give a considerable degree of confidence that Washington would have reliable information on the destruction of a U-2 by a SAM shortly after the attack. There is also a probability that correspondingly reliable information would be available with respect to an unsuccessful firing of a SAM on a U-2. A possibility exists that a U-2 could be attacked by MIG aircraft using air-to-air rockets and special attack techniques. In this case also, information would probably be available promptly. However, there remains a possibility that a U-2 could disappear under circumstances in which we had no positive information on the cause of its loss.

d. If the US did institute increasing surveillance by low and medium altitude aircraft, ostensibly and partly in order to acquire more detailed information, the chances of an incident triggered by the firing on a US reconnaissance overflight would be increased.

3. Political Considerations.

a. Balancing Objectives - The fundamental political judgment in this problem involves balancing the opportunity to achieve our long term objective in Cuba, the overthrow of Castro's regime and elimination of Communism from Cuba, with the risks of the US-USSR confrontation and the political acceptability of our means of attaining that objective.

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Since the political and power realities argue against arbitrary and unilateral action without provocation, the exploitation of Cuban provocations is the most feasible means for taking the action necessary.

The political costs of using an incident to press courses of action and reaction leading to the achievement of US objectives in Cuba, possibly including the removal of the Castro regime, have been considered. We conclude that such costs will be least, and will be acceptable, if (a) initial Cuban provocation is internationally recognized, and (b) a measured pattern of increasing US military reprisal, in reaction to escalating Cuban actions, is established.

#### 4. Scenario--Phase I.

a. The most appropriate reprisal to destruction of a US reconnaissance aircraft engaged in overflying Cuba would, if the attack were made by a SAM, be either (1) <sup>to eliminate</sup> a limited number of SAM sites in the vicinity of the action (depending on the geographical location, three or four nearby sites), or (2) to eliminate all SAMs in the initial attack. In the case of an interceptor attack, either (1) the facilities of the nearest (or, if known, the offending) fighter airfield, or (2) facilities of the few active fighter airfields, should be completely taken out. At the same time, the US would initiate a high volume of harrassing medium and low level reconnaissance overflights, in addition to maintaining the U-2 coverage.

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b. The US would promptly initiate (without publicity) generation of the necessary invasion force, so that it would be ready as soon as possible, in the event Cuban escalation were to lead to a decision to invade.

c. US forces would be placed on appropriate readiness

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d. The US would inform selected heads of government, NAC, and the OAS governments immediately prior to the reprisal action, of the reprisal and of the UN proposals we planned to make, and would initiate promptly consultations with the NAC and OAS groups on possible future measures which might be required--especially a new quarantine.

e. The US would call for prompt consideration of the crisis in the Security Council, and would vigorously attack Cuba and defend the necessary but limited US reprisal. We would concentrate our charges against Castro's regime, rather than the Soviet Union, and we would take the initiative in hauling him before the UN. We would, in addition to defending the requirement for reconnaissance, offer to end all aerial reconnaissance over Cuba if the Cubans would accept UN (including US) ground inspection adequate to insure against the presence or introduction of offensive weapons or offensive training, and when all Russian military personnel were returned promptly to the USSR.

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5. Phase II.

a. It is unlikely that the USSR would react to the US Phase I actions by instituting serious counterpressures at Berlin or elsewhere, unless of course they had shot down the first reconnaissance aircraft intending to use our reaction as a pretext to create a crisis in Berlin or elsewhere. If that were the case, we would in any event be faced by a Soviet created crisis. If this were not a deliberate Soviet action to touch off a crisis, the Soviets would probably be cautious at least while assessing our intentions in Cuba. During this period, they would probably give strict orders to Soviet personnel manning the SAMs and in other positions on Cuba to avoid any reprisal or provocative action.

b. The Cubans would almost certainly initially reject the US offer. The Soviets and Cubans would exert maximum political and propaganda pressure on the US in the UN and in general.

c. It is possible that the Cubans might shoot down another US aircraft, either through lack of discipline or miscalculation of the consequences. As a general principle, the most appropriate level of reprisal would seem to be graduated suppression of Cuban air defenses. Thus, if the first plane had been destroyed by a SAM and only a few SAMs had been knocked out in the initial reprisal, and if a second aircraft were attacked by a SAM, all SAMs would be

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destroyed. If the initial attack had been by a fighter, and the second by a fighter or a SAM, any remaining SAMs and fighter airfields would be taken out on the second offense. If the second attack were by AAA, the problem would be more complicated but all AAA in the area of the attack could be promptly suppressed, as well as any remaining SAMs.

6. Phase III.

a. In the second round of US initiative (Phase III), there are two broad alternative courses of action, depending upon whether the enemy reaction (Phase II) had involved military engagement.

b. Alternative 1. If the Cubans have made a second military attack in Phase II, the US, in addition to the immediate further military reprisal sketched above (in 5.c.), would note that since the Cubans did not accept our offer of an equitable arrangement to dispense with US overflights, and were continuing to interfere with them, a quarantine (on everything but food and medicine) was being established. The US would either seek OAS authorization, for which a majority but not unanimity could probably be gotten, or would undertake it unilaterally on the basis of its earlier consultations with the OAS and NAC, and the OAS resolution of October 1962.

(1) US justification for a quarantine would include stress on the vital Hemispheric need for information on military

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activities in Cuba, the fact that the Cuban action demonstrated a determined effort to overthrow the status quo established in October-November 1962, and the fact that such action further raised suspicions of Cuban military intentions. We were compelled by these facts to interdict all direct and indirect military support to the Island until complete assurance of the security of the Hemisphere could be obtained. We could further note that the US had chosen to exercise a restrained course of action which would involve minimum sacrifice by the innocent Cuban people. We might publicize our earlier offer, and the reasons why the quarantine was necessary, in leaflets to be dropped over Cuba.

(2) Quarantine might be initiated even in the absence of a second Cuban attack, for example if our reconnaissance detected suspicious signs of new threatening military activity, or perhaps if the Cubans or Soviets instituted reprisals elsewhere.

(3) Once the quarantine was established, in due course something would have to give. Assuming the Soviets would comply with the blockade, Castro or some other element of Cuban leaders might decide that there was nothing that the Soviets could or would do to help them, and that agreeing to the removal of Russian military men and inspection, in exchange for withdrawal of the quarantine and harrassing reconnaissance, would be their best deal. The US would, in that case, settle for that agreement.

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(4) The Soviets would, in the case of a quarantine, be under conflicting pressures to do something but not to overcommit themselves. They might risk an incident in challenging the quarantine, which would have to be strictly enforced. If they did undertake counter-pressure on access to Berlin, the existing contingency plans would be put into effect as necessary. The US would have to persevere in maintaining the quarantine until Castro cracked or capitulated, or the deterrent effect of our will to stand up to Soviet pressures and counterpressures in other cases would be badly undermined.

(5) It is possible that an effective quarantine would provoke an uprising. In that case, the US would support the uprising by whatever means are necessary, up to and including invasion, to insure its success. (This represents a new situation for which a different scenario applies.)

c. Alternative 2. If there is no military counteraction to the harrasing reconnaissance, and no other persuasive trigger for a quarantine, the US could undertake various measures designed to stimulate the Cubans to provoke a new incident.

(1) The US might initially intensify its reconnaissance with night flights, "show-off" low-level flights flaunting our freedom of action, hoping to stir the Cuban military to action.

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(2) The US might extend its actions to large scale leaflet drops, drops of agents, "CARE"-type packages delivered to known or possible guerrilla areas, and the like. This course might stir the Cubans to military action or induce them to agree to the US terms. It also might stimulate an uprising. In any of these cases the subsequent course of action would be clear, and would be to our advantage: either invasion if an uprising occurred or the Cubans undertook military action, or removal of the Russians and ground inspection if the Cubans agreed. If, however, the Cubans did not react, this kind of activity on our part would give them propaganda ammunition. Such measures must therefore be gradual, geared to world political reactions.

(3) Perhaps the US could use some drone aircraft as "bait," flown at low speeds and favorable altitudes for tempting Cuban AAA or aircraft attacks.

(4) Soviet politico-military counterpressures elsewhere, beyond a vigorous political offensive and propaganda, would not be likely. Soviet commitments to Cuba might rise at whatever time the Soviets decided we did not intend to escalate the crisis--perhaps a few weeks after the invasion force had been readied but not committed. It is possible that the Soviets might approach us privately with an offer of quiet withdrawal of their military men from Cuba in exchange for our dropping the harrassing reconnaissance (by implicitly accepting the U-2's only) and our demand for inspection.

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d. Thus, depending above all on whether the Cubans were or could be made to be trigger-happy, the development of the initial downing of a reconnaissance plane could lead at best to the elimination of Castro, perhaps to the removal of Soviet troops and installation of ground inspection in Cuba, or at the least to our demonstration of firmness on reconnaissance and, if our initial reprisal had eliminated all the SAMs, we would have greatly increased our future military freedom of action and political options.

7. ~~████████████████████~~.

If this course of action were to be pursued,

- (1) Medium and low level reconnaissance overflights of Cuba, on a scale paralleling present U-2 high altitude flights and as a supplement to them, should be instituted.
- (2) Authorization should be given for programs to reduce the present eighteen day period required for the generation of invasion forces, by pre-positioning some equipment, buildup of sealift, etc., so that the US would be able to support more quickly an uprising on the Island, if that were necessary.

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Addendum

We have considered the question of a fabricated incident and conclude that it would not be feasible or desirable to contrive a mock Cuban attack on a US reconnaissance aircraft. This plan applies to a genuine attack on a US aircraft over or near Cuba.

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE STANDING GROUP

Subject: Certain Cuban Contingencies

The Problem.

To capitalize on various Cuban provocations by taking reprisals to place pressures on, or to effect the removal of, the Castro regime.

A. Internal Revolt

1. An internal revolt could take one of two general forms: (i) a revolt within the structure of the existing regime or (ii) a revolt essentially outside the governmental structure against which the full power of the Government might be arrayed. In addition (i) might trigger (ii) or vice versa. Either might also involve Soviet troops in countering the insurgency. Any of these cases could provide the basis for increasing US military pressures to eliminate the Castro regime.

2. Case (i) is the most likely, and also the case most likely to succeed without outside intervention. It would draw its inspiration and support from nationalistic elements who had become disenchanted by the abject dependence of the regime on the Communist Bloc, isolation within the Hemisphere, deepening of the economic crisis, a threatened or actual Communist accession to complete control of the regime at the expense of the remaining members of the 26th of July Movement, or the death of Castro.

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3. Case (ii) might take the form of widespread disruptive behavior supported in whole or in part by elements of the militia, or an uprising in one of the mountainous areas which might attract local militia elements.

4. There are several variants to case (i), in particular:

(1) A "palace coup" either by hard-line Communists, or by members of the 26th of July Movement.

(2) A revolt by the Cuban armed forces or militia.

a. Palace Coup.

1) A palace coup by ~~hard-line Communists~~ might be the trigger for a counter-coup by ~~elements~~ of the armed forces or militia. Each of these cases has a great danger of involvement by Soviet forces, but presumably the Communist coup is most dangerous from this standpoint. Since the world is on notice that the US would tolerate no interference by local Soviet forces in an attempt by the Cuban people to throw off the Castro yoke, it would provide a platform for US intervention on behalf of the Cuban people.

2) A palace coup by members of the 26th of July Movement would probably arise from a broad conspiracy involving support from elements of the armed forces

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and militia. Such a coup might start with the assassination of Castro and a plea to the US to fend off intervention by Soviet forces. Clearly, if both Army and militia arrayed themselves against the putchists, the opportunity for US intervention would be fleeting. The attitude and actions of Soviet forces would vitally affect the outcome. The most favorable case for persistence of the coup would ensue if both elements of the Cuban armed forces supported them and the Soviets remained aloof. On the other hand, were the latter to intervene, the basis for forceful US action would be more solid.

b. Military Revolts.

