

CONFIDENTIAL

3 December 1957

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EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR:

[Redacted]

SUBJECT

: Inspection and Disarmament Proposals

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1. I read the two papers attached to ER 9-9045 with great interest. I am certainly in sympathy with the purpose of these proposals as summarized in your paragraph 1. I would recommend your suggestion that the Director read [Redacted]'s paper particularly because it does have ingenious aspects. He could also well read [Redacted] paper.

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2. One reason for suggesting that you pass [Redacted] paper to the Director is for the reason that it is almost certain to be discussed in certain official circles anyway. [Redacted] was a most important member of Doolittle's Air Task Force which worked on the Comprehensive Plan for Disarmament with Mr. Stassen. I'm confident that [Redacted] will have discussed this paper with Doolittle and that Doolittle will bring the suggestions to notice.

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3. [Redacted] may have dealt with policy problems to which there is no answer, but his approach is certainly an ingenious one. I will be glad to discuss this with you if you wish.

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[Redacted Signature]

General, USA (Ret)
Deputy Director (Coordination)

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Attached

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[Redacted] Proposal
[Redacted] Draft Letter

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D R A F T

12 November 1957

Dear Marshall Bulganin:

Since our exchange of letters, two highly significant events have commanded the attention of the world. One is felicitous for mankind - the other, ominously foreboding.

The happy event is the successful launching of the Russian satellite. I would be glad if, in my behalf, you would extend sincere congratulations to those responsible for this important achievement.

The tragic event is the failure of the disarmament negotiations to achieve any concrete success. Though differences have been narrowed, agreement still eludes us.

I am sure the implications of a continued technological race are clear and of heavy concern to you. The future will be tragic for humankind if technology remains harnessed to serve War, rather than Peace and the noble purposes of man and his God.

In this letter I would like to deal with specific actions pertaining to both these events. Some of these actions I am now taking, and others I would like to suggest for your consideration.

With regard to satellites and space flight, it would seem important that our scientists and engineers work together on specific projects wherever possible. Such measures will help

achieve an end we both prayerfully seek -- that space shall be used by men only for peaceful pursuits.

To this end, I would like to suggest that Soviet scientists launch some of the Vanguard satellites which our scientists have built for the I.G.Y. I believe such a joint project might produce certain scientific answers sooner than could either of our programs separately. It would also start us in joint endeavors for the peaceful exploration of space.

There is a second step which we should take immediately. As you know, during the recent disarmament negotiations we suggested that an international scientific group be convened immediately to study the technical problems involved in controlling the use of space for peace. Could we not take prompt action on the suggestion, and thus embark immediately on yet another joint effort in space affairs?

On the horizon lies the exploration of the moon and planets. We would be pleased to examine with the Soviet government the desirability of establishing a joint project to pool our resources for interplanetary exploration.

Additionally, the U.S. has under construction a satellite for aerial inspection, to supplement aircraft used for this purpose. We intend to commence test flights in 1959. Assuming that a U.N. Arms Control Agency is then in operation, we expect to make results from this inspection satellite available to that agency. In this connection your government might wish to

collaborate with us in making the best possible satellite inspection system available to the U.N.

By over-flying the U.S. with satellites, the Soviet government has also raised certain other questions. There is, of course, the legal question of national sovereignty in the upward direction. Undoubtedly an international group should be convened shortly to begin technical discussions on this subject.

Meanwhile, the U.S. Government will act on the only practical basis possible - namely, that national sovereignty extends as high into the air spaces as defensive military aircraft can operate and thus control. It has been pointed out that the situation is somewhat analogous to that which established the 3-mile sovereignty limit for international waters in relation to the range of coastal gun fire at that time.

However in this nuclear age, we cannot assume that higher overflights are for peaceful purposes. I therefore suggest that we immediately work out an arrangement to provide for the prior registration and inspection of all overflight vehicles above those air spaces which most nations can today control themselves and which therefore can be considered sovereign -- namely, the practical operating height of military aircraft.

As you know from my suggestions when we met in Geneva in July 1955. I deeply believe that mutual overflying of each other's territory can very beneficially serve the interests of Peace. Thus, in no way does the U.S. Government intend to

protest non-military overflights by the Soviet government, regardless of whether your satellites are used primarily for scientific observation of space, or for observation as in aerial inspection. It has been intimated that such observation of U.S. military activity is or will be accomplished by Soviet satellites and if so, I welcome this initiative by the Soviet government as a concrete step toward aerial inspection.

With further reference to the subject of disarmament, I would like to tell you of the actions the U.S. Government is now taking in an effort to break the dead-lock and bridge the slim remaining gap that unfortunately failed of negotiation in the recent parleys.

1) The U.S. Government has suspended all tests of nuclear weapons greater than 10 kilotons, provided that no other nation conducts such tests, provided that international inspection to control such a limitation is installed within one year, and provided that an agreement is reached and controls installed within two years so that henceforth all nuclear materials are produced for peaceful and not military purposes.

