

DM-  
10 May 1961

DEPUTIES' MEETING

Present: Mr. Dulles, General Cabell, Mr. Bissell, Mr. Amory,  
Colonel White, Mr. Helms, Mr. Barnes, Mr. Abbot Smith,

[REDACTED]

MR. DULLES:

a. Noted a cable [REDACTED] regarding the C-130B [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] and our proposal to substitute a C-54 therefor, and commented  
this was rather a short exchange [REDACTED]

He said this offer should be beefed up a bit and we should amend our  
proposal to "several C-54's!" Mr. Bissell agreed and remarked he  
would be willing to go as high as three. The Director concurred.

Action: DD/P

b. Noted an outgoing State Department Circular reviewing  
problems posed by the Castro regime, and asked that CIA Chiefs of  
Station at posts where this cable was received get in touch with their  
respective ambassadors with particular reference to paragraph 6.

c. Referred to the record of actions taken at the NSC meeting  
on 5 May 1961, and asked DD/P to follow up on any action required by  
CIA. Mr. Amory noted that a copy of the record of action in question  
had been sent to Mr. Bissell.

d. Noted there is a possibility the President may visit  
[REDACTED] and asked DD/P to take a hard look at the security implica-  
tions involved.

[REDACTED]

f. Asked DD/P to draft a cable to Admiral Dennison expressing  
appreciation for his support during the Cuban operation.

g. Stated he was not convinced that all is quiet in [redacted] and will remain so, and directed that a standby radio operator be assigned to our Station there. Action: DD/P

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GENERAL CABELL:

Noted a cable from Chief of Station, [redacted] reporting the possibility of a coup in [redacted] and suggested the Station Chief be instructed to advise President [redacted] of the information we have on this subject. The Director concurred. Action: DD/P

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MR. HELMS:

a. Reported that he had been advised by Jim Critchfield, CIA representative on the Iranian Task Force, that at its meeting yesterday Mr. Hilsman of State was of the strong opinion that a new estimate on Iran is needed and should be prepared by him and [redacted] [redacted] Mr. Helms said that Mr. Critchfield had suggested to Hilsman that this was a matter of primary concern to the estimators, and Hilsman had replied that the estimative machinery was "too cumbersome" and all that was required was for him (Hilsman) and [redacted] to roll up their sleeves and produce the estimate in the shortest time possible. Mr. Bissell noted that in his opinion Mr. Hilsman's proposal is wrong and the Director should bring our feeling on the matter to his attention. He pointed out that the Board of National Estimates and the military should not be left out in the preparation of any estimate and, further, that requests for estimates on any subject should be channeled through the DCI. Mr. Amory remarked that our 28 February 1961 estimate on Iran is a good one, is valid, and that at the moment [redacted] of ONE is working with Mr. Talbot and others in State in bringing it up to date. Mr. Bissell again stated he could not too strongly recommend that Mr. Hilsman be advised that intelligence contributions to task forces ~~a~~ pointed on a given area should be requested through the Director and handled by the established estimative procedures.


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[redacted]

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MR. BISSELL:



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MR. BARNES:

a. Reported that he had seen Arthur Schlesinger to brief him on  and believes Schlesinger now has the information he desired.

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b. Reported that the most recent  survey took the Cuban operation to task, stating it was particularly ill planned from the viewpoint of the invasion beaches selected. After some discussion, it was agreed that Mr. Barnes would take up this matter with Messrs.

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JSE