Local or general revolts by the Army or militia coupled with attempts to seize the seat of Government or proclaim an alternate regime are possible quite apart from any links to a conspiracy within the regime. It is possible that an action within one of these elements might be the catalyst for similar action within the other. A militia revolt opposed by the Cuban Army and the Soviet troops would provide the least time for the US to react while the revolt was still alive. It is conceivable, however, that the revolutionists could take to the hills, prolonging resistance and giving us more time to react.

5. Popular Uprising. Case (ii), a revolt outside the governmental framework, could manifest general discontent through the appearance of a number of guerrilla bands operating at widely separated

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points and supported with food by the peasants. Alternatively, a single guerrilla leader, operating in a particularly disaffected province, might expand his operations to the point where the Government was compelled to react massively. Suffice it to say, in the atmosphere of present-day Cuba neither of these possibilities is very likely. The Government has an excellent surveillance network, both internally and with respect to the air and sea approaches to the Island, and the peasants as yet are unwilling to risk their necks until the Government's chances appear poorer than they now are.

B. Cuban Intervention in Latin America

1. A flagrant case of Cuban interference and violence in the internal life of another country (such as Venezuela or the Dominican Republic) could provide the basis for OAS sanctions, including a quarantine or perhaps a demand for inspection at Cuban ports and airfields. It would be difficult to use such an incident directly as justification for an invasion. However, in addition to the institution of a quarantine, the US could use the resulting tension as justification for a quiet buildup of the invasion force, and then use a new incident in quarantine enforcement, Cuban incursions on Guantanamo, or an uprising as justification for invasion.

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2. It might be desirable in preparation to highlight Cuban training and dispatch of subversives, instruction for sabotage, etc., as background for "the incident." The incident itself should be domestic, violent and quickly identified as part of a pattern of Castroist export of revolution which would threaten other Latin American governments. (A "one-two" series of incidents would excellently serve to underline this point.) In this manner, the need for a drastic quarantine would be established.

3. A quarantine should cover POL as well as all arms entering, and arms and "agents" leaving, Cuba; it should probably not cover food and medicine. In the long run, a POL blockade should be effective in disrupting Cuba internally. If Castro sought to negotiate an end of it, we should set an unacceptably high price such as unlimited inspection to verify no subversive training being undertaken, no arms shipments in or out (except returns to the USSR), etc.

4. An "uprising" in this situation would be similar to any other, except that the US would have been able to generate US invasion forces for its support during the blockade.

C. Incidents at Guantanamo

1. An incident at Guantanamo, such as a Cuban incursion, or cutting off of the water supply (the source of which is off the US reservation), could provide an opportunity for protective action

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beyond the perimeter of the base. In particular, restoring the source of water and protecting it from further interference would provide a reasonably good justification for the US to react with whatever degree of force was deemed necessary for this task. Assuming the Cubans resisted, the security of the element would justify broadened actions. This could come to involve pitched battles, and require US invasion.

2. Expansion and escalation from an incident at Guantanamo would be fully supported in the US and by some Allies, but it would have the political disadvantage of stemming from a US base held against the desires of the incumbent government. In general, justification based on protecting US rights would be less suitable than support to a Cuban uprising or strong action after Cuban export of revolution.

3. While the scenario of events following from an incident might escalate to full-scale US-Cuban combat, it might not. The Cubans might, at once or after some initial skirmishes, break contact and withdraw to permit the US to restore the water supply and even to keep guards outside the US military reservation. In that case, especially if the Cubans had offered to restore the water supply, it would be very disadvantageous for the US to appear to be "picking a fight" over a broad definition of our base rights.

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4. An uprising fortuitously located within range of US assistance from the Guantanamo Bay base would be militarily favorable, but it might appear to be contrived by the US.

D. Incidents at Sea

1. There are two categories of possible incidents at sea which might justify reprisal against Cuba:

a. Castroite hi-jacking of a Latin American vessel; or

b. Cuban naval attacks on or harrassment of a US or Latin American ship.

The former would not, in itself, seem to provide clear opportunity for reprisals of a direct effective nature. The latter could be met by attacking the offending Cuban vessels and perhaps counter-harrassment of Cuban ships with the possibility of an incident arising.

2. Escalation at sea might lead to US reprisal against Cuban gunboats in port as well as at sea, but unless such action led to shooting down a US plane it is difficult to see how it would justify US quarantine or invasion. If a US attacking aircraft (at sea or over a Cuban port) were attacked, we might start the scenario of reprisals against Cuba's air defense. Thus, an incident at sea could trigger the air defense scenario; otherwise, incidents at sea do not seem promising.

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6 May 1963


**MEMORANDUM FOR The Director, NRO**

**SUBJECT: Flight Following Arrangements for High Altitude  
Reconnaissance of Cuba**

1. The following information on this subject has been obtained from the Joint Reconnaissance Center in response to your previous request.

2. Currently the BRASS KNOB U-2 photographic flights over Cuba are supported as follows:

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


3. In the event of a hostile attack by interceptor aircraft the following information could be available.



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5. **SUMMARY.** The support presently being provided during BRASS KNOB operation is capable of supplying timely and comprehensive information concerning hostile actions taken against U-2s over Cuba. It may be expected that Washington authorities will be advised of the circumstances surrounding a hostile act within 5-10 minutes after the occurrence.



Therefore positive assurance that such a timely determination will be possible cannot be given.

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*Signed*

**John L. Martin, Jr.**  
Colonel, USAF  
Director, NRO Staff


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 UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
**OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP**

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS		
1	<i>Chief Director</i> DDCI	<i>Handwritten</i>	
2	DCI		
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	ACTION	DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
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**Remarks:**

This is an NRO summary of sources which might provide information on U-2 shootdown over Cuba as per request in connection with Cuban Contingency Plan.

H. Scoville, Jr.

Att: Control No. NRC 0129-63, dated 6 May

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FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
DD/R	5/8/63

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

In reply refer to I-35505/63

24 April 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: DOD-State Paper, "U-2 Flights, Cuba -- Contingency Plans"

Attached is a revision of the DOD-State paper incorporating all those changes recommended by JCSM 325-63 which were acceptable to me and the Secretary of State. You will note that subparagraph 3.d. has been reworded in such a way as to meet the concern of the JCS that there be no precommitment against an invasion of Cuba.

It is anticipated that the paper, in its present form, will be used for discussions with the President at an early date.

/s/ ROBERT S. McNAMARA

Attachment  
As stated above

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DOD-STATE PAPER

U-2 FLIGHTS, CUBA - CONTINGENCY PLANS (C)

1. Problem. The possibility exists that Soviet/Cuban forces may shoot down, or attempt to shoot down, a U-2 reconnaissance aircraft over Cuba. The purpose of this report is to develop a series of actions to be considered by the United States in advance of and after the event.

2. Facts Bearing on the Problem

a. U-2 flights are currently conducted over Cuba at the rate of approximately two sorties per day.

b. Alternative methods of carrying on surveillance are available but the quantity of data that could be obtained by these alternative methods is smaller than that obtainable with the U-2; thus, the available alternatives would not meet presently stated requirements. A prolonged hiatus in high altitude surveillance would be intolerable in view of the continuing Soviet option of reintroduction of IRBMs and MRBMs.

c. While not a certainty, present intelligence resources give a considerable degree of confidence that Washington should have reliable information on the destruction of a U-2 by a SAM shortly after the attack. There is also a probability that correspondingly reliable information would be available with respect to an unsuccessful firing of a SAM on a U-2. A possibility exists that a U-2 could be attacked by MIG aircraft using air-to-air rockets and special attack techniques. In this case also, information would probably be available promptly. However, there remains a possibility that a U-2 could disappear under circumstances in which we had no positive information on the cause of its loss.