2) - - - Air Base in Alaska has been designated the port of entry for Soviet aerial inspection aircraft. From today, you may notify the Commander of that Air Base of the route from Siberia and estimated arrival times of your inspection aircraft. He will arrange with an official of your designation for re-fueling, maintenance, interim-landings of your inspection

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aircraft while over U.S. territory, for their inspection and the boarding of a U.S. monitoring official, and for the priority clearance of their flight plan through our air traffic control system to fly where you may like over the U.S.

3) I have ordered our aerial inspection overflights of the U.S.S.R. to commence today, but at altitudes ~~greatly~~ in excess of ~~practical~~ U.S.S.R. sovereign air spaces - that is, at altitudes considerably greater than those normally defended by Soviet aircraft. The special aircraft and balloons we have built for this peaceful purpose are of course unarmed, and will fly so high that most will probably not be seen, ~~let alone~~ ~~intercepted~~. But if they should have unforeseen difficulties, I am confident that the Soviet government will provide for their safe return.

Naturally, we would prefer to put our aerial inspection of the U.S.S.R. on the same basis as I have offered to you. But the above interim arrangement, which is disadvantageous for the U.S., will suffice until hopefully you may be able to designate a port of entry and arrange other particulars for normal aerial inspection.

4) I would like to turn now to the question of inspection at ground control ports which you urged upon me at Geneva. We are prepared to receive immediately up to 500 Soviet inspectors in the U.S. for one year and arrange for their posting to watch our military movements at airfields, ports, railway centers and

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other such points of your choice. The arrangement can be extended if within this period, we can install a similar number in the USSR, or hopefully negotiate a more complete international agreement that would extend the area and objects of such control, and would also provide for mobile ground inspection operations.

5) Within six months the U.S. government will reduce the number of its military effectives to 2,500,000. If the Soviet government takes similar action, and if we can install a mutually satisfactory inspection system to verify conventional force levels, then the U.S. is prepared to make a further reduction.

6) With regard to renouncing the use of nuclear weapons, the U.S. has already renounced their use except in self-defense. However, we stand prepared to clarify in an international convention just what is meant by their use in self-defense against both conventional and nuclear aggressions.

Further to advance disarmament action, I am today writing President _____ of the U.N. General Assembly to tell him of our plans to construct an inspection satellite and to offer its results to a U.N. Arms Control Agency. I will also tell him of an aerial inspection force which we are organizing to place under the control of such an agency, to cover areas of the world not inspected under mutual arrangements. I shall also point out that all results from U.S. inspection efforts will be made available to a U.N. agency, on request.

I feel sure you will regard sympathetically this action to break the disarmament deadlock and to move concretely to free technology better to serve mankind in his peaceful pursuits. If our collaboration to this end can be advanced by meeting to discuss comments you may have regarding the above, and our possible future actions, I will be delighted to meet under U.N. auspices with you and with the heads of such other U.N. Governments as may be appropriate.

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August 22, 1957

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To:

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From:

In our various discussions concerning methods of avoiding the results of a surprise attack, we seemed to usually return to the need for a "best interim solution." I thought I'd have a try at putting down on paper what this solution might be.

I. PROGRAM

- A. Capitalize on our unadvertised and unique inspection capabilities.
- B. Give away as many apparently important U. S. advantages as will impress the U. N. community and tend to confuse the U.S.S.R.

II. OBJECTIVES

- A. Reduce the fear of a surprise attack from the massive retaliation position we are in by breaking through the Iron Curtain and gaining vital surveillance and target information.
- B. Make use of our aerial inspection technological advantage before it becomes dangerously obsolescent or obsolete. We have the equipment, organization, including trained personnel, in being at this moment to implement the following program -- later these may not add up to a national asset of usable proportions.

III. DETAIL OF PROGRAM

- A. The U. S. government, as a matter of national policy, will periodically inspect the land masses of the U.S.S.R. and other nations with aerial reconnaissance devices. All aerial inspections of other nations' land masses will be announced by this government in advance to the U.N. with

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the course, altitude, and speed of the inspection device *will be*
(being) specified, provided that the nations involved on the
land masses being inspected have informed the U. N. that
they will take no hostile action against the inspection
device. In such cases a U. N. inspection of the aerial
reconnaissance device will be permitted prior to takeoff.

- B. The results of all U. S. inspection surveys will be made available to the U. N. and a U. N. inspection team may review the raw data. In the case of inspections over those land masses involving nations which have not informed the U. N. of their intentions as mentioned in A. above, the results of the inspections will be made available to the U. N. immediately after the inspection and no prior announcement of the details of the flight will be made.
- C. Simultaneously inform the U. N. that we unilaterally will suspend tests of all nuclear devices September 1, 1958. Invite the U. N. to send ground inspection teams to monitor our actions.
- D. We will unilaterally agree to report monthly to the U. N. on the size and lethality of our stockpile of nuclear weapons and will permit physical inspection of our storage sites by the U. N.

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cc: