

May 30, 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Secretary of State

SUBJECT : Disarmament Proposals: Intelligence Advantages
of a General Exchange of Blueprints

1. From the point of view of my responsibility as Director of Central Intelligence, I would like to set forth the reasons why I believe it is to the United States' advantage to broaden the exchange of blueprints of military forces and armaments beyond the limited Arctic-Siberian areas we now propose to include under inspection. One of the elements of the strength of the Communist world lies in their posture of secrecy. Any significant penetration of this secrecy will have substantial advantages to the Free World.

2. It is unlikely that, with certain minor exceptions and on a temporary basis, the Soviet would locate significant elements of their military forces and armaments within the limited Arctic-Siberian areas mentioned above. What we would gain, or the Soviet would lose, from such blueprints would be nominal.

3. An exchange of blueprints would not appear to be administratively unmanageable provided it is confined to a restricted number of designated items of real strategic importance. The selection of these would be a matter for the Department of Defense, but I have in mind such elements as modern jet bombers and fighters, naval vessels, major weapons such as heavy artillery, larger tanks, rockets and missiles, air bases with runways over 6,000 feet, possibly major factories producing military items, etc. If we concentrated on the major weapons and installations for which mass concealment is most difficult we would have at least made a start in the right direction.

4. The comparable data to be furnished the Soviet on U. S. forces and armaments would, I believe, merely confirm officially to them the data which is furnished in Congressional hearings and to the press.

TS # 164556

TOP SECRET

- 2 -

5. On the other hand the value of the blueprint we receive from the Soviets would be of some intelligence value even before it was capable of on-the-spot verification. Moreover, we believe that the present state of our intelligence on such key items as heavy bombers and submarines, for example, is sufficiently precise so that we could probably detect any seriously fraudulent figures. It is also highly probable that the Soviets do not know the respective degrees of certainty of our estimates on the various components of military forces and so would have a most difficult time if they attempted to fake their report in any major way.

6. Finally, if the Soviet propose to proceed to further steps of disarmament after the initial stage it would be extremely dangerous for them to start out in the first stage with fraudulent blueprints in areas where we already have considerable knowledge.

7. The original proposal regarding blueprints was eliminated when the 15% formula for international storage was changed to a provision for such storage of specifically designated items without regard to any percentage of existing blueprinted stockpiles. It seems to me, however, that entirely apart from this provision a modified formula for blueprint exchanges would present the Soviet with more problems than the United States, would give us relatively greater advantages and hence that the decision to eliminate this exchange, except for the general Arctic area, should be given further consideration before the final instructions are transmitted to London.

ALLEN W. DULLES
Director

cc: Secretary Quarles (#2)
General Cutler (#3)
Mr. Robert Bowie (#4)

AWD:at
Copy #5 - DD/I
Copy #6 - DCI ✓
Copy #7 - ER