3. Political Considerations

a. Balancing Objectives - The optimum objective with regard to this contingency is to deter the attack on the U-2 by giving private

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and public assurances that the US reaction to such an attack would be prompt, firm, and effective. The fundamental political judgment to be made in connection with the attack itself involves balancing the opportunity to make progress toward our long-term objective vis-a-vis Cuba (the overthrow of Castro's regime and elimination of Communism from Cuba) with our objectives vis-a-vis the US-USSR confrontation. The political and power realities, including the USSR's capability to react in Berlin or elsewhere, argue against arbitrary and unilateral action, without provocation, to eliminate Castro. The exploitation of contingencies is the only politically feasible means for taking steps, in the immediate future, to apply US military power directly to reduce Castro's power and influence. Yet obviously, no single contingency can be said to offer the last chance to move against Castro. Moreover, in any new major confrontation over Cuba the United States will be facing a Khrushchev who has reflected on the lessons of the missile crisis and who will be less likely to retreat before US power. Thus, the United States must consider the USSR's capability to react to a second Cuban crisis by actions in Berlin or elsewhere.

b. The context of the attack - It is judged that the USSR would be likely to deliver an official warning prior to an attack on a U-2. In the event that an attack is conducted, therefore, without advance warning, allowance should be made for the possibility that there was a failure of USSR command and control procedures by providing for a minimum response, initially, while attempting to ascertain Soviet intent by all means available. For the same reason, in a case where USSR responsibility is in doubt, the US might desire to take an initial public position that holds Castro rather than Khrushchev responsible.

c. Advance notification and consultation - Secretary Rusk has recently informed the North Atlantic Council of US concern that there may be an attack on a U-2 over Cuba. Consultation with our Allies after a Soviet warning or a Soviet attack probably would become known to the

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USSR. The longer the period of direct or indirect warning thus given to Khrushchev, the more opportunity he is given to make threats of retaliation from which he would find it difficult to withdraw, thus increasing the dangers of escalation, causing confusion among our Allies, and inhibiting their decision to support the United States. On the other hand prior knowledge acquired by the USSR could provide the deterrent effect suggested above. Moreover, once a specific indication of intent to attack is received, or an attack occurs, the retention of political support of our allies argues for as much notice as possible of our intentions.

d. Options - The plans which follow provide for a spectrum of response against the presupposed contingencies. The decision as to the specific degree of force to be applied within this spectrum is a matter for determination at the time of the attack on the U-2 and is dependent on evaluation of latest intelligence and the existing political dynamics. The removal of a facility of the same type (SAM, MIG airfield, AA battery) as the weapon which attacks the U-2 has the virtue of a limited, eye-for-an-eye retribution before the world. Retaliation against a single SAM site regardless of the type of the offending weapon retains the political advantage of a limited response and has the additional feature of orienting action against the weapons system we are most interested in removing.

Both of the foregoing options can be made relatively surgical in nature in order to provide minimum offense to the USSR. The elimination of all facilities of any one weapons system (SAM, MIGs, AA batteries) or all air defense systems would provide progressively larger steps toward the elimination of the Castro regime but might be considered of such proportion by Khrushchev as to make counter Soviet retaliation mandatory. It is also possible that the shock effect of such vigorous response could lead to a decision by the USSR to cut her losses and gradually withdraw from Cuba. US retaliation by elimination of one facility and subsequent

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large-scale surveillance at low levels deprives the US of required high altitude coverage and cannot safely be continued indefinitely.

Any of the foregoing options could be combined with a decision to reinstitute a partial or total quarantine. Total quarantine, if maintained, could serve to bring Castro down. At the very least, it would provide a negotiable application of force from which to bargain in the Security Council in exchange for Soviet concessions.

The foregoing options might be made more palatable to the USSR by (a) taking the public position that Castro had been the perpetrator of the attack; (b) renewing the US offer to work out on the ground inspection of Cuba and the Caribbean (coupled with a general settlement such as withdrawal of Soviet troops) to eliminate the need for future aerial surveillance; (c) making it clear that the foregoing reprisals were not intended as a prelude to an invasion. This would leave open the decision to invade if required in the event of escalation by Cuba or by the USSR in Cuba or elsewhere.

