


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
DEPT OF STATE review(s) completed.

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Next 3 Page(s) In Document Exempt

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TOP SECRET
EYES ONLY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE UNDER SECRETARY

November 1, 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR:

[Redacted]

Central Intelligence Agency,
121 Administration Building,
2430 E Street, N. W.,
Washington 25, D. C.

STAT

I am transmitting to you certain materials from General Smith's files which are uniquely of interest to the Agency.

I should appreciate your holding them in a special file so that General Smith can refer to them if necessary.

Richard V. Hennes

Richard V. Hennes
Staff Assistant to
the Under Secretary

TOP SECRET
EYES ONLY

250139

SINGLE COPY - Please return to General
Smith's office.

*For action see telegram
to*

STAT

~~TOP SECRET~~



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

29 June 1954

EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR: GENERAL SMITH

TAB A

The following reply to your message to Ambassador Alexis Johnson has been received: this date:

"Appreciated your helpful and reassuring message. I am very concerned over control situation. Instructions so severely limit our role that [redacted] are inevitable moving out of conference into private conversations on this with result likely be even less satisfactory than if we could have participated more actively. Particularly hope you saw my Secto 511, Department Secto 485 and my Secto 538."

STAT

TAB B

TAB C

Tosec

Allen W. Dulles
Allen W. Dulles
Director

Document No. _____
 No Change to Class.
 Declassified
 Class. Changed to: TS (S) C
 Next Review Date: _____
 Auth: HQ 7A-3
 Date: 16 Oct 91 By: [redacted]

STAT

250139

TOP SECRET

June 25, 1954

EYES ONLY JOHNSON FROM SMITH

For your private information, since basic instructions transmitted TOSEC 138 were approved not only by President but also by Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs Committees, they tend to bind us to course of action which we may not be able to follow, in light of developments at Geneva and military deterioration in Indochina, and give Congress a certain lien on conduct of foreign affairs which Secretary does not want to continue indefinitely.

In order regain our freedom of action and to be in position to react with greater flexibility to whatever may be evolution of Indochina situation, without obligation to consult Congress, Secretary has decided basic instructions should be withdrawn and Congressional Committees informed that we no longer consider them in effect.

TOP SECRET

250139

25-21

SECRET

Action

Control: 11685

FE

Rec'd: June 23, 1954
3:30 p.m.

FROM: Geneva

Info

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: SECTO 511, June 23, 7 p.m.

G

SP

C

EUR

R

P

PRIORITY

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

With reference my SECTO 512 it seems to me situation is clearly moving rapidly toward Franco-Viet Minh agreement on respective zones of occupation under cease-fire, with almost complete lack of agreement on supervision. When agreement on zones reached, French pressures for effecting cease-fire are likely be so strong as to force virtual French capitulation to Communist views on supervision.

Must recognize Communist proposals on supervision very closely parallel those in effect in Korea, and French likely take view that they cannot prolong fighting obtain better terms than UNC agreed to in Korea in spite of differing situations. I am concerned over this situation and believe we should do all possible during this interregnum to forestall it, as well as not give French any grounds for accusing us of having prevented progress.

I therefore believe that we should generally be flexible on technical and procedural suggestions of French while reiterating and maintaining our position on basic substantive principles.

I think it very important that French have ready for use at an appropriate time a fully developed draft agreement on control so they are not at last minute maneuvered into position of being forced to work from a detailed Communist draft. I plan to discuss this with Chauvel tomorrow and attempt make arrangements for Colonel Dwan establish close liaison with French experts so as obtain clearer insight into French thinking and give us opportunity make suggestions.

Would appreciate any suggestions Department may have concerning other lines of action we might take.

JOHNSON

BD/6

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250139

OUTGOING TELEGRAM

Approved For Release 2003/04/25 : CIA-RDP80B01676R002500070011-8

Department of State

11015

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

SECRET

1954 JUN 25 PM 8 00

CC/T

SENT TO: Amconsul GENEVA TOSEC 485
RPT INFO: Amembassy PARIS 4828

27-21

3

Origin
SP
Info:
SS
G.
C
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LIMIT DISTRIBUTION
~~Reference~~ SECTO 511.

Agree with your analysis and reaffirm ~~our~~ belief ~~that~~ control commission should be provided by UN or alternatively by Colombo Powers. You should reiterate this to Chauvel and on every appropriate occasion warn him against any agreement which would place Communist satellite state on control commission.

Agree ~~that~~ French should have draft agreement prepared, preferably along lines consistent with our position. However we should not participate in preparing draft.

Dist. Desired
(Offices Only)

DULLES

Drafted by:

Telegraphic transmission and

S/P: EAGullion: PSA: PJSturm: tas
Clearances: 6-25-54

classification approved by:

Walter S. Robertson

EUR:WE - Mr. Tyler

S/S -

250139

SECRET

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

12/37

25-D

SECRET

Action

Control: 14005
Rec'd: June 28, 1954
2:38 p.m.

FE FROM: Geneva

Info SS TO: Secretary of State

G NO: SECTO 538, June 28, 4 p.m.

SP
C
EUR
UNA PRIORITY

R SENT DEPARTMENT SECTO 538, REPEATED INFORMATION PARIS 515,
P SAIGON 222, LONDON 329.

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION.

PARIS FOR EYES ONLY AMBASSADOR; SAIGON EYES ONLY CHARGE; LONDON EYES ONLY AMBASSADOR.

Chauvel this morning told me he had had further discussions with Kuznetsov when returning his call Saturday and also with Chinese Communists re control problem but nothing concrete had developed. Chauvel has impression Soviets are maintaining lead in matter of international control while Chinese Communists maintaining initiative re military conversations. Chauvel is asking Offroy (French Ambassador in Thailand and former diplomatic counselor in Saigon) to work on USSR June 14 proposal (SECTO 442) with view to preparing commentary which Chauvel may make at tomorrow's restricted meeting. (In this connection I again noted Colonel Dwan's knowledge of Korean armistice details and pitfalls could be made available to Offroy if desires).

I took occasion to stress point made into Section 485 re our views on inclusion Communist satellite state on control commission. Lamb (UK representative who was present for part of my talk with Chauvel) seemed support this point of view. We were generally agreed re Colombo powers but I have impression Chauvel estimates at least one Communist power may in end have to be accepted by France. Fact French; as one of belligerents, willing to submit to control of purely Asian group whereas other side demanded inclusion one or more European satellites of USSR evidence French good faith and gives good talking point on this issue. I urged "impartial" be used in referring control commission rather than Communist terminology of "neutral".

Chauvel is currently considering informally setting up without reference to conference a group of three (France, UK and USSR) at expert level to consider and compare current proposals on

control as 250139

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SECRET

-2- SECTO 538, June 28, 4 p.m., from Geneva.

control as well as negotiate ad referendum on this subject. Chauvel said Lamb somewhat reticent on this proposal and Chauvel is asking Paris to instruct French Embassy in London to urge it on Foreign Office. Chauvel very concerned existing wide differences on control and is trying to push toward agreement on details at least to point of refining issues for quick decision by ministers when they reconvene to consider reports of military conversations.

Chauvel reports military talks with Viet Minh on Saturday were unsatisfactory. Viet Minh allegedly worried about change in French Government and wishes assurance Chauvel, Brebisson and others fully qualified to speak for new government. Chauvel says he has reported this to Paris and expects following Cabinet meeting this afternoon, "it will be taken care of" but result, according to Chauvel is loss of two days in military talks. Further complicating factor is absence authorized representatives of new Vietnamese Government.

Re recently opened military discussions between belligerents in field, Chauvel stated that until talks here have made further progress he unable to see what can be achieved in field other than establishment of contact and necessary facilities.

JOHNSON

TT:BD/8