#### 4. Military Considerations

a. Prompt, but deliberate, retaliatory measures should be taken following the shooting down of a U-2 and, in certain circumstances, in event of an unsuccessful attack against a U-2. After certain precautionary measures are taken, including the evacuation of noncombatants from Guantanamo and the initiation of reinforcement of that base, it is feasible to make a retaliatory attack on a Cuban military facility or facilities at first light on the morning of the day following the shooting down of a U-2, weather permitting.

b. US response to an attack by SAM site, MIG, or AA battery should be against one or more Cuban military facilities. Where retaliation is to be taken against a single facility, it should normally be a SAM site selected to meet the following criteria: It should be as close as feasible to the location of the incident but should be selected for accessibility of attack and for isolation from populated areas to minimize noncombatant casualties.

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5. Range of Circumstances. In the event of the shooting down, or the attempted shooting down of a U-2 over Cuba, a wide variety of circumstances may attend the incident:

a. With public advance warning by the USSR either through press media or through official governmental communications and/or other indicators of imminent Soviet/Cuban action:

(1) Pre-attack

- (a) Public threat only
- (b) Covert indicators or official governmental communications.

(2) Unsuccessful attack

- (a) Demonstrable and persuasive evidence
- (b) Doubtful evidence

(3) Successful attack

b. Without public advance warning and other indicators of imminent Soviet/Cuban action:

(1) Unsuccessful attack

(2) Successful attack

6. Courses of Action to be Considered

a. With public advance warning by the USSR and/or other indicators of imminent Soviet/Cuban action:

(1) Pre-attack

(a) Public threat only - If the warning is limited to public threat, unaccompanied by confirming intelligence indicators of imminent Soviet/Cuban action, the United States should inform Khrushchev that the flights will continue.

(b) Covert indicators and/or official governmental communications - If advance warning is obtained through covert means and/or official governmental communications, with or without public warning:

U-2 flights should be suspended while military preparations

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are initiated by establishment of appropriate conditions of readiness in all US commands and readiness is improved for evacuation of noncombatants from and reinforcement of Guantanamo. The fact of increased readiness would almost immediately become public. U-2 flights should be suspended. Enemy intentions may be verified by flying target drones, for a limited time. If these drones are not fired upon, U-2 flights will be resumed. If the target drones are fired upon, consideration will be given to taking out all or selected SAM sites, or substituting photographic drones and low-level reconnaissance for U-2 flights. U-2 flights will be resumed where there is reasonable prospect that they will not be fired upon. Adequate surveillance of Cuba requires that any hiatus in U-2 flights be limited in time.

(2) Unsuccessful attack

(a) Demonstrable and persuasive evidence - In the event that public advance warning or other data provides demonstrable and persuasive evidence that an attack has been made, the United States should:

1. At the time of the decision to take reprisal action, declare appropriate conditions of readiness in all US commands (if not already in effect), and initiate evacuation of dependents from and reinforcement of Guantanamo.

2. Initiate military preparations for an attack early the next day.

3. Alternatives: Conduct the attack on one, several or all SAM sites. Before resuming U-2 flights, check enemy intentions by flying target drones. If these drones are not fired upon, U-2 flights will be resumed. If the target

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drones are fired upon, consideration will be given to taking out all or selected SAM sites, or substituting photographic drones and low-level reconnaissance for U-2 flights. U-2 flights will be resumed when there is reasonable prospect that they will not be fired upon. Adequate surveillance of Cuba requires that any hiatus in U-2 flights be limited in time.

(b) Doubtful evidence - In spite of public advance warning, an unsuccessful attack may occur in circumstances which make it impossible to provide demonstrable and persuasive evidence that an attack has in fact been made. In such a case, the United States should assess the situation in the light of circumstances existing at the time and apply flexible, selective measures ranging from no response to those measures specified in subparagraphs (2) (a), 1, 2, and 3, above.

(3) Successful attack

(a) At the time of the decision to execute reprisal attacks, the United States should declare an appropriate condition of readiness in all US commands (if not already in effect), and initiate evacuation of dependents from and reinforcement of Guantanamo.

(b) Initiate military preparations for reprisal action early the next day.

(c) Alternatives:

1. Alternative I - Conduct an attack on all SAM sites.
2. Alternative II - Destroy one SAM site; thereafter, until safety of U-2s can be assured, or for a limited time, fly only low-level reconnaissance and photo drones.

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b. Without public advance warning and other indicators of imminent Soviet action.

(1) Unsuccessful Attack

(a) In light of assessment made at the time, make military preparations by establishment of appropriate conditions of readiness in all US commands and by evacuation of dependents from and preparations for reinforcement of Guantanamo.

(b) U-2 flights should be suspended while these preparations are being made.

(c) After preparations are made, publicly announce that an unsuccessful attack was made.

(d) Execute reprisal attack against one SAM site; then either resume U-2 flights, or test enemy intentions with target drones. If these drones are not fired upon, U-2 flights will be resumed. If the target drones are fired upon, consideration will be given to taking out all or selected SAM sites, or substituting photographic drones and low-level reconnaissance for U-2 flights for a limited time. U-2 flights will be resumed when there is reasonable prospect that they will not be fired upon. Adequate surveillance of Cuba requires that any hiatus in U-2 flights be limited in time.

(2) Successful Attack

(a) At the time of the decision to attack a site, declare an appropriate condition of readiness in all US commands, initiate evacuation of dependents from and reinforcement of Guantanamo.

(b) Initiate military preparations for and conduct reprisal attack early the next morning on one or more of the SAM sites, depending on the circumstances.

(c) Execute reprisal attack against one, several, or all SAM sites. Before resuming U-2 flights, check enemy intentions

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by flying target drones. If these drones are not fired upon, U-2 flights will be resumed. If the target drones are fired upon, consideration will be given to taking out all or selected SAM sites, or substituting photographic drones and low-level reconnaissance for U-2 flights for a limited time. U-2 flights will be resumed when there is reasonable prospect that they will not be fired upon. Adequate surveillance of Cuba requires that any hiatus in U-2 flights will be limited in time.

e. Concomitant Political Initiatives. In each of the foregoing cases, the United States should consider concomitant political initiatives as follows (parenthetical portions that follow are applicable only to those cases in which a retaliatory attack on a site is to be made):

(1) Inform North Atlantic Council (immediately prior to attack).

(2) Transmit Presidential messages to Macmillan, Adenauer, de Gaulle, Fanfani.

(3) Inform Organ of Consultation of Organization of the American States of the situation and US intentions.

(4) Transmit instructions to USUN to inform Secretary General, United Nations at time of attack or clear warning and call for immediate Security Council meeting.

(5) Transmit message from President to Khrushchev - giving it simultaneously to Soviet Ambassador in Washington (deliver at time of attack).

(6) Issue public statement by the President, including message to the Cuban people (at the time of the attack).

(7) If the Soviets wholly or partially blockade Berlin in response to US retaliation, immediately convene Quadripartite Group to consider implementation of "Preferred Sequence" courses of action with respect to Berlin.

d. Subsequent Military Action. If strike aircraft used in the

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
retaliatory strike against a single site are shot down, additional retaliation action would be taken against appropriate Cuban targets.

e. U-2 is missing with confirmation lacking as to cause. No action should be initiated until there is confirmation that the disappearance is the result of a Soviet/Cuban attack; then the United States should proceed in accordance with subparagraph 6 a (3) or 6 a (2), as appropriate.

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File No. \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_

Subject *2 Cuban Patrol Boats*  
*harassing CG 95314*  
*Photo - 1-12*

*9* Location *?*



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
7CGD-042663-12 Date APR 26 1963

File No. \_\_\_\_\_

Subject *CG 95314, and Cuban*  
*patrol boat, incident,*  
*photos 1-12*

Location *?*

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
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7CGD  
File No. 22662-96 Date APR 26 1963

Subject CG 95314, being harassed  
by 2 Cuban Patrol Boats.  
Photo - 1-12.

Location

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Miami, Fla.

7CGD- 042663 - 01      Date APR 26 1963

File No. \_\_\_\_\_

Subject *Cuban Refugees in row boat  
and Cuban Patrol Boats, Harassing  
CG 95314 Photo 1-12*

Location *?*